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The languages people use to communicate
with computers differ in their intended apti-
tudes, towards either a particular application
area j or a particular phase of computer use
(high level programming, program assembly, job
scheduling, etc*). They also differ in physi-
cal appearance
a
and more important in logical
structure. The question arises, do the idio-
syncrasic :< reflect basic logical properties of





The last decade has produced many areas of interest
within the field of computer science. This thesis is con-
cerned with the subarea of computer systems, and more
specifically the virtual design (abstracted from any par-
ticular physical hardware) for networks of asynchronously
operating digital computers. In addition to being appro-
priate for networks, the general design presented in this
thesis can be used to describe current logical operating
systems and can provide a framework within which to design
languages.
Early digital computers were very simple, had only
limited structures within which users could formulate
solutions to their problems, interpreted only simple

sequences of instructions, and were under the complete con-
trol of one user at a time. Input and output was normally
under user program control, and only minimal control func-
tions were provided such as test and skip en certain flags,
limited jumps, and instruction modification.
Users soon desired to construct more complex compu-
tations. More general control structures were introduced
along with ways of communicating between program parts.
Extended machine languages were developed to exploit these
new features. Users could now do more, and they soon
found that such tasks as the routine testing for external
interactions, were wasting much of their capacity. The
resulting concept of interrupt, which was "apparently in-
troduced with the UNIVAC 110 3" to obtain good input/output
(BN7D did away with this annoyance but introduced a more
complicated control structure. A well-defined program
organization was required so the users could cause the
processor to focus its attention on the appropriate pro-
gram part at the appropriate time, along with methods of
resolving logical conflicts due to the asynchronous ar-
rivals of these interrupts.
The need to improve system performance and lower
job costs by using parallelism, in conjunction with the
interrupt, resulted in multiprocessor computer systems.
The use of simple I/O processors caused the CPU to be

poorly utilized when only one user program was resident
in the machine at a time. Better CPU usage was achieved
with multiprogramming operating systems (time multiplexed
programs proceeding in a pseudo parallel manner). The
concept of digital "process" as a sequence of process
states was developed as the abstraction of these inter-
acting entities. Early processes were not very complex,
and although each process could proceed in pseudo par-
allel with other processes, little or no explicit inter-
process interactions were allowed. As users became more
sophisticated, more complex intraprocess state structures
and control operations were developed. The process state
normally includes both information to direct the processor
in its operations and the Information which the processor
manipulates in response to such directions.
The ability to create multiple processes soon led
to a desire to use a set of parallel processes to accom-
plish a single purpose thus requiring the support of more
general interprocess interactions. New problems were cre-
ated by multiprocess systems because of the need to share
resources. The physical system needed to multiplex its
physical assets to achieve some optimal goal, while the
logical processes needed to share logical resources (for
example, the information in files) amongst themselves




As experimentation with interprocess and system
user relationships proceeded, a need developed for the
management of uncooperative processes. If a user process
is completely isolated from all other processes including
the system, as was true in earlier operating systems , it
can be uncooperative and only ths user of that process is
affected. Such isolation is no longer feasible because
of the diverse user population which must now be served.
Many systems being developed are attempting to fulfill
these needs by permitting a use: 1 to construct multiprocess
computations and allowing substantial interprocess inter-
actions including the control of other processes.
The design of a computer system to support a gen-
eral user community can make no simplifying assumptions
concerning their reliability. It must allow for users who
are subject to making errors and who may even intention-
ally try to circumvent the system to achieve their own
goals. One of the essential concerns when designing a
general purpose system is that it be able to support such
potentially uncooperative processes while guaranteeing
the integrity of the system. As users employ more com-
plex interprocess interactions, they require access to
more complex facilities.
The delegation of such services and decisions to
the user process opens the way for the possibility of

5significant uncooperative behavior which the system can
no longer prevent. In order to prevent such behavior,
the system designer would have to make arbitrary a priori
decisions as to what is to be considered uncooperative be-
havior by all of the processes to run on that system. How-
ever, if interprocess interactions are permitted, only the
users of the system (through their processes) can decide,
in general, when uncooperative behavior has occurred with
respect to these interactions. It is impossible for the
system to prevent uncooperative process behavior without
imposing worse case restrictions on all processes.
The real need is to control the effects of such
uncooperative behavior by regulating the scope of the
effects of the interprocess interactions of each process.
If one process within a system claims another is being un-
fair, either some outside authority must arbitrate or they
must come to a joint solution, in which case they have
implicitly formed a joint authority. A generalization of
the system/user relationship is necessary if a network de-
sign is to permit delegation of the control of interesting
interprocess interactions. Users must be delegated the
authority to control the processes over which they have
responsibility. For example, a user process should have
the same ability to control the processes it creates, as
a time sharing system process has to control the processes

6it has created for users . Users must be provided a me-
chanism for exercising their authority, where the rules
of responsibility say it is appropriate , thus permitting
them to control the interactions of those processes which
they feel need be controlled. At the same time though,
those processes not under their responsibility, must be
provided protection from their authority.
One final need becoming apparent today is for sys-
tem designs to be portable. P. C. V/ithington (Wi72) makes
some interesting observations about future computer sys-
tems. He claims that because there will be significant
hardware cost performance improvements in the near future,
machine independent applications which are portable will
be more economical than "optimized" machine dependent
applications. Application systems would not need to be
rewritten solely because the physical hardware upon which
they are implemented is changed. He predicts that the
next generation will include network systems and then
forecasts that
the operating system will permit the network
of processing modules to be widely varied;
the user will be able to add, subtract, and
upgrade them individually, without undergoing
the pain of conversion. The •generation cycle'
we have become familiar with should end, and
orderly evolution should become the rule.
Today's software systems are very complex and can-
not be rewritten easily for a new hardware system. If
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writing everything for a virtual (not machine dependent)
system structure, and then implementing this structure on
new physical devices would far outweigh the inefficiencies
due to any specific implementation of that virtual system.
The implementer of such a virtual system could use trans-
lation, or Waite's macros (Ua70), to ease the implementa-
tion job, but the user would not have to be concerned with
the move. If the virtual system is augmentable, to meet
special needs, users may be able to gain some of the same
efficiencies they now geb by writing for a particular phy-
sical machine while still getting portability.
In order for portability to be successful, a clear
distinction must always be made between the virtual struc-
tures defined and the physical implementation of them.
The general acceptance of virtual address spaces and vir-
tual processors has proven that it is not necessary to re-
quire the logical and physical mapping to be 1-1. A gen-
eral design, that clearly separates the logical and phy-
sical systems, is necessary if portability is to be
achieved. Only then does the design not become con-
strained to a particular type of machine (perhaps at the
cost of sacrificing some specific efficiencies of each
machine)
.
With the advent of networks, composed of different

8kinds of digital computers, transportability becomes even
more imperative. If the complex is to be a useful vehicle
for sharing resources, then the whole network must provide
a consistent face to the user. Even if all of the communi-
cation interfaces are the same, the users will be reluctant
to exploit the network if they must interface with a dif-
ferent operating system at each node. A user may wish to
move a process between nodes. This means a standard inter-
face must be defined for user processes, at a level which
assume no particular physical architecture or devices.
The virtual system designer should not define what par-
ticular physical resources the implementer must have. The
implementers of the virtual system must be given the flexi-
bility to select those physical resources which permit them
to optimize their implementation subject only to local man-
agement constraints. If hardware is developed which will
improve their implementation, they should be able to use
it without requiring any change in the logical system the
user sees. The only effect on the user should be a change
in the cost performance.
Current Work
Since it is impossible to discuss all of the litera-
ture relevant to this thesis, attention will be focused
primarily on those systems which represent the logical
structure within which users define their problems and

not physical implementation or application problems. Since
the COSINE report (Co7D contains a general discussion of
the area of operating systems and provides an introduction
to many of the terms that will be used in this review of
current work, no real effort will be made to define speci-
fic terms here, Those terms which are used in later chap-
ters will be explained and defined at that time within the
context of the network being developed.
Of primary interest in this thesis are those works
which deal with networks of digital computers, the process
state structures supported by systems, and the operating
environment provided for user processes. This includes
the concepts of control and parallelism, the interactions
among processes, and the ability of a user process to man-
age resources. Papers dealing with the protection and al-
location of logical resources and with portable systems
are also of interest. The remainder of this section will
attempt to survey some of these areas to indicate the logi-
cal structures currently being used.
Networks : Networks of general purpose digital com-
puters are becoming accepted as a viable way to provide
computer services, and interest has developed in how to
exploit such networks to allow increased availability of
physical and logical resources. Farber (Fa72) defines a
computer network as "an interconnected set of dependent
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or independent computer systems which communicate with
each other in order to share certain resources such as
programs or data and/or for load sharing and reliability
reasons*"
The April 1972 Datamation from which the above
quote was taken provides a brief introduction to seven
"typical networks" and some of the problems involved in-
cluding organization and management of such networks.
Farber's article discusses the networks with respect to
organization, composition, number and geography of nodes,
machine sizes,, and communication interfaces. Companion
art.1c.les by Stefferud (St 72) and. Hootman (Ho72) look at
networks from a manager's point of view, including such
questions as "who is management," "where it resides," and
network economics. None of the articles discuss what
operating system structures must be provided in a network
to fulfill these responsibilities, and none of them make a
clear distinction between the physical systems and the
logical systems which will be using the network. Imple-
mentation management problems relating to the accounting
of physical assets is included, but not how the logical
processes will be able to manage logical resources dis-
tributed over the network. The desire of users to create
multiprocess computations and manage logical resources by
user defined techniques is being overlooked, even though
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it appears this may be desired more in a network than in
current systems. Although the technical interconnection
problems "shov; promise of being solved" (St72), the pro-
blems of how to u.se networks, and the political and man-
agement problems, must also be solved before a user will
be able to write interesting and useful general systems
which can exploit networks.
Information concerning the "ARPA" network is the
most readily available. Two series of papers (CC70 S HK70.
RW70) and (CH72,OH72 ,TH72 ) , along with some companion
papers, provide a fairly complete discussion of it. The
purpose of ARPANET was to provide "a network that would
allow for the interconnection > via common-carrier cir-
cuits, of dissimilar computers at widely separated. ARPA-
sponsored research centers" (OH72).
Each node has an IMP (Interface Message Processor)
which "acts as a nodal switching unit and also inter-
connects the research computer centers" (HOSTS) (OH72).
Originally, a user accessed the network only through a
HOST, but it soon became desirable to provide direct
terminal access which was done using a Terminal IMP (TIP).
The TIP provides the services of connect and disconnect to
remote sites, and then becomes transparent to the conver-
sation between user and HOST. It is not the intention of
this thesis to go into the implementation problems of
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HOST to HOST communication. The interested reader is re-
ferred to the papers for a more complete description of
these problems.
"The growth of the network has dynamically cata-
lyzed an area of computer science which has to do with
the quite general problem of how programs should inter-
communicate, whether in a single computer or between com-
puters" (01172). In the ARPANET, an attempt was made to
provide a general mechanism allowing user-level process-
to-process communication (CII72). Interprocess communica-
tion is carried out in a simplex manner using one of the
256 logical connections. Since each HOST in the network
names its own processes, "sockets" provide a unique name
in a name space divided among the IIOSTs. Each HOST then
maps socket names onto the processes. Processes are cre-
ated according to procedures local to their respective
HOSTs, and must interface with a network control program
(NCP) resident in each HOST to be able to communicate. If
the conversation between processes is to be duplex, two
connections must be made.
A process uses local operating system calls to tell
the NCP to send a message to a specific socket. The NCP
interacts with the ARPANET to send the message to the re-
ceiver's HOST NCP, which then uses appropriate system
primitives to deliver the message to the process with the
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destination socket. One major weakness of the ARPANET is
that "System calls will vary from one operating system to
another" (CC70). The ARPANET has no concept of a network
operating system it provides for its processes.
Pro c ess : The use of the term "process," as a con-
cept relevant to computer systems became common in the
literature as a result of its use by two separate groups:
project MAC at MIT used it in 1964 as a "precise concept
in discussing design problems of mult ipre grammed computer
systems" (De?0) and Dijkstra used it in 196*5 v'tien he pub-
lished his work on "Cooperating Sequential Processes"
(Di67). It is somewhat surprising that the connotations
of the many formal and informal definitions of process
are similar even though each definition was designed to
fit within a certain context. A survey of these defini-
tions can be found in the introduction to Horning and
Randall's "Process Structuring" (HR7D. Their definition
of process is as follows:
A triple (S, f, s), where S is a state vari-
able set, f is an action function on that set,
and s is the subset of the state space of S
which defines the initial states of a process.
A process generates all the computations gen-
erated by its action function from its initial
states.
Fitzwater and Hintz (FH71) present a definitional
system which allows the designer to represent a process
state, define a processor, and then validate the design

by observing the system behavior as the processor works
on that state. Their definition of process is an rinter-
pretation sequence of process states," This definitional
system is useful because it relates processes to the con-
cepts of system 8 complexes of such systems, and asynchro-
nous communication between the members of this complex.
This system is convenient for providing a formal defini-
tion of a design to remove any ambiguities*
A digital computer system has the property that
there is one or more points in its execution sequence at
which its state can be observed and its behavior studied.
A process state normally contains a process name space
or data part, and a program part which directs a proces-
sor in its transformation on the process state.
Although the AHPA papers talk about creating a
process in a HOST system and allowing processes in separ-
ate HOSTs to communicate using the network, there is no
formalism of the properties of a process or of its states.
Each system is controlled by the physical system manager
and there are no network operations, other than communi-
cation, by which one process can interact with a process
in some other system.
Although identifiable processes, as components
in computer systems, were originally very simple, they
have become more general and more complex. Dijkstra
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(Di65, 67,68,71) has investigated logical process coopera-
tion, when no restrictions exist on their relative speeds,
The cooperating processes have access to one or more var-
iables, which they can cooperatively check to see whether
or not to proceed into a "critical section." Although a
process may have to wait logically on other processes be-
fore entering its critical section, it proceeds asynchro-
nously at all other times.
Numerous recent designs use the concept of a pro-
cess in describing their system. "THE" (Di68) is a "so-
ciety of sequential processes with undefined speed ra-
tios" where "harmonious cooperation is regulated by means
of explicit synchronizing statements." Alsberg's (A17D
"OSL/2" is an implementation of Dijkstra's hierarchial
concepts in which a process can create and monitor new
processes, thus becoming an operating system for them.
"ESOPE" (BB69) permits processes to interact via inter-
process communication and control other processes by using
activate, block, create and destroy. "TENEX" (BB7D per-
mits a user to create a process tree hierarchy with mul-
tiple simultaneously runnable processes where a parent
controls the children. The "RC^OOO" system (Ha7ia) is
basically a "monitor that can be extended with a hier-
archy of operating systems." Any program can initiate
"other programs in a hierarchial manner and execute them
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according to any strategy desired," In all of these sys-
tems j a. process is normally considered as a potentially
asynchronous executable entity with communication some-
times possible between it and other processes in the sys-
tem.
Control; Some concept of control (what is to be
done next) is present in one form or another in all sys-
tems and computer languages. When talking about programs
Dennis (DV66) describes a "locus of control" and Denning
(De68) a "thread of control." With respect to multipro-
gramming and multiprocessing systems, control may be con-
sidered as the switching of the attention of the proces-
sors among the various programs in the system, and can be
described at various levels of abstraction (for example,
machine instruction execution, program instruction se-
quencing, or multiprogramming).
Fisher (Pi70) says "the control structure of a
programming language is its sequencing or interpretation
rules and as such provides a programming environment which
encompasses any task within that language." He goes on
to say that there is a need for more than a "step by step"
concept of control so the "point of view" with which pro-
blems can be attacked is not constrained. Both his intro-




Control structures in most early computer languages
were not much more complex than the machines upon which
they were designed to be run. One instruction was se-
quentially executed after another with conditionals, jumps,
and later subroutine jumps as their only control mechanisms.
Systems were normally dedicated to one user at a time,
and it was only to provide services for the convenience
of the users that a basic operating system was developed.
Although operating system designers soon included concepts
of system/user relationships, multiprogramming, and
multiprocessing, there was little development of languages
containing such concepts.
SIMULA (DN67) introduced the concept of coroutine
and SIMULA 67 (DM68) extended this to "quasi-parallel sys-
tems," Nested blocks similar to SIMULA main blocks were
allowed, resulting in a tree of nested coroutines. "Task-
master" (FM65a, FM65b) (a real time system) similarly or-
ganizes its tasks in a tree structure. Every Taskmaster
task has several ALGOL like statements which may receive
control directly from the scheduler, or as a result of
clock or outside interrupts, rather than sequentially from
other tasks. A significant disadvantage of "Taskmaster"
is the requirement that all users cooperatively return




Dijkstra's work with cooperating sequential pro-
cesses has interested researchers in the definition and
implementation of systems permitting process interactions,
along with the associated problems of mutual exclusion and
synchronization. The implementation of "P&V" type opera-
tions usually is based on having only one physical pro-
cessor or a sharable memory (OSL/2 (A171), ESOPE (BB69),
OREGAITO (BE71)
S THE (Di68), Venus (L17D). Efficient im-
plementation of "P&V" operations j, when these assumptions
are not true, might be difficult. Other systems permit
interprocess interactions through a form of logical com-
munications other than the use of shared variables (GE600
(BD69), TENEX (BB71), ARFA). One example of how the solu-
tion of "critical section" problems using "P&V" operations
could be difficult to implement (on a multiprocessor sys-
tem), would be when the processors are using a "cache"
like buffer memory. There is normally no update of the
information buffered by one processor if another processor
changes a buffered variable. Special features would have
to be introduced just to handle the "P&V" operations. The
ARPANET was forced to U3e a message system instead of
"P&V" type operations for interprocess communications
since processes could reside in different HOSTs which did
not share memories. Wirth (Wi69) complains that "P&V"
may be too primitive anyway, since the synchronization of
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loosely connected processes naturally consists of the in-
terchange of messages, as is done In ordinary life.
Mo3t systems do not guarantee either the order of
execution or the length of time a physical processor will
be applied to eaeh process. Individual processes effec-
tively proceed asynchronously, except through their own
explicit logical synchronization. For example, a common
way of handling interprocess communication is by synchron-
izing the two processes through such primitives as block/
wakeup or block/cause (BD69, SO69). Requiring a process
to go to sleep, when waiting for a message, implies a sin-
gle thread of control in a process and no logical inter-
rupt facilities. Wirth (Wi69) feels this is good because
"The interrupt effectively consists of the insertion of
one or several instructions at points of the program which
can neither be foreseen nor reconstructed." On the other
hand, it prevents the process from doing other work while
waiting for messages. OSL/2 (A17D has no concept of an
interrupt at the logical level, and as the author points
out, must be completely "command driven." Rose (Ro7D is
the only author who specifically discusses "multi-threaded"
processes, although multiple threads are implicit in the
few systems which do allow transfer to a specific address
for the delivery of a message.
System-programmers recognized early the usefulness
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of faults (error conditions which occur during the execu-
tion of an operator in a processor), and interrupts (sig-
nals from sources other than the processor itself) but
user application languages have been slow to include such
concepts. PL/I (IB68) introduced the "ON condition," but
most other languages have no such feature. Needham (Ne7D
feels that all faults should be handled within the process
using a crapping mechanism. As a general mechanism, he
says a process should have a "catastrophic address'* to
which control is transferred when all else fails. The
major problem with most present implementations of faults
is that they are not handled by the user in the environ-
ment in which they occurred, but are treated as interrupts
to independent environments. This distinction only becomes
essential in multiprocess systems. The system designer
cannot expect to know everything each user wants to do,
and therefore can implement only arbitrary design decisions
in such system provided fault handling routines.
Interactions and Resources : Early computer systems
were not concerned with interprocess interactions since
they supported only one process (user) at a time. As sys-
tems became more complex, the number of concurrent users
increased, and the amount of resident information accessi-
ble to the executing processes increased. Uncooperative
process behavior by design or default became a dangerous
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potentiality, and the control of interprocess interactions
became a necessity. At first the trend was to isolate the
process completely, both logically and physically, but it
soon became apparent that suitable facilities had to be
provided to permit processes to interact.
Since interprocess interactions (mutual or recipro-
cal action or influence of one process on another) will al-
ways exist, some form of protection must be provided. A
good overview of process protection can be found in Co71
and De71. Most computer systems, designed for multipro-
gramming provide some control over process interactions,
such as privileged instructions or memory protection. For
example, the IBM 360 memory hardware protect and the Mul-
tics (Or72) segmentation binding within a ring, were de-
signed to limit a process's access to its logical address
space regardless of where it resided physically. Use of
a hierarchical directory, with the system checking access
rights, is the usual way of protecting user files. One
problem in Venus (Li7D is the lack of segment protection
which requires but cannot ensure that all processes be co-
operative. Most of the other systems make use of disjoint
logical process address space (GE600 (BD69), ESOPE (BB19)).
TENEX (BB71) and Multics (Or72) integrate the file system
into the virtual process address space, binding segments
to a logical name only at execution time. They hope to
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make sharing of data and procedures simpler since two log-
ical names can be used by different processes, and can be
mapped onto one physical name representing the shared in-
formation. One of the major difficulties of permitting
interprocess interactions only through shared segments is
that the occurrence of race conditions is encouraged, which
must be solved by expensive coope ration, and requires phy-
sical systems to always provide a way of sharing memories
even in a network. Interprocess interactions using com-
munication do not have this difficulty.
Achieving process protection by using separate logi-
cal address spaces, created a need for sharing logical en-
tities. The concept of a logical resource which can be
passed to a process was developed. Which entities are to
be considered resources, and which processes are to be per-
mitted to have them, is highly dependent on the level of
abstraction with which the system is being managed. Until
recently resources were defined primarily in terms of their
mapping onto an implementation. The introduction of multi-
programming, and the concepts of virtual machines and
virtual address spaces, have begun to separate what the
process manipulates from the resources the implementer
manipulates. Pnysical resources such as space are manipu-
lated by the implementor, and logical resources such as
files are manipulated by the logical processes.
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Some systems ars beginning to permit processes to
manipulate resources. In "Venus" (Li71) cooperative re-
source management is used. In "Multics" (Or72), programs
and information can be shared freely at the will of the
user* In "ESOPE" (BB69) a set of resources is allocated
to each user, and it is up to the set of user processes
to share them. Gaines (Ga71) limits a child to a subset
of its parents* resources, as does the RC 4000 (Ha?la)
system.
With the advent of suballocation of resources,
theoretical work on the protection of logical objects be-
comes much more important. Vanderbilt (Va69) controls
access to shared items by executing certain objects with-
in a data structure language he has developed. Lampson
(La69, 71) is interested both in the theories of protec-
tion and in implementation problems such as "how can in-
formation which specifies protection and authorizes access,
itself be protected and manipulated?" His theory suggests
that objects be named by capabilities, access be granted
to these objects by keys. A process then can be con-
sidered to execute in a domain (group of capabilities),
and entry between domains can be protected by "gates" thus
giving a process different powers in different domains.
Graham (Gr71a) extends this work, and discusses the pro-
blem in relation to "Sue." Conway (CM72) suggests another
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implementation model where the matrix elements "are deci-
sion rules t '' He makes a distinction between data depend-
ent and data independent rules which can be exploited by
checking the data independent security once at translation
time and then checking only the data dependent security at
execution time.
The protection of objects Is imperative, and any
general logical system must provide some technique for
doing this. A decision must be made as to which objects
are to be protected, the means of protecting each, and
the rights of the owners of such protected objects. A
design cannot be considered as properly supporting unco-
operative processes unless protection is provided for all
interactions,
Cooperative Management of Uncooperative Processes :
Most systems today lack a general mechanism, which the
process can invoke, for handling uncooperative processes,
particularly when the process to be controlled may exist
in some other system in a network. To be able to do this,
mechanisms must be provided to allow for accountable re-
source allocation and for control (possibly remote) of
interprocess interactions. Recently there have been
several logical system designs which have partial solu-
tions to some of these problems, but they are too special-
ized to satisfy all of the requirements (processes which
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must share address space to interact, cannot be completely
Isolated)
.
The definition of uncooperative behavior between
interacting processes is only possible from the point of
view of the authority over such processes. Several de-
signers have included process hierarchies in their systems
which permits a process to control its own subprocesses.
Since the difference between operating sys-
tems and production programs is one of juris-
diction only, this problem is solved by ar-
ranging the internal processes in a hierarchy
In which parent processes have complete con-
trol over child processes. (Ha70)
A child can only be created, started, stopped, and removed
by a parent who supplies the resources and gets them back
when the child is removed.
Gaines (Ga71) is interested in "what happens if a
process derails," and TENEX (BB71) has an "inverted tree
defined by the capability for direct control and killing."
"Although not completely general, a tree structure process
hierarchy implicitly provides the protection and reference
facilities that are wanted in most applications." One of
the design goals of TENEX was that "the system should en-
courage and facilitate cooperation among users as well as
provide protection against undesirable Interactions."
There are three areas which might be considered deficien-
cies if this system was to be considered as a network
structure. First, processes are permitted to communicate
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via shared memory, which is difficult if the hierarchy is
distributed over nodes of the network. Second., each "Job"
is a separate hierarchy, thus limiting some of the general
interprocess cooperation which might be desirable. Third,
the system does not provide for logical resources to be
allocated down a hierarchy with guaranteed protection.
Portability; If useful portability is to be possi-
ble, each system must maintain a strict separation of logi-
cal and physical resources, and the logical system that a
user sees should remain invariant over moves to different
physical systems. Landin (La66) says "The physical/logical
terminology is often used to distinguish features that are
a fortuitous consequence of physical conditions from fea-
tures that are in some sense more essential," Given any
specific logical structure to implement, the implementer
usually has many ways to do it. The fact that the physi-
cal system is effectively finite usually requires certain
constraints in the logical processes. For example, "THE"
(Di68) requires all processes sharing system resources to
state, before the request is made, what their maximum
needs for each type will be.
Although, within the concept of a virtual processor,
users cannot directly control many of the physical resources,
virtual processors as currently used do not solve the prob-
lems of portability because the virtual processor usually
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has an extremely close relationship to the physical pro-
cessor on which it is implemented. Recently several sys-
tems have been implemented using a layered hierarchy of
systems or "onion skin" structure, Portability is then
achieved by designing a logical structure at the user's
interface and then implementing this structure as a lay-
ered hierarchy of more abstract virtual machines with the
outermost layer being the logical system the user sees.
Project LOGOS uses this structure (Br72, Gl"2a, b t HR72,
RB72). "The concept of a layered hierarchy of machines
is consistent with some current trends in system archi-
tecture and applies to both hardware and software of a
system. Thus the hardware/software split can be postponed
in the design process, allowing greater flexibility of
implementation." Several systems have used this technique
in their implementations ("THE" and "Venus"). The design
of a logical network which is abstracted from any particu-
lar machine permits different network facilities to imple-
ment the design using any desired number of hierarchies
of systems. Using this technique, the implementer may
find that it is only the lowest levels of the hierarchy
which need redefining. Regardless of what the facility
implementer must do to provide the system, the user will





Any general but useful design for networks of digi-
tal computers must solve the problems of network managea-
bility, generality, and portability. The network designer
must determine which decisions should be built into the
design, and which should be delegated to the users or the
implementers to make at a later time. The more decisions
built into a network design, the less adaptable the net-
work will become and the less freedom the user will have
to create optimal process relationships. A solution,
which does not result in arbitrary or unnecessary con-
straints on the network users or implementers, is to de-
sign into the system itself, only the choices necessary
to permit the network designer to delegate all other de-
cisions to either the users or the implementers.
The system designed in this thesis, provides suffi-
cient factorization of responsibilities and delegation of
authority to control the behavior of the processes running
in the network, to permit the development of a network
which satisfies the following postulated constraints.
1. The designed network must consist of a set of
interacting bounded programmable digital computer systems
with well-defined processes, and be open to communication
with foreign systems having undefined processes.
2. Responsibility for meeting the postulated
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design constraints and the design decisions must be fac-
tored between the network, implementation, and process de-
signers.
3* Each designer must have sufficient authority to
control the effects, on the processes running in che
network, of the interactions for which that designer has
been delegated responsibility.
4. Although processes must be permitted to dele-
gatr to other processes their authority to control process
Interactions
s
the delegating process always retains re-
sponsibility for that interaction and the authority to
control the process to which it was delegated.
5. The network definition must provide for modifi-
cation of its definition. The design must provide suffi-
cient constraints to be able to delegate safely to process
designers all modification decisions and authority to con-
trol the effects of such decisions on the processes in the
network.
The postulated constraints must always be satisfied
when design decisions are made in this thesis. Those de-
sign decisions influenced by the postulated constraints
must be shown to provide the greatest generality consist-
ent with the postulated and derived constraints. Those
decisions which are not directly influenced by the con-




Chapter 2 of this thesis contains the development
of a set of constraints within which the network deci-
cions will be made. The postulated constraints are moti-
vated first, and then additional constraints, which follow
directly from them, are developed. The third chapter de-
velops and informally defines the network design consist-
ent with the constraints developed in Chapter 2. Chapter
H uses the network structures to describe several other
representative systems, discusses both the implications
of this work, and of other work being done in parallel
with this thesis, and describes some of the areas which
deserve future i^esearch. A formal definition of the de-
signed network is given in Appendix C.
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Once a satisfactory set of criteria
and postulates has been formulated, then
one may deduce, rather than design, the
structure of a computer (Van Horn, Va66,
p. 227).
CHAPTER 2
NONCOOPERATION - THE SOLUTION
Introduction
The previous chapter described some of the problem
areas associated with current networks and systems, along
with some of the present approaches to solving those prob-
lems. This chapter will develop a set of design con-
straints sufficient to allow the solution of network man-
agement problems arising from the inclusion of general
control structures, potentially uncooperative processes,
and portability of user processes and the design itself.
The problem of process noncooperation will be looked at
briefly, and the postulated constraints will be motivated.
Additional constraints, which define the delegation of
authority to control certain process interactions, will
be developed from the postulated constraints.
A solution to the problem of process noncooperation
is necessary if a network designer is to be able to give
process designers responsibility and authority to control
the processes in the network. A direct approach to the
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problem of process noncooperation Is difficult because
there Is no objective point of view from which to decide
that noncooperation exists. What is considered coopera-
tive by one process designer
s
might be considered uncoop-
erative by another. A final judgment, by definition, can
only be made by the proper authority, which might exist
as a single designer or cooperatively as joint designers.
Three levels of authority exist in most computer systems
today: user, operating system, and implementation. One
of the major problems, usually encountered in cur-rent sys-
tems, is the lack of a clear factorization, between these
three groups, of the responsibility for the control of
process behavior and authority to do so, Operating sys-
tem and implementation designers (commonly Indistinguish-
able) often know very little about what the user intended
a process to do, and therefore can only make general as-
sumptions about it when trying to manage its behavior.
It is unlikely that tho network designer will ever
know all viewpoints from which to judge process noncooper-
ation since this would require complete knowledge of what
all users of the network were logically trying to accom-
plish. Analysis, by the network designer, of process non-
cooperation would only lead to ncnformal systems and a
philosophical discussion. The network designer should not
make arbitrary decisions for the user by decreeing which
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process actions are to be considered cooperative 3.nd which
are not, but should provide services to the appropriate
agent responsible for that process to make the decision.
The key to the problem of process noncooperation
is that there must be at least two interacting parties be-
fore cooperation or lack of it can have any meaning. It
takes at least two marching soldiers before they can be
out of step. The one declared out of step is clearly not
the ranking authority unless it was a cooperative self
declaration because of incompetence. If all interactions
in the network can be recognized, and a safe means pro-
vided by which they can be controlled, the network de-
signer can delegate responsibility and authority for the
management of such interactions to other agents. A logi-
cal state structure, as distinct from a physical imple-
mentation of it, must be imposed on the processes along
with the definition of appropriate transformations on
these states, so that the effects of all process opera-
tions are known. If the scope of the effects of a pro-
cesses' potential noncooperation is well-defined, respon-
sibility for process noncooperation can be delegated to
the processes concerned. (Well-defined: Something is
considered well defined if it has been formally defined
and the definition holds over all systems in the network.
)
If process designers are to be delegated the
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responsibility for controlling process noncooperation, me-
chanisms must be provided within the network design for
the control of process interactions through which the
effects of noneooperation can be transmitted. As systems
became more complex, more than one dimension of responsi-
bility and authority for the control of processes devel-
oped. Users of early computers had complete control of
the machine and hence were completely responsible for their
pr-uoesses. but as systems became more complex, the user was
no longer uniquely responsible for what was happening.
For each interaction between processes, a proper
partitioning would designate a responsible agent v/ho could
then be given authority to control that interaction. In-
teractions between processes can occur because of the
existence of a process, the logical expectations of a pro-
cess, and interprocess communication.
The existence of a process may cause interactions
with other processes because the implementation must use
some of its limited physical resources to represent it.
The birth of a new process or death of an old one can pos-
sibly cause interactions because of limited rights to cre-
ate or kill a process, the use of objects borrowed from
other processes, or the use of some of the physical pro-
cesser time during the operation. Interactions might also
occur if a process is able to manipulate the physical sys-
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tern to get faster service or more resources, generate in-
valid state structures 9 or to change a microprogram which
another process might need to use.
Interactions due to the logical expectations of one
process with respect to the behavior of another process
make up a second category of potential sources of non-coop-
eration. Scheduling expectations might include not doing
what another process wants, doing things in the wrong or-
der, or not giving control back. A processes' management
of resources might cause problems by not returning re-
sources, allocating them improperly, not accounting for
what has been done with them, and changing or destroying
them.
Finally, interprocess communication can be a po-
tential source of noncooperation. A process might not be
able to find out the status of another process if the
other process is disregarding inputs or not sending out-
puts. Messages might be garbled or lost if input process-
ing is too slow. Shared address spaces might permit im-
proper state changes, modifying or destroying commonly
addressed objects, as well as both logical and physical
race problems with respect to accessing common objects.
Although the above examples are not complete, they
do indicate some of the interactions which a network de-
sign must consider. The network designers and implementers
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can be responsible for controlling some of then, however
the responsibility for the majority of them must be dele-
gated to the process designers since in many situations
only the user has the knowledge required to recognize un-
cooperative processes.
Postulated Design Constraints
There are five postulated design constraints which
are sufficient to permit a network to be designed which
can be ujed to provide a solution to network management
problems. Each constraint will have a discussion follow-
ing it which is intended to explain the terms used in it
and motivate why the constraint was included.
Constraint CI - The designed network must
consist of a set of interacting bounded
programmable digital computer systems with
well-defined processes, and be open to com-
munication with foreign systems having un-
defined processes.
Bounded - A logical system will be considered to
be bounded if it defines the logical effects of implemen-
tation failures which may occur because the implementer
has only a limited amount of physical resources of limited
reliability with which to work. The logical system does
not define when the implementation failures will occur;
this can only be determined by an evaluation of each im-
plementation and may in fact change with time.
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We11-defined processes - A process will be con-
sidered well-defined if it has been formally defined and
if the definition holds over ail systems in the network.
Foreign system - A system that interacts with the
systems in the network and which is constrained by the
network designers only in the nature of these interac-
tions.
Uride fined proc es
s
- Any process which is not for-
mally defined in the network. We can therefore make no
assumptions about its behavior.
The first constraint is intended to limit the
scope of the network structures which will be developed
in the next chapter. It should always be kept in mind
that this is a general logical network design and as such
makes no assumptions about the physical systems upon which
it may be implemented. With the advent of networks, any
general system design must consider the possibility that
the processes residing in different systems may wish to
interact.
A design which is appropriate for a network of
interconnected computer systems can be constrained to run
on a single system, but it may not be possible to extend
a single system design to run on a network and still pro-
vide satisfactory generality. The situation where the
network provides little more than interconnection services
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between systems, and each logical operating system is de-
veloped separately, is also not satis factory . The user,
whose processes span several systems in the network, must
design each process to operate properly on its HOST sys-
tem which may limit the computation's flexibility (TH72).
This problem can be avoided if the design includes a net-
work as a basic postulate and then includes process state
structures and operations on these states which are as
general as possible. By providing a common logical sys-
tem design at each system in the network, the design per-
mits the user to easily understand the network and the
processes it will support. It is a network design that
is of interest in this thesis.
"Interacting"—When looking at an arbitrary set of
systems, it is convenient to be able to say whether or not
each member of the set is also a member of the network.
Only systems which interact with other systems of the net-
work can be candidates for membership in the network. If
a system does not interact with a system in the network
then it is not of interest in this thesis. Foreign sys-
tems are not considered to be members of the network.
"Bounded" systems must be included in the design
in recognition of the fact that the physical implementa-
tion will, for all practical purposes, have access to only
limited physical resources. The network design must
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recognize this fact, arid properly designate responsibility
for the process interactions which can occur due to it.
"Programmable 11— If the design were not restricted
to programmable computer systems, several networks could
be designed which might not be considered general. Sys-
tems which exhibit totally built in reflexes (not pro-
grammable by the user) , such as airline reservation sys-
tems, although interesting, have a design which could not
be easily extended to a network where the users are de-
fining many of the processes. On the other hand, a design
providing for user programmable systems, could be user, to
implement the reflex system.
"Digital computer" systems have several properties
which make them nice to study. The design problems they
present should be solved before looking at more complex
networks. Although the formal definition of "digital sys-
tem" being used in this thesis can be found in PH71 and
Jc-73, the essential concepts will be introduced here in-
formally. It is important to recognize that there is a
distinction between a single digital system and a network
of interacting digital systems. A digital system has
three primary parts: a set of components which hold in-
formation; a set of devices which are capable of perform-
ing transformations on the information stored in those
components; and a set of communication "channels."
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The "system processor" is that part cf the digital
system which performs the transformations and is itself
invariant v/ith time. It may contain one or more operators
which carry cut transformations on process states. Each
operator is applied as follows. All operators which are
to be executed during the present system cycle are applied
in parallel at the beginning of the system cycle and then
proceed asynchronously. The next system cycle does not
commence until all operators have completed and the system
has again reached a defined state,
A "system process" is an initial instantaneous des-
cription of the whole state cf the system, followed by all
of those states reached by repetitive application of the
system processor. The system state may contain a set of
one or more process states which represent different parts
of the system state (for example, user process states).
A "process" within a digital system can thus be defined
by its initial process state and the sequence of process
states reached as the system processor operators are ap-
plied to it.
Each digital system In a network has a system state
and system processor which perform the transformations on
that state. Each system processor proceeds at its own
pace through its interpretation sequence, without any con-
sideration of the speed at which the other members of the
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set are proceeding. Because there is no synchronization
between different systems, there must be a clear under-
standing of intersystem communication. Each system pro-
ceeds as follows. If messages are generated during the
application of the system processor, they are collected
in a set, and when the system processor completes its cy-
cle they are transmitted to the other systems, After
transmitting the messages, the system updates its own
state with the messages that have arrived since the pre-
vious update and the next cycle begins. Incoming mes-
sages are buffered between updates since (in a digital
system) they must not influence the interpretation during
the application of the system processor. This is closely
analogous to the ordinary concepts of intersystem inter-
rupts.
"Well-defined" processes are necessary before any
assumptions can be made concerning their behavior. For
example, the creation of a new user process state must be
controlled so it can be recognized as such by the system
processor. Each process state may have several parts
which must remain invariant, irrespective of what is hap-
pening in that system or in any other system in the net-
work.
A network will be considered "open" if the pro-
cesses, when executing on one of the network systems, have
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the ability to communicate messages to and i'-eceive mes-
sages from foreign systems (using normal interprocess com-
munication only). Although it would nave been possible to
have considered a closed network, where communication could
be exchanged only between processes in the network, there
would have been many interesting process interactions which
would have been ruled out. Since it would be difficult for
the network designer to be able to know how to interpret
the logical structure of all future message interactions
with foreign systems, this is left up to the process to do.
The same mechanism will be used for communication
with foreign systems as is used for interprocess messages
between processes in the network. As a result, no special
structures will have to be provided by the network design-
er, to service these external interactions. Even though
foreign systems will not be formally defined in the network
and therefore nothing can be said about the behavior of
their processes, as long as the communication operators
are formally defined, and appropriate constraints placed
on their effects on the network systems, the network pro-
cesses can still remain formally defined. Since the net-
work designers have no authority over the design of for-
eign systems, they must localize the potential effects of
process interactions with such systems. By restricting
such interactions to messages to and from a process in the

network, potential Interactions are limited to that pro-
cess. The network design must only ensure that such mes-
sage interactions are possible, and that the processes
have control over the receipt and interpretation of such
messages.
Constraint C2 - Responsibility for meeting
the postulated design constraints and de-
sign decisions must be factored between
the network, implementation, and process
designers.
In this thesis it is only those interactions, for
which one of these three designers may be held responsible,
that will be discussed. Although other designers (manage-
ments) may exist in a network and may be important, they
are not of interest here. In order for the network to be
manageable, there must be no conflicts of authority or
improper assignment of responsibility. For these three
designers there must be a partitioning of responsibility
which is disjoint in time. The network designer influences
process Interactions by the features included in the de-
sign, the implementation designer influences process be-
havior by the physical resources chosen with which the de-
sign is implemented, and the process designer is responsi-
ble for controlling process behavior by the features chosen
with which to define it.
The separation of logical and physical resources

found In some sy; terns today is part of such factorization.
The physical resources are managed by the implementation.
Logical processes make requests to use certain resources,
but the mapping from logical to physical is not necessari-
ly 1 - 1, Since not all implementations In a network will
come under one management, the network design provides the
common interface between the Implementers and the process
designers. If responsibility is clearly factored, each
designer can solve its own management problems in a lo-
cally optimal manner, The development of more complex
systems and the distribution of a set of processes over
a network make it imperative that the responsibilities of
the network, implementation, and process designers be
clearly stated. Identification of these responsibilities
Will permit bhe network designer to introduce appropriate
mechanisms so each responsible agent can fulfill its re-
sponsibilities
.
Of primary interest here are the process state
structures and system processor operators necessary for
the process and network designers to do their job. Al-
though the implementation of the network design on par-
ticular architectures will require much design work, no
assumptions will be made here about the way the physical
implementers will solve their problems. Until there Is
a network design to implement, questions concerning im-
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plementation are only secondary.
Constraint C2 requires that responsibility for meet-
ing the postulated design constraints and design decisions,
including the interactions mentioned earlier, be assigned
to one of the three designers, Within the network, each
implementation management must be free to manage the re-
sources it is using to implement the network. Therefore
it must have responsibility for such resources so it can
meet its own optimization criteria. If users are to be
permitted to construct interesting and useful process re-
lationships, process designers must be assigned responsi-
bility for the definition of these processes. The network
design must, of course, define the Interfaces between each
of the other designs, and therefore must have responsibil-
ity for providing a well-defined interface and for con-
trolling Interactions between the other designs.
Constraint C3 - Each designer must have suf-
ficient authority to control the effects, on
the processes running in the network, of the
interactions for which that designer has been
delegated responsibility.
If responsibility for controlling the effects of
process interactions is factored between network, imple-
mentation, and process designers, then each designer must
define and control uncooperative process interactions.
Since noncooperation is a point of view, only the re-
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sponsible agent can determine when some action is uncoop-
erative. It was pointed out earlier that process noncoop-
eration can be controlled only by restricting the effects
of the various interactions through which it can occur.
Each of the three designers, therefore, must be given such
authority to restrict the effects of the interactions for
which it is responsible. Only then can each designer im-
plement a local control of cooperation or lack of it.
Although constraint C2 requires that responsibility
be factored between the three designers, nothing would
have been solved without the addition of constraint C3.
Responsibility to control process interactions without
the associated authority to carry out those responsibili-
ties would be meaningless. The network design must in-
clude sufficient logical process state structures and
system processor operators for a designated responsible
agent to control those interactions which the design has
defined a3 its responsibilities. Responsibility and
authority must both reside with the same agent.
Constraint Ck - Although processes must be
permitted to delegate to other processes
their authority to control process inter-
actions, the delegating process always re-
tains responsibility for that interaction
and the authority to control the process
to which it was delegated.
This constraint must be postulated if process de-
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signers are to have the flexibility to do their job. The
intent is not to design a process independent system, but
just the opposite. The design should permit the user to
define multiprocess computations which are highly process
dependent. Several recent system designs include such a
service to the users (TENEX, RC^OOO).
The question of whether or not a given process de-
signer should make use of multiprocess computations does
not belong here, although it is not difficult to think of
examples where doing so makes design of process behavior
much simpler. A simple example would be a logical operat-
ing system which has three primary processes running under
it (time sharing, batch, and utility). The operating sys-
tem designer might want to have one process, which retains
ultimate authority, to arbitrate conflicts between the
other three processes, but to delegate the authority to
make local decisions to the three children.
The delivery of maximum freedom to user processes
to manage other local processes, requires that they be con-
sidered as submanagers and given corresponding authority
to control process behavior necessary to fulfill their
responsibilities. Process submanagers should be able to
construct their computations as multiple interacting pro-
cesses and be able to delegate some of their authority to
subprocesses over which they retain ultimate responsibility
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and authority. The user can then create various operat-
ing environments for sets of subprocesses in a hierarchy
of user defined operating systems. Instead of requiring
one process to make all decisions according to a general
algorithm, authority can be passed to other processes to
make the decisions in a locally optimal manner. Con-
straint C>1 is Intended tc force the network designer to
include the ability for processes to delegate responsi-
bility and authority. A clear designation will have to be
made as to which responsibilities the network designer
will delegate to the process designers.
Constraint C5 - The network definition
must pr617rdir~for modification of its def-
inition. The design must provide suffi-
cient constraints to be able to delegate
safely to process designers all modifica-
tion decisions and authority to control
the effects of such decisions on the
processes.
Any network design, which is to survive over a
period of time, must recognize the fact that changes will
be necessary. Additional systems may be added to the net-
work or new process state structures may develop. Con-
straint C5 requires the final network design to define
what types of network evolutions will be permitted, along
with the environments in which they may take place and
under what constraints. If these evolutionary processes
were not so constrained, an implementation designer could
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never know that the implementation was valid.
Process designer support is the whole reason for
any computer system design. It would be inconsistent to
give process designers responsibilities for some interac-
tion and then perrrit the network to be modified and effect
that interaction without the "consent" of that designer.
If the network is to support well-defined processes as re-
quired by constraint CI, process designers must make the
decisions as to whether or not some modification will cause
some of their processes to misbehave. Implicit in this
constraint is the fact that, because of the three way fac-
toring of responsibility for controlling process interac-
tions, there will be some interactions which will be the
responsibility of the network and implementation designers
and therefore should not be available to the process de-
signers 6 The control that process designer has over the
effects of network definition modifications will be deter-
mined by the factoring of responsibility required by con-
straint C2.
Delegation of Authority Constraints
The previous section introduced the design con-
straints that are being postulated in this thesis. The
remainder of this chapter will develop some additional
constraints which follow from the postulated constraints.
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This section looks at some authority delegation constraints
arising primarily from C2 and C3.
Delegation Constraint Dl - Responsibility for
each interaction and authority to control it
must be uniquely assigned to the same designer.
This constraint follows directly from C2 and C3.
Although it is implicit in the previous constraints, it
should be clearly stated as a constraint so the network
designer makes such a unique designation when a choice
exists. If a designer is designated as responsible for
controlling an interaction, it would not be consistent to
permit another agent to also have control over it. The
responsible agent would no longer be responsible and con-
straint C2 would be violated. A designer with authority
to control an interaction must be able to act on its own
initiative, subject only to its design constraints.
A constraint similar to Dl is necessary in any de-
sign that is to produce a manageable system. Each design-
er must be able to solve its problems in any locally op-
timal manner, without fear that some other designer is
also competitively controlling that same interaction with
resulting conflict of authorities. If conflicts of author-
ity existed in a system, the system would no longer be
guaranteed to be manageable unless there were an arbitrator
present to settle the conflict. If such an authority does
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exist , then it is the unique authority this constraint
says must exist.
The recognition that this constraint exists, pro-
vides the network designer the freedom to delegate to the
other designers the responsibility for solving their own
problems. Once an interaction is designated as being the
responsibility of one of the three groups of designers,
mechanisms can be provided to permit those designers to
solve their problems. The network design does not have
to make arbitrary choices of algorithms to solve particu-
lar prob]enc, but can defer the choice of which algorithm
to use to the appropriate designer. Unique assignment of
authority permits the designer to delegate the maximum
number of responsibilities to the facility and process
designers. This results in a simplified network design
which still fulfills the responsibilities of the network
designers.
Delegation Constraint D2 - Network designers
are responsible for ensuring that the network
is self-protecting, meets the constraints, and
is formally defined.
Constraint D2 follows directly from the second
postulated constraint requiring that responsibility for
interactions be assigned to one of three designers. The
network design provides the interface between the process
and implementation managements. The remainder of this
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thesis will define this interface.
Self-protecting - A network is self-protecting if
there are sufficient constraints on the freedoms of future
designers (implementation and process) so their actions
cannot affect the network in any way which would cause it
to violate any of the constraints or design decisions.
If the design were not made self-protecting, con-
straint violating inter-actions might occur between the
process and implementation designers. If all implementa-
tion designers were under one authority, or if all pro-
cesses were known to be cooperative, then the protection
responsibility could be delegated to them. Since we can-
not assume either of these situations to be true, the only
common designer in all cases is the network designer. The
network designer thus is the only agent capable of ful-
filling this need. A need for network self-protection
exists if the processes are to be well-defined.
Ensuring that the network design meets the con-
straints is an obvious requirement of the network design-
er. The process and implementation designers cannot be
held responsible for this requirement since neither one
of them has enough global information to know if the net-
work meets the constraints or not.
Formally defining the network must be a responsi-
bility of the network designers since they are responsible
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for the design in the first place. A formal definition is
required if the network designers are to expect it to be
unambiguously understood by the implement ers and the network
users. It must also be formally defined If the designer
is to know that it satisfies the design constraints.
Design Constraint D3 - The implementation
designers are responsible for the design,
construction, and maintenance of an opti-
mal equivalent system.
An equivalent system is one In which the processes
are isomorphic to the processes as formally defined. Con-
straint D2 recognizes that the network v/ill be implemented
and that, according to constraint C2, some agent must be
held responsible for the implementation. Each implementa-
tion designer is uniquely capable of determining what the
optimal implementation at that facility v/ill be. Only
the implementation designer knows what physical resources
are present or can be obtained at that facility. Each im-
plementer must first design an equivalent system according
to Its own management constraints, then construct such an
equivalent system, and finally maintain that equivalent
system.
This constraint permits the local designers to con-
tinue to optimize their local implementations since they
have complete responsibility for the equivalent implementa-

5*
tion designer from moving an implementation to another
physical machine or making modification to the current im-
plementation. As long as the implementation remains equiv-
alent, the local implementation designer is free to make
any changes in the implementation deemed desirable.
The success that a network achieves in exploiting
this delegation, of responsibility and authority to the
implementation designer, will be highly dependent on the
particular design chosen. It is particularly important
that no one-to-one mappings be required between particular
features of the logical network design and particular phy-
sical resources which might be available. Note that this
says one-to-one mappings required by the design. One-to-
one mappings which result by accident or the design of the
implementcrs might be beneficial because of potentially in-
creased efficiency, and is a choice of the implementers
though and within their authority. Today's system designs
often depend on such mappings and this makes them costly
to move. If the "impressive improvements in technology"
that Withington (WI72) predicts are to be beneficial, new
logical designs must provide for economical movement be-
tween facilities and between technology generations. Be-
cause of the responsibility delegation in this constraint,
most of the interactions mentioned earlier which do not
appear in the network as formally defined, will be the
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responsibility of the implementation designers who will
have authority to control them in any way that optimizes
their own goals.
Delegat ion Constraint Dft - The process
designers are responsible for all vir-
tual interprocess interactions.
Virt ual Interprocess interactions are those pro-
cess interactions which would appear if the processes were
being run as formally defined, and do not include those
additional interactions which might appear in the equiva-
lent implementations because the implementation designer
chose particular physical resources for his implementation,
Constraint DH follows from C2 and CI. The imple-
mentation designers cannot be held responsible for virtual
interprocess interactions since each implementation de-
signer may be under a different management and none of
the constraints prohibit interactions between processes
residing in different network systems. The network de-
signers cannot be responsible for all virtual interpro-
cess interactions because they cannot hope to know what
all processes will be designed to do. The only designer
remaining is the process designer. Even if it were not
a constraint which is implicit in the postulated con-
straints s delegating to process designers the responsi-
bility for all virtual interprocess interations would be
desirable from a point of view of generality.
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De legation Constraint D5 - If an implementa-
tion designer nas an urfeolvable problem due
to boundedness which effects the processes
in the network
s
the effect on the process
state structure must be well-defined so the
process designers can ameliorate the conse-
quences.
.
If the first postulated constraint had not included
bounded systems, constraint D5 could have been glossed
over by adding a statement, in the design, that the imple-
mentation designers would always do the best they could.
This would have required implementation dependent process
transformations without a common definition of the effect
of such "failures" on the formal definition of the network.
Implementation "failures" are solely the responsi-
bility of each implementation designer under D3, as long
as they do not effect the virtual processes. When the
implementation designer declares that a process has hit a
bound (an implementation "failure" has occurred which the
implementation designer declared will affect that process
state), the "failure" is no longer solely the implementa-
tion designer's problem. If the solution were left up to
each Implementation designer, each solution might be dif-
ferent and the processes might no longer be well-defined.
Since constraint C^l permits a process to delegate to other
processes authority to control certain interactions, the
process which hits the bound may not be responsible for
the problem. The implementation and network designers may
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not have suffie ient knowledge to decide what action to
take to ameliorate the problem, only the process designers
may have the information necessary to do it. The flexi-
bility that a process designer has to do so, will be high-
ly dependent on the features included as design choices
from a point of view of generality. Constraint D5 is
intended to force the network designer to include suffi-
cient features in the design.
Delegation Constraint D6 - Network designers
are responsible for the initial definition of
the network and implicitly for all evolution-
ary paths. Implementation designers are re-
sponsible for the implementation of the Initial
definition and for any potential evolutionary
path. Process desip:ners are responsible for
selecting which evolutionary paths will be
followed.
Responsibility must be factored between the three
designers (C2) and network modification must be permitted
(C5), therefore a delegation constraint must be developed
assigning responsibility for network evolution. The net-
work designer is the only one of the three designers which
can properly be assigned responsibility for defining
changes in the initial definition. D2 requires that net-
work designers be responsible for ensuring the network is
self-protecting, meets the constraints, and is formally
defined. This constraint extends C2 to Include responsi-
bility for all potential network evolution, and requires
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that the initial network definition also define all poten-
tial evolutionary paths. When the implementation design-
er's responsibilities in D3 are extended to include the
implementation of modified definitions, it is imperative
that such designer be able to determine if the implementa-
tion will be able to support such modifications before it-
claims it has implemented the network. In order for an im-
plementation designer to be able to make such a determina-
tion, all potential paths of network evolution must be de-
fined as part of the initial network.
It is possible to factor the remaining evolutionary
responsibilities between the two remaining designers. An
implementation designer must support the initial network
and all potential evolutions if it accepts the network.
This must be so since the implementation designer is the
only designer which can be responsible for implementing
such changes.
Process designers must be delegated the responsi-
bility for determining which path to take. The network
designers fulfill their responsibilities when they define
the initial network and all potential evolutionary paths.
Implementation designers fulfill their responsibilities
when they implement the initial system, including modifi-
cation operations for all potential evolutions as defined
by the network designers. The process designer is free to
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choose the particular path of evolution that it wants to
take. Under C5» process designers are the only designers
which can evaluate the potential effects of such modifica-
tion on the processes. D^ delegates process designers as
responsible for virtual process interactions. Since modif-
ication of the network may cause virtual process inter-
actions (processes may behave differently after a modifica-
tion than before), the process designers must choose the
modification to be done. Neither the network nor the im-
plementation designers have sufficient knowledge to decide
which modifications to make. It is possible to delegate the
authority to process designers to choose the path, since it
is the network designer which designs the operators that
process designers will cause to be executed. The network
designer must ensure that any choice of modification oper-
ators will always be a permissible one.
Implementation Desi gner Constraints
This section is included primarily for completeness.
Since it is not the intention of thin thesis to look at im-
plementation problems nor to constrain- the implementation
designers more than necessary, the constraints dealing with
equivalent system implementation, modification, and bounded-
ness are sufficient for our purposes. Each particular im-
plementation designer will have to develop further imple-
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mentation constraints when designing an equivalent system.
Responsibility and authority for meeting the constraints
and design decisions has been factored and future imple-
mentation designers will be responsible for this part of
the design. The remainder of the chapter will look at
further constraints on the process and network designers.
Process Desi gner Constraints
This section will look at some of the constraints
which must be placed on process designers to ensure that
their actions remain within the postulated constraints.
Process Constraint PI - Processes must be
arranged in a tree structure defining their
hierarchy of responsibility over descendent
processes.
The network design must permit processes to dele-
gate to other processes their authority to control process
interactions. The delegating process always retains re-
sponsibility for that interaction and authority to control
the process to which it was delegated (C*0. There are
many interactions over which process designers have author-
ity (D4, D5). The possible process interactions mentioned
earlier included such things as birth and death, allocation
of logical resources, and logical expectations.
Implicit in constraint CH is a hierarchy of proces-
ses which defines their relationship with respect to re-
sponsibility and authority for controlling other processes.
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Each process in the hierarchy will be held responsible for
its behavior to processes above it, even while delegating
authority to processes below. There appears to be two
alternative ways that such a hierarchy could exist. It
could be as a general graph structure with the various
threads being the different responsibilities and authori-
ties, or the more restrictive form of a tree structure with
the threads of responsibility defining the tree.
First, any particular chain of responsibility and
authority cannot be permitted to double back on Itself if
the network is to guarantee well-defined processes. The
concept of having authority over someone who has author-
ity over you is incongruous. If it were permitted, the
network would have to arbitrate conflicts, which it can-
not do because it dees not have sufficient knowledge of
what the processes are trying to accomplish. The only
alternative is to have a non-intersecting thread of re-
sponsibility.
This restricted graph would still permit there to
be more than one process responsible for another process.
If one process has more than one process responsible for
its behavior, it would be impossible to ensure that there
would never be any conflicts of interest between these
authorities. When one of the responsible processes exe-
cuted its authority, it might affect the process, for
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which it is sharing responsibility, in a way which would
affect the interactions over which the other process has
authority. Such conflicts of authority would require
arbitration which cannot be allowed If processes are to
be well-defined.
The remaining alternative is to permit processes
to be related only in a tree structure defined by their
responsibility and authority over descendent processes.
Since there is at most one immediate responsible agent,
it can have complete and unique authority over the pro-
cesses for which it is responsible. Although this is a
constraint on process behavior, it produces significant
freedom for the network designer because there is no need
to be concerned over whether or not a process has a cer-
tain authority over another process. The designer must
only be concerned with providing mechanisms which a parent
process can use to exercise its authority over a child
process, and not be concerned about the merits of the use
of such an authority.
Process Constraint P2 - A unique root
process must exist representing overall
process management.
Constraint D4 points out that it must be the pro-
cess designers which control all virtual process interac-
tions. The previous constraint points out that process
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authority and responsibilities exist in the shape of a
tree. An extension of the above arguments leads to con-
straint P2. If interactions between processes in differ-
ent trees are to be permitted, then there must be an agent
responsible for such interactions. Both trees must there-
fore be sub-trees of some common ancestor. It would be
an arbitrary constraint on process behavior to say that
two processes cannot interact if they exist in different
trees. Any such root process may produce sub-trees which
it chooses to isolate and consider independent trees if
desired. This root process is thus unique for all of the
processes in the network.
Process Constraint P3 - No processor race
conditions can be permitted to effect a
process state transformation during that
transformation.
This is a direct consequence of CI which says that
the design must have well-defined processes. If the de-
sign did permit processor race conditions to exist within
a process state transformation, the design would no longer
satisfy constraint CI. The actual mechanisms to be used
to prevent such processor conditions from occurring are
numerous, and the ones chosen for a particular network
design may vary according to the influence of other de-
sign choices. This does not rule out the inevitable race
conditions arising from the receipt of interprocess
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messages by a system processor*
Proces s Constraint P4 - Operators available
ITo process designers "affect only the con-
taining process state.
If nonlocal process state trans formations (trans-
formations on process states other than the one that con-
tained the operator that was executed) were permitted,
constraint CI could be violated, unless all such nonlocal
transformation could be predicted, accounted for, and con-
trolled by a responsible agent.
There are several reasons why these requirements
would be extremely difficult to guarantee in a network
design. If nonlocal process transformations were per-
mitted, each implementation designer might be forced to
make sure they could not cause processor race conditions
for the effected process state. Even if such interactions
were in general constrained to processes within the same
system, the use of multiple physical processors might be
difficult. It would also introduce an arbitrary con-
straint on process designers.
Such Interprocess transformations, if permitted,
would be a form of interprocess communication (in effect,
shared space). Equivalent behavior can be achieved by
the process (which would have initiated the interaction)
transmitting a message to the other process. The message
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then could cause the desired transformation as an opera-
tion local to the other process state. The final network
design ? if general enough, can provide these equivalent
operations without the Inherent overhead that would be
required if nonlocal process state transformations were
permitted.
Process Constraint P5 - Multiple processes
may be transformed in parallel.
Constraint P6 is an obvious consequence of the first
postulated constraint which says that the design is to con-
sist of a network of digital computer systems. It would be
inconsistent to expect the network as a whole to operate
sequentially. At a minimum, processes in different sys-
tems must be permitted to execute .in parallel. It is the
responsibility of the network designers to define parallel
transformations, and allow process designers to determine
whether or not to make use of this facility. It would be
improper at this time, though, to make constraint P5 any
stronger.
There is nothing in the postulated constraints
which would force the design to include parallelism in
each system in the network. Although this might appear
desirable, it must be Included later as a design deci-
sion, not here as a design constraint.
Process Constraint P6 - Distribution of
processes over the network must be per-
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mitted and each process state must be
uniquely contained In, at most, one sys-
tem at a time.
Constraint ?6 is implicit in postulated constraint
CI. It would make no sense to have a network of systems
and then restrict all processes to exist in the same sys-
tem. Process designers should be able to choose how to
distribute processes in the network, and constraint ?6
says that such a distribution is possible.
A process would not be well-defined if it were
contained in more than one system at a time since each
system would proceed independently in parallel. There
is no assumption made about the relative speeds of the
systems in the network which means that nothing could be
said about the rapidity with which the disjoint process
parts were proceeding. Since a process is a sequence of
process states, the process becomes not well-defined when
more than one system is transforming it because the se-
quence of process states would not be well-defined. Pro-
cess designers are responsible for splitting a process
into multiple processes so they can run on multiple sys-
tems.
Process Constraint P7 - Interprocess communi-
cation must be permitted and be subject to
parental control. Synchronization between
processes is the responsibility of process
designers. Processes residing in different




If it were not for postulated constraint Ck (pro-
cess delegation of authority) the network could be de-
signed as a simple time sharing system where no interpro-
cess interactions were permitted. Constraint C*J implies
that there will have to be some interprocess interactions
if the process designers are to fulfill their responsi-
bilities. Since process transformations must be local to
the process (P4), the only remaining means of meeting con-
straint 04 is to permit interprocess communication.
That such communication be subject to parental con-
trol is an obvious requirement, stemming from constraint
C4 and developed in D4. Process designers are responsible
for all virtual interprocess interactions and therefore
must be responsible for interprocess communication. The
need for a process tree hierarchy of responsibility (PI)
puts the control of such interactions in the hands of the
parent.
Process synchronization is an interprocess inter-
action for which process designers must be responsible
under D4. Network and implementation designers cannot
always know if two processes in the network are synchron-
ized 4 either intentially or by accident. The definition
of digital systems under constraint CI says nothing about
the relative speed at which process steps in two systems
are carried out. Synchronization or lack of it between
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systems is not a property of our network since it depends
on the implementation. The particular allocation of hard-
ware used by implementation designers for its optimal
equivalent systems (D3) might have multiple logical sys-
tems implemented on one physical system, or might use mul-
tiple physical systems to implement one logical system.
Without placing an arbitrary constraint, to implement
either synchronous or asynchronous systems only (which
we choose not to do), synchronization between processes
in different systems can only be ensured by the processes
themselves using interprocess communication.
Process constraint P8 - An "accountable ob-
ject71 chain must exist, and processes must
be able to restrict use of these accountable
objects when sub-allocated.
Accountable objects are logical resources which
processes may allocate to their children , The network
design provides services for the accounting of these ob-
jects, including the return of them if a parent wishes
them back and enforcing constraints on their use.
A process tree of responsible agents alone does
not completely describe the implications of postulated
constraint C4. It does not provide sufficient services
for a process designer to use to control all virtual in-
terprocess interactions. There are several interactions
with respect to logical resources which the previous
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constraints still permit to go uncontrolled. If a network
is to permit processes to delegate authority, then this
authority is a logical resource whose accounting and sub-
allocation is something that a parent may need to control.
The constraints make no assumptions about a child's cooper-
ation with its parent. A special mechanism must therefore
be provided which permits the parent to fulfill its respon-
sibilities even if a child becomes uncooperative . The
process tree defines responsibility , but does not constrain
how deep the tree may be or how many children a particu-
lar process may have.
Although it is the responsibility of the process
designers to decide what and how much authority to give
to a child, the network design must provide remote en-
forcement services for accountable objects. At this point-
it is not important what is being passed, but only that
certain accountable information must be passed. For ex-
ample, communication must be subject to parental control
(P7) and certain accountable information may be necessary
to accomplish this. Since the children may not be cooper-
ative, the network must provide use restrictions and ac-
counting mechanisms, which may be invoked to protect these
objects from the actions of a child.
These items (whatever they may logically represent)
become accountable objects to the network. Since there
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are no restriction*? on how deep a tree nay be or how many
children a particular process may have, a constraint is
required which provides sufficient facilities to process
management to control the use of these objects* Given
the existence of an accountable object, the network, if
it is to perform its functions, must be able to locate
the object. The network design must provide for an ac-
counting chain (to the object from the process responsible
for it) which is not subject to the desires of the child
process. In addition, if a process designer is to dele-
gate some of its authority, then mechanisms must be pro-
vided which allow restriction of the use of these account-
able objects in addition to just accounting for them.
Network Des igner Constraints
The previous section developed some of the con-
straints on the system design due to process designer
responsibilities which can be derived from the five postu-
lated constraints. This section will look at some of the
constraints which must exist to permit the network de-
signer to fulfill its responsibilities.
Network Constraint Nl - The network designer
is responsible for providing a set of invari-
ant names which can be used by the process de-
signers for communication and control.
Since different implementation designers, if not
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restricted, might use local names for control and commun-
ication
>
process communication might become implementation
dependent. If process designers created the names, they
also might not be consistent in name creation. The only
common designer capable of defining a set of invariant
names, which can be used by the processes for communica-
tions and control, is the network designer.
Network Constraint N2 - The network de-
signers 'aire responsible for changes in the
network formal definition.
The fifth postulated constraint introduces the
possibility of augmentation into the design, D2 desig-
nates the network designer as responsible for the net-
work's definition, and D6 designates the network designer
as responsible for all evolutionary paths. The network
designer must also fulfill its responsibility by con-
straining evolutionary changes in the formal definition,
before the implementers can actually augment the system.
Network Constraint M3 - Sufficient services
must "be provided, by the network designers,
for the process designers to accomplish their
purpose, including resource accounting and
intersystem communication.
The particular services provided by the network
designers will be designed according to how they deem
the network will be used. Resource- accounting and inter-
system communication are services already mentioned spe-
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cifically, but there will be many more. This is a require-
ment since each designer must have sufficient authority to
restrict the effects of the interactions for which it is
responsible. If the process designers are to be respon-
sible for all interprocess interactions, then the network
must provide common services through which they may exer-
cise this authority,,
Network Constraint UH - Network modification
operators are meta-operators and must first
ensure the modification does not violate any
of the postulated constraints and then either
act as a no-op if it is one of the permissible
paths of evolution or fault if it is not.
Network modification operator - A formally defined
operator which the process designers can cause to be executed.
It is intended to cause the network definition to be modi-
fied and then implemented by using locally defined procedures
Meta-opsrator - An operator whose effect i3 not
represented by a change in the process state. (In this
case it changes the network definition.
)
No-op - An operator which does not change the proc-
ess state other than to advance the "program counter."
It is clear that such modification operators must
be meta-operators since they operate on the network defin-
ition and not on the process state. That the operators
must prove the modification does not violate any of the
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postulated constraints follows from the delegation of re-
sponsibility constraint D6, where network management is
responsible for all evolutionary paths. The only way that
the network management can fulfill this responsibility is
to design the operators so they ensure the modification
does not violate the constraints.
The results of process management executing such an
operator, must be either a no-op or a fault in the execut-
ing system. The execution of a modification operator may
cause interactions which are the responsibility of each
of the three designers. The definition must be changed,
the new definition must be implemented, and finally the
process must be told it succeeded or not.
If the operation had any affect on the process it-
self other than fault or no-op, then the implementation
management would have to ensure that the process remained
well-defined. All system steps would have to be designed
and implemented so the execution of a modification opera-
tor during one of the steps would leave the executing pro-
cess well-defined (this might be possible), but even worse,
it would have to leave all other processes (also executing
during that step) well-defined. This is clearly not the
responsibility of either the process or implementation
designers
.
Since the network designer does not have complete

knowledge of what either of these two designers will al-
ways be doing, the only guaranteed non-race situation is
to consider it a no-op in process transformations. The
process executes the operator and either goes on with a
no-op or faults (well-defined operations during that
system step). The definition is either changed or not
depending on the validity of the operation, and finally
the implementation designer changes the implementation
between system steps when all processes are not undergoing
transformations and then starts the next system step using
the new definition.
Network Constraint N5 - The effects of
network evolution, ether than the addition
of a new system to the network, must be
local to the system within which the oper-
ator was executed.
This constraint follows directly from the fact that
we are interested in digital systems (CI), the factoring
of responsibility, and maintaining well-defined evolu-
tionary processes. To say that the effects of evolution
were other than local to the system in which the operator
was executed would require synchronization between two
systems, a violation of the concept of digital system.
This would not rule out, of course, a process in one sys-
tem executing an operator which caused a message to be
transmitted to another process in another system. That
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process could then execute the modification operator and
cause that system to be modified since the final modifica-
tion Is local. The exact procedure again will depend en
the particular modifying operators provided by the network
designers. The addition of a new system cannot be con-
sidered locaj since there is no such system in the first
place.
Network Constraint N6 - The network design
must" 1 Lt process designers to limit the
effects of a network modification operator
to the process executing it. Process de-
signers must be able to uniquely control
the right to execute non-commuting modifi-
cation operators (if any exist).
Constraint N6 follows directly from postulated con-
straints CI and C5. Process designers must have responsi-
bility and authority to control the effects of network
definition modification on the process interactions for
which the process designer has been designated responsi-
bility. This is not quite strong enough to guarantee the
well-defined processes as required by CI. Because the
modification operator is really a meta-operator (N'l),
there could be interactions due to two processes simul-
taneously executing non-commuting modification operators
which would result in non-well-defined processes or sys-
tem.
C5 as stated could permit the effects to be limited
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to the two processes executing the modification operator,
but the resulting network definition might be different
than either one of the processes expected. In order to
guarantee that all processes will be well-defined, pro-
cess designers must be able to limit the effects of the
execution of a modification operator to the process exe-
cuting that operator.
As a consequence of permitting the processes to sub-
allocate their responsibilities the right to execute non-
commuting modification operators (if they are permitted)
must be controlled. If non-commuting operators exist,
then two processes executing such modification operators
could affect each other in a way that would make the oper-
ation have nonlocal effects and possibly producs processes
which are not well-defined.
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Programming generality is the inde-
pendence of an algorithm from the environ-





The primary goal of this thesis is the d<
and formal definition of a general machine in< idi nt net-
work design which will support potentially uncooperative
processes. In the previous chapter a set of constraints
were developed which are intended to permit network manage-
ment problems (relevant to the control of uncooperative pro-
cesses) to be solved. Boundedness and network evolution
were also included. Network designers are responsible for
the design end formal definition of the network. Implement-
ation designers are responsible for implementing locally
optimal equivalent systems. Process designers are responsi-
ble for controlling all interprocess interactions between
the processes in the virtual network, including those due
to suballocation of the control of interprocess interactions.
This chapter will informally develop the major design
choices relevant to process state structures and the trans-
formations to be carried out on them. Within the bounds of
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the constraints, many network designs could be produced,
some of which would not provide what we feel is sufficient
process generality* This chapter presents those design
decisions, relating to such generality, which the networks
defined by this design should provide. The design choices
will be explained and where necessary shown to be consistent
with the constraints of the previous chapter.
Since network modification must be permitted, a mini-
mal system will be presented from which any particular net-
work may evolve. The process designers determine which
modification operators will be executed, and therefore re-
tain significant control of the attributes of a particular
network. A minimal initial definition also has the advantage
of requiring the network design to Include at least those
network modification operators which are necessary to evolve
interesting networks from the initial system. Although the
sequence of presentation did not effect the validity of the
constraints, the same cannot be said for the design decisions
presented here. The development is intended to be complete
enough to permit the reader to understand the essential
characteristics of the network in all respects except its
final representation. A formal definition of the network
will be found in Appendix C.
There are several informal design principles which
have been used in this chapter. An attempt has been made to
provide facilities which process designers can use to con-
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struct processes which implement their decisions concerning
the control of their application processes. The network de-
sign should not build in particular strategies whenever it
can be avoided y particularly if it limits the freedom of
process designers. The tools provided should be useful and
convenient so that interesting applications can be produced
and properly managed. Each process in the network should be
able to make finite progress, independent of what other pro-
cesses in the network are doin
In addition to providing a rich programming environ-
ment, the design should be general enough to be used as a
model to compare current systems, and should be an easy
framework for communicating ideas. To accomplish this the
concepts should provide generality of expression rather than
a list of options which tend to be confused. In order to
maintain generality, the introduction of features reflecting
specialization for specific applications or particular phy-
sical assets should be minimized. Where possible, placing
constraints on the design of the programming languages should
be deferred until they are required.
Although efficiency with respect to current systems
is not a primary goal, process generality features should
not be Introduced without hope of reasonable implementation.
Invariant network features should be identified so imple-
mentation designers can exploit them for efficient imple-
mentation. Intuitive notions of efficiency should be brought

80
into play when choosing between design decisions, particu-
larly if they concern implement at ion on current systems.
Subprocessor and Expression-State
Design decision Al - Each system processor in
the network will contain a set of identifiable
subprocessors including at least the following
three: OF (General Programmable), AO (Account-
able Object), and PR (Process state Receive and
transmit)
.
A subprocessor is defined as an operator of the sys-
tem processor that is applied to a single process state.
It may be designed to produce an arbitrarily complex pro-
cess transformation, using only information within that
process state* Process designers request the system pro-
cessor to apply a particular subprocessor to a particular
process state. The execution of a subprocessor only trans-
forms the process state to which it is being applied and
does not involve message transmission or receipt.
All operators of the system processor, including sub-
processors, which are to be applied during a particular
system step, are applied in parallel. The system step does
not complete until all operators being applied during that
step have completed. The system processor performs all oper-
ations not local to the process state (the transformation
involves information in addition to that contained in the
process state). For example, it delivers messages to a
process state for disposition by a subprocessor, and dis-
patches messages after they are generated by a subprocessor.
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The introduction of the concept of sub-processor into
the network design provides a freedom to delegate responsi-
bility for* the design of the languages to be interpreted by
the subprocessor to future subprocessor designers with a
minimum of constraints. The network designer still retains
responsibility for designing the network so process design-
ers can control interprocess interactions. The subprocessor
thus becomes the user programmable part of each system pro-
cessor. The design of the language interpreted by a sub-
processor will define the way processes may be formed by
defining the transformations on process states.
Since processes are not assumed cooperative, it is
convenient to limit the effects of the interpretation of
such languages. The use of a subprocessor, whose operations
can only be local to a process state, permits this. The
system processor then performs all operations not local to
a process state and can be designed to provide a well-
defined interface for all operations which are not strictly
local to a process state. The network designer need only
constrain, not define, subprocessor operations which are
always local to a process state. All non-local services of
the system processor can be invoked implicitly by the sub-
processors, and be invariant across the network.
An equivalent system processor could have been de-
signed which did not contain subprocessors. It could be
augmented with equivalent transformation operators and
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proper sequencing and control functions to produce processes
equivalent to those produced using subprocessors. Subpro-
cessors simplify the network design. Without them, the sys-
tem processor is cluttered with details which are not rele-
vant to its basic operations of providing services not local
to a process state. Understanding those operations which
would have been logically grouped as a subprocessor is made
more difficult because of the additional potential inter-
actions they would have with the other operators of the sys-
tem processor. Since a process state is observable once
each system step, the observed process would be cluttered
with the intermediate steps which would have been hidden by
a subprocessor,
The designer of a subprocessor has certain freedoms
that would not be present if all of the subprocessor func-
tions had to be integrated into the system processor. Only
the system processor, and the interactions of a subprocessor
with it, need be understood by that subprocessor designer.
Nothing need be known about the way other subprocessors
operate during execution. It is assumed that all network
designers will meet the constraints and design decisions.
Without subprocessors, their responsibilities would include
a much larger part of each system. All systems in the net-
work would not necessarily provide the same set of subpro-
cessors. The interactions to be prepared for, if the design
did not use subprocessors, would therefore not necessarily
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be the same in each system, complicating the problem even
more. Many more constraints and design decisions would have
to be introduced into the network to ensure that it supported
only well-defined processes.
A subprocessor designer need not be concerned with
having its operations interrupted by incoming messages, or
the effect of the transmission of a. message to another pro-
cess whose subprocessor is in the middle of a process step,
Nonlocal operations are done by bhe system processor. Buf-
fering or other techniques can be used by a subprocessor
designer during the execution of a process step since such
information cannot be affected by anything outside the sub-
processor until the step has been completed. The network
designer thus guaranties the locality of process state
transformations with minimal constraints on subprocessor
designers.
Subprocessors are applied by the system processor to
the process states f in the same manner as any other opera-
tors, and must be identifiable (recognizable and named)
within the system processor. Process designers must have
control over the sequencing of subprocessor applications,
uniquely specifying the different subprocessors to be
applied. The system processor, if the subprocessors are
identifiable, can be designed to apply the proper subpro-
cessor on command by process designers without caring what




Each system in the network will have at least a GP,
AO, and PR subprocessor which are common to all systems.
The network designer cannot hope to know all the subpro-
cessors present and future process designers will want to
use. Therefore, although these three common subprocessors
provide all initial network services, it would be arbitrary
to define a set of subprocessors which, would be available
at each system in the network and then prohibit the intro-
duction of any others. One of the purposes of introducing
subprocessors into the network is to defer to future de-
signers the development of subprocessors and the languages
they interpret. The at least in design decision Al is in-
tended to permit the introduction of additional subproces-
sors. One of the network evolutionary steps that the design
will permit is the introduction of new subprocessors into
particular systems of the network.
The GP subprocessor is the general programmable sub-
processor which is common to each system in the network. It
provides all initial network services to process designers.
The GP is programmable to ensure that process designers may
invoke services to create useful processes, thus fulfilling
network management's responsibilities to provide for pro-
grammable systems. The GP must provide all such services
by interpreting a very general programming language since it
may be the only programmable subprocessor in some systems.
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Without at least one common programmable subprocessor avail-
able at each system, process transportability would not be
very useful. The GP, since it is common, will provide pro-
cess designers with one language whose interpretation is in-
variant in all systems in the network. If a particular sys-
tem provides for additional programmable subprocessors , the
process designer must make the choice of whether or not to
use the GP. The GP is therefore not the "universal" lan-
guage, but only a guaranteed "common" language.
The AO subprocessor is common to all systems in the
network and has been delegated the job of fulfilling all
network responsibilities with respect to accountable ob-
jects (N3 and P8). By delegating these responsibilities
to a subprocessor Instead of fulfilling thorn as part of
each system processor design, the network designer is able
to defer binding the structures used for accountable objects,
while still having sufficient guarantees that the network
responsibilities will be satisfied. The network design can
proceed without getting involved in the semantic and syn-
tactic problems involved with accountable objects and their
use. The AO subprocessor will not be programmable in the
general sense of the word, but will provide services to the
programmable subprocessors of the network. It must be de-
signed to carry out its responsibilities cooperatively with
respect to accountable objects, even though particular pro-
cesses may try to be uncooperative.
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The final subprocessor which must be common to each
system in the network is the PR (Process state Receive and
transmit) subprocessor. The PR will carry out transforma-
tions on the PR process, whose function will be to re-
ceive both process states from other systems and requests
for process creation and transmission from processes in
its own system. If the request is to create a new pro-
cess or if it is a process state from another system and
the process state is valid to run in that system, the PR
process requests the system processor to start the process.
If the request is to move a process to another system, the
FR process requests the system processor to transmit the
process state to the PR process in the destination system.
Validation of requests for process creation and
movement is simplified by requiring that within the network
systems only the AO subprocessor be able to generate them.
Since the AO subprocessor is designed to be cooperative,
the PR can be designed to assume all requests, even from
other systems within the network are valid, provided
communication is designed so the source is known. Re-
quests from foreign systems would present a verification
problem since nothing may be known about such foreign
systems. A PR process will therefore be designed to re-
ceive requests only from processes within its system or
from other PR processes in the other systems of the net-
work. The PR functions can easily be defined as a sub-

8?
processor and delegated to future designers. An example
PR subprocessor is defined in Appendix c.
§®s^^clslonJV2- A process state is de-fined by a set of identifiable, typed, possi-bly related expression-states, and associatedinformation necessary for both subprocessor
allocation and interprocess interactions.
A process state will have identifiable substates
which will be called expression-states
. Expression-states
contain the stats information associated with the execution
of a subprocessor. Program interpretation information
along with data structures and their associated values would
be included. Expression-states are accessed and transformed
by subprocessors when they are applied to the process state.
Without the requirement that expression-states be
identifiable, subprocessors might not be able to distinguish
one expression-state from another. Accidental subprocessor
operations on expression-states other than the ones it should
be accessing might occur, with possibly undefined results.
In order to ensure that illegal process states did not occur,
the design would have to place additional constraints which
would restrict the generality available to process designers.
We could have said that expression-states could not interact.
There would then be no need for more than one expression-
state in a process state at a time. This solution would not




We could have restricted the process state from con-
taining more than one bype of expression-state. The whole
process state structure could have then been made subprc-
cessor type dependent. The state structure recognized by
the subprocessor could then be made to define different
expression-states* The system processor would only have to
know which subprocessor to apply and the subprocessor de-
signer would define all permissible operations on the pro-
cess state. Although this is simpler, it is not as general
as permitting multiple kinds of related expression-states
to exist within one process state.
Once the design permits a process state to contain
multiple kinds of expression-states, all subprocessors can
no longer be guaranteed to recognize all of them. For exam-
ple, a process state might contain three kinds of expression-
states related in a tree structure (root and two branches).
The appropriate subprocessor for either branch might be able
to interpret the root expression-state, but not the expres-
sion-state at the other branch.
If the design is to support well-defined processes,
each subprocessor must recognize when it has referenced a
new expression-state. This prevents a subprocessor from
accidentally transforming an expression-state because an
expression-state boundary was unwittingly crossed. The
network design must therefore provide expression-state de-
limiters in a process state so that it is possible to recog-
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nize all of the expression-states contained in It.
Expression-state recognition alone does not guarantee
well-defined processes. A subprocessor independent method
of identifying an expression-state as to its kind is also
needed. There is no way to guarantee, using independently
designed expression-states, that all subprocessors can de-
termine if a particular expression-state is one of the types
it can interpret „ The network defined process state struc-
tures must therefore provide that a type be associated with
each expression-state. A subprocessor when applied to a
process state, can then identify all of the expression-
states and know which ones- it can interpret. As long as an
expression-state is identifiable, typed substate of a pro-
cess state, no further constraints need be placed on its
internal structure, this is left up to the individual sub-
processor designers.
A process state contains, in addition to a set of
expression-states, the information necessary for the system
processor to carry out subprocessor allocation and inter-
process interactions. Since both of these operations in-
volve operations external to a process state they must be
performed by the system processor (constraint PlJ ) . The sys-
tem processor therefore must have access to the necessary
information. Such information cannot be maintained internal
to the expression-states because the system processor might
not be able to recognize it. Expression-state structures
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are defined by the subprocessor designers and not the system
processor designer. Therefore, the information must be part
of the network defined process state structure external to
expression-states.
A2_j_l - Subprocessor access to structures of
any "other type of expression-state must not
violate the conventions of the other expres-
sion-state's designer.
Identification of expression-states by type is not
sufficient to guarantee well-defined processes. The access
of subprocessors to other than their own type of expression-
states must be constrained so those expression-states are
not left in an improper form* The designer of an expression-
state defines the conventions that are to be followed and
the designer of any subprocessor which is to access it must
follow these conventions.
It would be impossible for any designer other than
the expression-state designer to decide on the conventions
to be followed when a subprocessor accesses each type of
expression-states since no constraints have been placed on
their design in the first place. The network design must
therefore delegate to that same designer the responsibility
for deciding what conventions must be followed upon another
subprocessor access to the expression-state. The designer
of each subprocessor is then responsible for ensuring that
the proper conventions are followed by it on access to a
particular type of expression state and that it does not
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transform any expression-state type it is not supposed to
access.
Control-Point
Design decision A 3 - "Control-Points" are
accountable object .
Control-Points like expression-states will be sub-
states of a process state. They will have associated with
them the information necessary for the system processor to
carry out its services with respect to the containing pro-
cess state. Control-points are an expression-state inde-
pendent interface between subprocessors and the system pro-
cessor. Subprocessor allocation and interprocess interac-
tion information can be associated with them and therefore
be maintained external to expression-states. The design
and use of such Information can thus be kept independent of
the design, and use of expression-states.
The concept of control-points as part of a process
state will simplify the design of the system processor. The
design of operations on the process state information asso-
ciated with control-points can be separated from the lan-
guage dependent transformations on the information contained
in expression-states. Since control-points are part of the
process state, their information can be operated upon local-
ly by a subprocessor operating on that process state. In
addition, the system processor can safely access the control-
point state information because the state structure is part
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of the network design and the same in all process states.
Control-points are also well-defined and therefore can be
interpreted by all system processors in the network.
The next several sections will describe the role con-
trol-points play in subprocessor allocation and interprocess
communication. It will not be possible to transform an ex-
pression-state, and hence a process state, without a control-
point. Competition for control-points is therefore a type
of interaction between processes for which process designers
must be held responsible. They are the only agents with
access to sufficient information to manage such interactions.
The AO subprocessor provides the only network guar-
anteed mechanism through which process designers can sub-
allocate control-points in the process tree, while main-
taining the ability to restrict their use or recover them.
As long as control-points are accountable objects, the AO
subprocessor will account for them and enforce a parent's
requirements placed on a child's use of them.
A3.1 - Individual control-points may be paired
wTUTT individual expression-states and more
than one such pair may exist in a process
state at one time.
When paired with an expression-state, the control-point
names that expression-state for all system processor pro-
vided services. Pairing a control-point with a particular
expression-state permits process designers to distinguish
it (for the system processor) from all the other expression-
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states in the process state. Although expression-estates are
typed, they are not really named since there may be more than
one expression-state of a given type in a process state.
Pairing a control-point with a particular expression-state
permits process management to use the control-point's state
to direct the system processor in performing its operation
with respect to that particular expression-state. As will
be seen later, this is particularly convenient with respect
to interprocess communication.
Having multiple expression-state/control-point
(ES/CP) pairs within a process state, permits a process de-
signer to select for interpretation more than one expression-
state at a time. Since control-points have associated with
them all the information necessary to direct the subproces-
sor in carrying out all operations which are not local to a
process state, they must contain the information necessary
for subprocessor allocation. Multiple ES/CP pairs permit
more than one expression-state at a time to be involved in




- When paired with an expression-state, a
control-point will have associated with it the
type of subprocessor to be applied.
The subprocessor type associated with a control-
point that is paired with an expres3lon-state Informs the
systems processor which type of subprocessor is to be

applied to that expression-state. Process designers can
thus control what kind of subprocessor Is to applied to a
particular expression-state by ensuring that the ES/CP
pair has the correct subprocessor type associated with it.
The system processor could not otherwise determine which
subprocessor to apply to a particular ES/CP pair. The sys-
tem processor can therefore operate in a. purely reflex man-
ner and not be concerned about any potential ambiguity in
the mapping of subprocessor type onto expression-state type.
Design decision A*i - Control-points will serve
as uniquely named destination addresses for inter-
process messages. The arrival of such messages,
as well as local subprocessor operations, may des-
ignate an ES/CP pair as requesting a subprocessor,
regardless of the status of other pairs. The sys-
tem processor will apply at most one subprocessor
to a process state each process step.
If interprocess communication is to be permitted be-
tween the processes in the network, there must be some way
of unambiguously directing each message to the destination
process. Control-points are used to name particular ex-
pression-states within the process state. By using them
for communication also, other processes are able to direct
their messages to a particular ES/CP pair within a process
state, not just to the process Itself. Addressing an inter-
action to a control-point name In effect addresses the pro-
cess which contains an ES/CP pair by that name. Process
designers thus need not be concerned about the residence of
the destination process as far as message delivery is con-
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cerned. Directing messages to particular ES/CP pairs pro-
vides a generality for- process designers not normally avail-
able.
If control-point3 are uniquely named and messages
directed to particular ES/CP pairs the system processor can
complete the delivery. If the messages were directed only
to the process then the subprocessors would have to deliver
them to the appropriate expression-state. Constraints would
have to be placed on all subprocessor designers to ensure
they all did it by the same conventions. This would be a
restriction of their design freedom which is not necessary
when the system processor delivers messages to uniquely
named ES/CP pairs.
The system processor must know when a process is re-
questing that subprocessors be applied. Part of the status
of a control-point must then be whether or not it is making
such a request (Demand Status).
When a given subprocessor is interpreting the process
state, it would be arbitrary to prevent that subprocessor
from changing the demand status of the other ES/CP pairs in
that process state. Process designers should have the
flexibility to make use of such intraprocess (interexpres-
slon-state) control operations. This design choice is con-
sistent with our desire to permit subprocessor designers to
perform any operation which remains local to a process
state, provided of course it does not violate any of the
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other constraints or design decisions.
Interprocess messages could have been received pas-
sive] y in the sense that each subprocessor would have had
to look in a buffer to see if there were any pending mes-
sages. Active designation of an ES/CP as demanding a sub-
processor upon the receipt of an interprocess message would
be analogous to Interprocess interrupts and provide a much
more flexible control mechanism.
At a minimum, some sort of wake-up signal has been
accepted as a necessary mechanism in most of the systems
recently designed. This makes a wait loop unnecessary. A
process may go to sleep pending such signals. The wakeup
mechanism can be considered a type of message from some
special system process. In such designs the "system pro-
cess" is a routine buried in the operating system struc-
tures. In our design, the operating system is not unique.
It would be a set of processes, managed like all other pro-
cesses by process designers, whose most important attribute
is their relative position in the process hierarchy. There
is no reason why only a system process should have such
abilities in general. The active receipt of messages in
our network design permits interprocess interactions to have
the same effect and provide process management the desired
generality.
The introduction of message activated ES/CP pairs
(message sets the pair demanding) means that more than one
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such pair in each process state could be demanding a sub-
processor at one time (just as for active hierarchial in-
terrupt routines). If only subprocessor operations local
to a process could have activated other pairs , such opera-
tions could have been constrained so that the subprocessor
made sure that only one such pair was requesting at a time.
To require the same thing for interprocess messages would
require interacting with at least one system processor. The
system processor would have to be greatly complicated if it
had to provide information to a message generating subpro-
cessor on what the receiving process was doing. The trans-
mitting process might experience long delays waiting for
necessary information if the processes were in different
systems.
Permitting more than one ES/CP pair, within a process
state, to be requesting a subprocessor greatly simplifies the
design. The system processor does not have to provide ser-
vices to a process about what the other process is doing
and the generating subprocessor does not have to include
provisions for such interactions with the system processor.
An incoming message may designate an ES/CP pair as demanding
a subprocessor independently of the status of other pairs.
Multiple demanding ES/CP pairs within one process
state introduce a potential ambiguity into process behavior
which must be removed. If the processes in the network are
to be well-defined, both process designers and the system
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processor must know unambiguously which one of a set of de-
manding ES/CP pairs will receive the subprocessor. In order
to prevent subprocessor race conditions for access to parts
of a process state, and still permit multiple subprocessors
to access that state, either disjoint environments or inter-
subprocessor race resolving would be required.
The only reason to have multiple expression-states
in a single process is to share environments. Requiring
expression-state environments always to be disjoint is
equivalent to putting them in separate processes. The sys-
tem processor might be able to check for disjoint environ-
ments within a process-state before applying the subpro-
cessors. Even if decision procedures could be determined
for some initial set of subprocessors, any additions to the
set would require modifications to the procedures and great-
ly complicate the network design. We have attempted to
keep the system processor simple and design it in a way
which permits the simple introduction of new subprocessors.
Requiring it to determine disjoint environments at subpro-
cessor allocation time is a complication not necessary if
the system processor applies only one subprocessor to the
process state each process step.
Subprocessors cannot take care of this problem them-
selves because it would require inter-subprocessor inter-
actions which would violate the basic independence of sub-
processors. We introduced subprocessors so they could be
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independently designed v\rith no concern for* what other sub-
processors are doing. Each subprocessor designer knows that
no other subprocessor can access the process state until it
has completed its operation. A process will undergo a pro-
cess step each time a subprocessor is applied to its process
state.
The system processor and process designers must not
encounter any ambiguities concerning which subprocessor will
be applied to a process state containing more than one de-
manding ES/CP pair. Therefore, there must be a well-defined
decision procedure which both the system processor and pro-
cess designer can use to make such a determination.
It would be arbitrary for this design to say which
such procedure must be used. Preemptive (priority) or non-
preemptive alternatives are possible. In the case of non-
preemptive, once an ES/CP pair had a subprocessor applied
to it, it would continue having it applied until it had
completed its operations. In the case of the priority
hierarchy (preemptive), a higher priority ES/CP pair might
become demanding before the lower priority pair had com-
pleted. In this case, the system processor would cease
applying a subprocessor to the lower priority pair (at the
end of that process step) and start applying one to the
higher priority pair. Such a modification of subprocessor
application before an ES/CP pair has completed its sequence




Faults ,011 the other hand, will be defined as occur-
ring while a subprocessor Is carrying out a process step, re-
sulting in a change in the sequence in which the subprocessor
is interpreting the current program stream. During the exe-
cution of a subprocessor, certain abnormal conditions may
occur which normally require the subprocessor to change the
sequence of transformations it is carrying out. The actual
mechanism used must, of course, be language dependent and
therefore part of the design of that subprocessor. Faults
are always handled as operations local to the expression-
state which was being interpreted when the fault occurred.
A*i.l - Each process state, except the PR Pro-
cess state, will contain an ES/CP pair which
can interrupt all others In that process and
which can be interpreted by the AO subproces-
sor.
We have delegated to the AO subprocessor designer
the responsibility for fulfilling the network responsibili-
ties for accountable objects. It is of utmost importance
that it not be possible for any process to prevent the AO
subprocessor from carrying out its duties.
Any process must be capable of accepting at least
one control-point in order to accomplish any transformations
on the process state. Each process state will thus contain
at least one accountable object (that CP) which the AO sub-
processor must protect and account for. The AO designer
must be permitted to maintain whatever information is
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necessary for the AC) subprocessor to do its job, Irrespective
of what else the process may be doing. Each process sta.te
must therefore contain an expression-state where such in-
formation is maintained and available to the AO subprocessorc
In order for the AO subprocessor to be applied, the expres-
sion-state must be paired with a control-point. Each pro-
cess state must therefore always have an ES/CP pair to which
the AO subprocessor can be applied.
A process must never prevent the AO subprocessor from
being applied when the ES/CP pair is demanding the AO sub-
processor. Since the system processor applies subprocessors
to process states , according to some well-defined algorithm,
the design must constrain the algorithm by which this is
done. The AO subprocessor must be applied when demanded,
in spite of what other requests for subprocessor application
are outstanding within a process state. The AO subprocessor
ES/CP pair must therefore interrupt all other- subprocessors.
This is the only way the necessary guarantee (that the pro-
cess cannot lock out the AO subprocessor) can be made to the
designer of the AO subprocessor.
A*j.2 - In addition to its basic functions, the
A~0 subprocessor will be responsible for regu-
lating process birth, death, and intersystem
movement.
Because of possible effects on accountable objects,
the design must (decision Al ) delegate to the AO subproces-
sor designer the responsibility for validating process birth,
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death, and intersystem movement. For example, a process
must not be permitted to commit suicide and destroy some
delegated accountable objects. Birth arid intersystem move-
ment of processes may also effect the accountable objects
for which the AO subprocessor is responsible. The AO sub-
processor designer must be able to prevent all such problems,
The network design cannot permit arbitrary subpro-
cessors to fulfill these responsibilities since this would
require interference with their design (Al) to obtain appro-
priate guarantees. The design therefore must not permit
them to perform process birth, death, or- intersystem move-
ment. By requiring the requests for these operations to be
forwarded to the AO subprocessor, the AO designer can con-
trol what will be permitted and what will not. The network
design thus fulfills its responsibilities with respect to
accountable objects, and to the AO subprocessor designer.
Communication
Design decision A5 - A process may generate a
single interprocess message each process step,
which is broadcast by the system processor to
a particular buffer associated with the destina-
tion control-point. Process designers can control
the right to transmit, the right to listen, and
the right to allow an ES/CP pair to become de-
manding as a result of a buffered message.
Process designers must decide what message to gener-
ate and the information necessary to generate the message
must come from within the process state. Since message
generation is therefore a local operation on a process
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state, responsibility for it can be delegated to the sub-
processors. The transmission and delivery of that message
are not operations local to one process state and therefore
must be performed by the Involved system processors. Al-
though the design of subprocessors has been delegated, the
design of the system processor has not. Several constraints
must therefore be placed on the design of message genera-
tion so that the system processor design can be completed.
A subprocessor may generate only a single message
each process step. This choice was made primarily for sim-
plicity and because it does not really restrict a process
designer since the process can r< petitively generate a new
message on each process step. The design of the system
processor is simplified since it does not need the additional
operators required to dispatch multiple messages from each
process. In addition, although a subprocessor may hit a
bound during the generation of a message because of the
size of the message, after it is generated the system pro-
cessor sees only a single bounded message. The complexity
of a message is subprocessor dependent. Although a sub-
processor may require multiple process steps to construct
a message, the system processor need not be concerned with
such problems.
After generation by a subprocessor, the messages are
"broadcast" by the system processor to a particular buffer
associated with the destination control-point. "Broadcast"
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means that the system processor will transmit the message
immediately. There will be no intersystem synchronization
to determine if the destination process is not listening,
or already has a message in that buffer. The destination
CF might not even be a member of some ES/CP pair which would
result in the network ignoring the message.
These types of interactions due to interprocess mes-
sage handDing are the responsibility of process designers,
not the system processor. When a process says transmit,
the system processor may not knew enough about the reasons
for the request to say such a command is correct or not.
Only a process designer can know. For example, there may
be processes which wish to overwrite an old message if it
has not already been interpreted by the destination process
(e.g., a real time clock interrupt). Since there is no def-
inition of the relative speeds of systems in the network,
nothing can be said about how soon (number of process
steps) the message will be delivered if the receiving
process is in another system.
If process designers are to be able to control the
use of a flexible interprocess communication mechanism, they
must be able to control the right to transmit to a particu-
lar buffer associated with the destination control-point.
Although a single receiving buffer could have been asso-
ciated with each control-point, this would have been un-
necessarily constraining on process designers. Two pro-
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cesses in different systems, interacting with a third, would
have to interact themselves to ensure that only one of them
at a time was using the buffer. If only a single buffer for
each ES/CP pair was allowed, the receiving process, of course,
could provide as many ES/CP pairs as necessary to receive
messages from different processes, but this seems like an
unnecessary waste of control-points. Multiple buffers
(which need not be created unless desired) provide a more
flexible interprocess interaction capability without sig-
nificant complication.
Each buffer can be thought of as a queue capable of
containing one or more messages. The most degenerate queue
is of size one and is the simpllst from a design point of
view, but larger buffer queue sizes might be useful for cer-
tain kinds of applications. At this point in the design it
would be arbitrary to say what the queue length must be.
If a logically infinite queue is considered, then
the design must consider the fact that the implementation
might actually have a fixed number of buffers to use. This
is just the boundedness problem and therefore must be con-
sidered anyway. If the queue length is logically finite
then the design must consider what to do in the case of
queue overflow. For example, the newest message would force
the oldest message to be lost. This is what is done in the
case of length one (e.g., message overwrite). Message re-
ceipt resolution in a digital system can be no better than
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the system cycle. It will be pointed out later that a pro-
cess step in this design occurs only once every three system
cycles. The queue greater than one would permit the system
to resolve messages each system cycle instead of once each
process step. In this design a queue of three would give
the system cycle message resolution if the process cleared
the queue each process step.
The design requires a source to direct messages to
particular control-point buffers. Process designers can
then be provided mechanisms for controlling Interprocess
interactions due- to competition for buffers by providing
control over the right to transmit to particular buffers.
Single or multiple rights could be provided (such rights
will be accountable objects managed by process designers).
Multiple rights to transmit to a single buffer might result
in race conditions. The resolution of such conflicts between
asynchronous systems would require a significant complication
of the system processors. Therefore, the use of multiple
rights to transmit to one buffer must be cooperative and
either Involve only identical messages (an interrupt) or be
used by only one process at a time.
The design will also provide process designers with
the ability to control when a process will listen (buffer a
message) and when the ES/CP will demand a subprocessor to
take care of buffered messages. Although control of trans-
mission is sufficient to accomplish this, local control of
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message buffering by the receiving process makes the process
designer's job simpler. Since the buffers associated witn a
control-point are contained in the system containing the
destination control-point, informing a system processor to
listen or not is simple. Controlling the rights to transmit
would present processes a much more difficult task. For ex-
ample, a process might become uncooperative and start trans-
mitting arbitrary messages to all buffers to which it has a
right to transmit. It may take numerous process steps be-
fore its parent can be notified, and can discipline the
child. Control over listening solves this problem easily.
Each control-point buffer records one complete in-
corning message. Process designers in addition to control-
ling the listening of each buffer, will be able to control
when such buffered messages will cause the ES/CP pair to
demand a subprocessor to process such messages. They are
the only agents who know enough about the design of their
processes to safely do this.
Foreign systems were introduced as a result of con-
straint Al to provide an open network. Since nothing is
assumed to be known by the network designers about foreign
systems or their processes, foreign systems must not be
permitted to violate any of the network constraints or de-
sign decisions. Thus, the only interactions which can be
permitted by foreign systems with the network will be the
exchange of messages with processes in the network.
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Such communication will look no different than any
normal interprocess communication. A control-point capable
of serving as a destination for messages from foreign sys-
tems will have a single buffer associated for each such
source. Process management will have all of the mechanisms
discussed above for controlling the receipt of such messages.
Transmission to foreign systems will be represented only a
a collection of rights to transmit to some destination "con-
trol-points" which do not exist in the network.
Process designers will be responsible for controlling
interactions with such systems including the interpretation
of such messages and other related matters. The network de-
sign thus fulfills its responsibilities by constraining the
interactions between foreign systems and the network sys-
tems to occur only using normal interprocess communication
mechanisms. By constraining such interactions to occur only
with the processes in the network, and not the systems them-
selves, process designers can be held responsible for the
management of such interactions.
A basic description of the operation of the system
processor can now be given. Each system processor is de-
fined as having a major cycle consisting of three phases .
A process may undergo one process step each major cycle.
The requirement for phases is a direct consequence of the
fact that the system processor must perform all of the oper-
ations not local to a process state without race conditions.
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Some of these operations are sequential in nature. During
the first phase (subprocessor allocation determination) the
system processor determines if any buffered messages should
cause an ES/CP .pair to request a subprocessor. Using this
information and information about all other requesting pairs,
it determines v/hich ES/CP pair within each process state
should have the subprocessor applied, and delivers messages
to that control-point if that is appropriate. The second
phase is subprocessor application. During this phase sub-
processors dispose of messages and carry out other operations
on the process state. These subprocessor transformations
will constitute that process step. The final phase is mes-
sage dispatching. Any messages which viere generated by the
subprocessors during the process step are dispatched by the
system processor and the next cycle begins.
Definition » Modification, and Bounds
Design decision A 6 - The initial network def-
inition will consist of one basic system with
an initial root process state. Network modi-
fication operators will permit the creation of
at least additional basic systems, subproces-
sors, subprocessor operators, and system pro-
cessor operators for control-point housekeeping.
Network modification was introduced in the previous
chapter (C5) and the network designers were delegated re-
sponsibility for definition of the initial network and all
potential evolutionary paths. Without evolution, a particu-
lar network definition would have to be chosen which might
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handicap some potential applications of the network design,,
A minimum network, with evolution, permits each application
to evolve the network definition to fulfill its own needs
(within the constraints placed on evolution by the network
designers). This design tries, wherever possible, to dele-
gate to the users, authority and responsibility for those
decisions best made in the context of their applications.
All basic systems will consist of a system processor
itaining the three required subprocessors and a PR process
state. In addition, the initial basic system must also con-
tain a root process state which serves as the initial root
of the process tree, defines an initial set of accountable
objects, and by repeatedly executing or delegating modifica-
tion operators, generates the particular network definition
desired.
The set of network modification operators, operate
on the definition itself and not on the process states. They
are meta operators and either act as a no-op if the request
is for a permissible path of evolution or fault if it is
not (N4). Such evolution, other than the addition of a new
system, must be local to the system within which the opera-
tor was executed (M5), and process designers must be able to
limit the effects of a such operations to the process exe-
cuting them (N6)
.
A (5.1 - The design of modification operators
will be delegated to subprocessor designers.
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Modification operators will not introduce
new modification operators.
Along with the initial network definition, the net-
.work designer is responsible for all evolutionary paths, but
process designers are responsible for selecting which evolu-
tionary paths to follow (D6). Modification operators there-
fore must be available to the root process, in the initial
languages provided, if it is to be able to create the desired
networks. Since language design has been delegated to sub-
processor designers, the design of the modification opera-
tor themselves, must also be delegated to the subprocessor
designer.
The problem of proving that a modification operator
does not permit a violation of any of the constraints or
design, decisions is greatly simplified if we do not permit
a modification operator to introduce another modification
operator. Such operators would require recursive proofs
which seem to be impractical. The design of the original
operators seems to present sufficient challenge for the pre-
sent.
Design decision A7 - Inaccessible objects may
result from meta-operations invoked by imple-
mentation designers because either a subpro-
cessor hits a bound or there is an implementa-
tion failure. Subprocessors trying to access
an inaccessible object will fault.
The network design is to include bounded computer
systems (PI). Problems due to having limited physical re-
sources which the implementation cannot solve and which
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affects a process state in the network, must be reflected in
the process state structure so process designers may amelior-
ate the consequences (D'J).
Implementation failures are a special case of the
boundedness problem. Given any implementation, there is some
probability it will fail, the particular probability being a
function primarily of the finite physical implementation.
By increasing the assets available, implementation design-
ers could reduce the probability of such failures. In the
limit, such failures could be eliminated, but since no im-
plementation will have unlimited resources, provision for
implementation failures must be included as part of the
boundedness problem.
Inaccessible Objects are a sufficient solution to
the problems of implementation failures. When the implementa-
tion recognizes a problem which it cannot solve, it will
identify the smallest logical unit of the process state
which contains the damage (this might be the value of a var-
iable or the whole process state itself). The implementation
will then mark this smallest unit as an inaccessible object
and continue until such time as a subprocessor attempts to
access that part, of the process state. The subprocessor will
be caused to fault when it attempts to access an inaccessible
object. This mechanism is sufficient since it does accom-
plish notification of damage to a process potentially capa-
ble of doing something to ameliorate the problem. If no
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process ever tries to access the information then no notifi-
cation occurs.
If the design required the implementation to notify
some process when an inaccessible object occurred, some de-
termination would have to be made of which process to notify,
how, and when. This probably cannot be properly decided by
implementation designers since they do not know enough about
what process designers were trying to accomplish.
Creating inaccessible objects within a process state
must be a met a operation to the defined network since the
decision of when and how to do it must be delegated to the
implementation designers. It is meta in the sense that the
creation of the inaccessible objects is not formally defined
as an operator in the network definition. The processes
cannot execute an operation and create one, they are created
only by the implementation. Subprocessor designers must de-
fine what their subprocessors will do upon receiving a fault
saying it has attempted to access an inaccessible object.
There is nothing in the design which v^ould prohibit
some type of "meta deal" between subprocessor designers and
implementation designers so that an elastic bound fault will
occur instead of creating an inaccessible object in some
cases. The operands to an operation might not be destroyed
until the implementation is sure the operation can complete.
This would permit the implementation to return things to the
way they were at the beginning of the operation and return a

fault to the subprocessor saying the operation would have
resulted in an "inaccessible object" if completed. Process
designers might then be able to take care of the problem.
Although the root process contains an initial set of
accountable objects, as the network evolves this set may net
be sufficient. For example, as the network definition is
modified to permit the system processor to take care of addi-
tional control points, process management will want to intro-
duce into the process states new accountable objects repre-
senting those additional control points. Since the modifi-
cation operators are no-ops and do not modify the process
states, an additional operator must exist to introduce the
necessary accountable objects. The designer cf the AO sub-
processor chooses particular representations for accountable
objects and therefore must define the operations which intro-
duce new accountable objects, although some of the operators
could be delegated to other subprocessor designers under
Bl. Heta arrangements with the implementer which define
mappings between accountable objects and particular opera-
tors in the system processor structure is also the AO de-
signers responsibility. These are not modification operators
since they operate. on the process state and not on the system
processor definition.
A7 . 1 - Implementation failures affecting the




If damage occurs only to accountable objects, a suf-
ficient solution is to handle it using the inaccessible ob-
ject mechanism. Host likely, the designer of the AO subpro-
cessor will invoke another meta arrangement with the imple-
mentation which will permit the implementers to notify the
AO ES/CP of such damaged accountable objects. The AO sub-
processor can then be invoked to provide some services to
the process to help it solve the problem. Such operations
are not necessary and, as part of the AO subprocessor design,
they are not of interest here.
When part of the accountability chain is destroyed
but some of the accountable objects are not damaged, that
part of the chain relevant to those objects can be recon-
structed through ghost processes . A ghost process is an in-
accessible object, except for the AO type ES/OP pair which
contains a reconstructed accountability chain. It is up to
the implementation designers to do the best they can to put
the chain back together by providing the appropriate informa-
tion to the AO subprocessor. Since there is a unique name
for all processes (tree of process names), such reconstruc-
tion of the chain is possible as long as the accountable
object themselves exist. The design choice here is to re-
quire the implementers to do the reconstruction wherever
possible.
Some of the subprocessor designers may wish to pro-
vide some services to permit the processes to be notified of
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problems with the accountable object chain, but again, this
is not necessary. Since processes may exist in different
systems, the mechanism as presented here would still be
necessary since the system containing a damaged process
state might undergo several process steps before the noti-
fied process is able to act.
Initial System Choi ces
This chapter has informally presented the essential
network features of the design. The constraints and design
decisions define the members of the set of networks that are
of interest,, Specific selections must now be made to define
the initial network system from which the desired networks
within the set may evolve. Although all networks within the
set are potentially reachable, any particular design might
limit those reachable by providing an appropriate selection
of modification operators. Since the definition of modifi-
cation operators has been delegated to the subprocessor de-
signers, little more will be said about which evolutionary
paths will be available in any particular network.
The initial system will not be highly evolved and
therefore will provide maximum potential for evolution.
This is good because it encourages the subprocessor designers
to include the general meta modification operators which can
create those specific features which might be desirable.
Below is a list of the structures to be included in the
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Initial network definition and following it will be a de-
scription of some of the reasons for those particular choices.
Initial System Processor
A. Service functions - not local to a process,
Subprocessor application by priority.









PR type control-point and expression-
state.
Initial root process state.
AO and GP type expression-3tate.




PR - one priority.
AO - highest.




Buffers, each with an arm bit.
PR - 1 for each network system.
1 acknowledge
1 for each process In that system
AC - 3 + N, Interface, acknowledge,
parent, + 1 for each child
BP - fixed number - (initial 1).
Enable bit
Deliver order bit
The initial network definition consists of one sys-
tem processor (containing the AO, GP, and PR subprocessors
)
along with a PR process state and an initial root process
state (A7). A priority hierarchy of control-points has been
chosen as the method by which the initial system processor
will determine which subprocessors to apply to a process
state with more than one demanding ES/CP pair. Within the
system, all requesting processes will receive a subprocessor
in parallel each process step. The priority mechanism was
chosen because it is simple, unambiguous, and provides an
interrupt capability. If our choosing this particular al-
gorithm becomes a serious constraint on the introduction of
others because of the set of modification operators provided,
it is a constraint which can be tolerated because it al-




In addition to subprocessor application, there are
several other services which the system processor will per-
form. Subprocessors generate messages, but must leave them
for the system processor to dispatch (an operation not local
to that process). The same is true of message delivery.
Operators must therefore exist in the system processor to
perform these operations and to do the housekeeping for the
buffers associated with control-points.
The AO subprocessor will indicate a process state
which is validly requesting transmission to another system
and designate the system to whlch.it is to be sent. The
system processor will then deliver the marked process state
to the local PR process for transmission to the destination
system. The PR process will then transmit that process
state to the appropriate destination PR control-point buffer.
The destination PR process will acknowledge receiving either
the process state or an inaccessible object, prepare the
state just received to run in the new system, if appropriate,
and present it to the system processor to start. Since
starting a process is not local to the PR process state, it
must be performed by the system processor.
One last service to be provided by the system proces-
sor has to do with modification operators. Subprocessors
will place in the interface buffers valid modification com-
mands. The system processor will execute operators to clear
the buffer during the message dispatching phase. The system
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processor will undergo modification at the end of the mes-
sage dispatching phase (after all operators have completed)
so that at the beginning of the message delivery phase the
new system definition will be in effect. This provides a
well-defined place in the operation of each system processor
where the definition change occurs.
The PR process state will contain only PR type ex-
pression-states while the initial root process will contain
both AC) and GP type expression-states. Control-points will
be one of the types PR, AO, and GP, and all ES/CP pairs will
pair control-points and expression-states of the same type.
In the initial definition there is no need for more compli-
cated pairings.
There will be a fixed number of control-points in
the network and additions to this set will occur only
through network modification.
A more dynamic generation of control-point names by
the system processor as part of its auxiliary functions
would have been possible (instead of requiring modification)
but this would have unnecessarily complicated the message
handling and subprocessor application operations. The trade
off required for a non-fixed number of control-points is
added system processor cycles. Iteration is required for
message updating and subprocessor application Instead of




Each control-point will be permanently associated
with one subprocessor type (GP, A0 S PR) and will have a
static position in the priority hierarchy. The static bind-
ing of subprocessor type and priority to control-point name
simplifies the design of subprocessor application operators
for the initial network definition. These items become part
of the control-point name thus simplifying representations.
A priority will be associated with all control-points.
PR control-points do not compete with other control-points
for subprocessors. The AO control-points will have higher
priority than all other control-points in a process so that
they will interrupt all other ES/CP pairs in that process
(A6). All AO types may share the same priority since there
will only be one such control-point competing in each pro-
cess state.
Each GP type control-point will be assigned a unique
priority. The initial network system will contain only one
GP type control-point and modification operators will be
used to generate the desired number of additional GP type
control-points. An evolved network with multiple GP control-
points j each with a unique priority, will permit multiple
GP type ES/CP pairs, having interrupt capabilities, to be
contained in one process state.
A demand bit will be associated with each control-
point, when it is a member of an ES/CP pair, to indicate
that it is demanding a subprocessor. An arm bit will be
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associated with each control-point buffer to indicate
whether or not the system processor should accept a mes-
sage destined for that buffer. All buffers will have a
queue length of one for simplicity. The PR control-point
will initially have one buffer for the initial root process
and ons message acknowledgment buffer. An additional buf-
fer will be added each time a new system is added to the
network definition or a new process is started in that
system (and deleted when that process is killed or moved).
This will permit maximum freedom of movement of the processes
over the systems in the network. PR control-point buffers
are always armed.
The AO control-point will have an interface buffer,
an acknowledgment buffer, a buffer for the parent process,
and one buffer for each child with which the AO subproces-
sor can conduct its interprocess business. An Interface
buffer is required for each process, to be used by the sys-
tem processor, for message dispatching and delivery. Only
one Is necessary since the design ensures that the system
processor will only operate on it when no subprocessor is
being applied, and at most one message is generated by that
process in a single process step. Since an AO control-point
exists in each process, the interface buffer can be associ-
ated with it. The network design puts no limit on the num-
ber of children a process may have, and they will each have
an AO type control-point which will need to talk to their
parent. One buffer is also needed to receive messages from
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the parent. Such a mechanism is necessary to ensure that
no accountable object will be lost because of race con-
ditions for a single buffer. AO control-points are always
armed.
In the case of both PR and AO control-points there
will always be at least one buffer which will be coopera-
tively used to receive acknowledgments. One buffer is suf-
ficient as long as they transmit only one message at a
time and wait for the acknowledged receipt of that message.
If, due to operational requirements, it is desirable to
have more than one message in transit at a time, then modif-
ication operators can be executed to create the desired
number of additional acknowledgment buffers.
Each GP control-point will have a fixed number of
buffers, not necessarily the same for all control-points.
The Initial definition will include only one buffer with
its single GP type control-point. One buffer is necessary
since we must have an open network (CI). The single buf-
fer will serve as a destination address to which foreign
systems can send messages in the initial network. This
will permit messages to direct the root process to stop or
start and to inject a program into it which will generate
the- proper network. Arming GP control-point buffers is the
responsibility of process management. GP control-point buf-
fers are automatically disarmed when a process requests to
move to a different system.
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Each control-point will have an enable bit to indi-
cate whether or not a message should be processed to cause
an interrupt. A message coming in for a control-point
which is currently demanding will not affect it until it
ceases demanding. This permits the subprocessor designer
to know that there will be no messages to be taken care of
before the present sequence of operations are completed and
the demand bit is turned off. It will be turned back on if
any messages are pending. PR and AO control-points are al-
ways enabled, GP control-points will be under GP program
control by the process designer.
The last item to be included with each control-
point will be a del 1ve r o rder bit. When a control-point
(with priority high enough to interrupt another ES/CP
pair and enabled) is in receipt of one or more messages,
the system processor must decide which message to deliver.
Since the buffers are individually named, a priority can
be associated with each of them. The system processor can
then deliver either the highest priority buffered message
or all such buffered messages for that control-point. No
reason hat been found to choose one delivery method over
the other so both will be permitted. The deliver order
bit provides process management control over which method




A problem Is introduced when a modification oper-
ator introduces a new system into the network definition.
Potentially the new system could send a process to all
other systems before each system has the required PR buf-
fer for the new system. The design must ensure that a
process not be lost in this way* Since modification oper-
ators must be executed local to the system being modified
(N5), a modify operator changing each PR control-point buf-
fer set must be executed in each system. A PR process there-
fore will not transmit to any other system until it Is in-
formed by a message from the PR process in each other sys-
tem, that the buffer has been created.
The initial network definition as presented above
will be formally defined in Appendix C. In addition,
since it is not very enlightening because of Its simplicity,
Appendix C will also present a two system network defini-
tion, with additional process states and control-points to
illustrate better the network design.
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For the designer of advanced informa-
tion systems, a vital requirement of any
operating system is that it allows him to
change the mode of operation it controls;
otherwise his freedom of design can be ser-
iously limited. (Per Brinch Hansen (ed. ) -
Ha 71a, p. 13)
CHAPTER k
SYSTEM COMPARISONS
Summary o f Network Structures
J j my features of the design presented in this thesis
have been used in other designs. The usefulness of this de-
sign arises chiefly because of its organization which pro-
vides process state structures and defines operations on
these structures which permits the delegation of authority
and responsibility over process behavior to the appropriate
interacting agent. Most contemporary operating system pro-
blems are thus either circumvented or solved with only mini-
mal constraints being placed on the users. The generality
of our network makes it a useful model for studying other
system designs. This section will summarize the relevant
properties which a network, as described in chapter three,
would possess. The next section will discuss, and compare
with our network, two systems which use a hierarchial pro-
cess structure (RC^IOOO and TENEX) and one general network
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(ARPA). The final two sections of this chapter will discuss
some further research, and summarize what this thesis has
accomplished along with some of the benefits to be gained
from it.
The previous chapters presented the design of a logi-
cal network which will support well-defined processes. If
the processes were not well-defined, investigation into the
properties of the network and the processes it will support
\ tld be difficult, if not impossible. The whole design
must be well-defined if useful services and facilities are
to be developed. If the network is not well-defined, guar-
anteeing its present logical properties would be difficult.
The initial design cannot be expected to include all
future concepts; therefore it must be designed so some of the
design responsibilities can be delegated to future designers.
Users must be delegated responsibility for the control of
process behavior. The network designer cannot hope to fore-
cast what all potential users of the network will want to do
or what algorithms will be necessary to manage the processes
they create. Only the users know what they expect their
processes to do. For the delegation of design responsibili-
ties to be successful, the processing components (network,
system, subprocessor) , and interactions between them and
the processes running on the network must be clearly defined.
The delegation of responsibility for the control of process
behavior is only possible if process, process state, and
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process step are clearly understood, along with intraprocess
and interprocess interactions. Since processes may attempt
to become uncooperative, the network must provide to the
user facilities for the management of such processes. If
interesting applications are to be developed, general pro-
cess state structures and transformations on these struc-
tures must be provided. If any significant software stabil-
ity is to exist, the design must be machine and technology
independent.
A network is defined as a set of asynchronous (no
definition of the relative speeds at which the systems are
carrying out their operations) interacting digital systems.
Interactions between them are possible only using broadcast
messages (message transmission occurs without regard for the
state of the- destination system, as with asynchronous inter-
rupts)
.
The logical network that a user will see is being de-
signed here, not the physical systems upon which the defini-
tion will be implemented. For example, since the design
does not constrain the relative speeds of the network sys-
tems nor how messages are physically moved from one system
to another, the implementer is free to use whatever tech-
niques and protocols are desirable. What physically happens
between the time when one logical system transmits a message
and the other logical system receives it, or how long the
procedure takes is the implement er f s business and not part
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of the network design.
Dealing with logically asynchronous systems has the
advantage that Individual system designers and implementers
need net be concerned with what other systems are doing, ex-
cept for the asynchronous communication. On the other hand,
if the users want logical synchronization between processes
running on different systems in the network, they must ac-
complish it using asynchronous interprocesses communications,
rather than by relying on synchronization of the steps of
the systems (intersystem lockstep is not defined in the net-
work)
.
The operations of each network system are carried out
by a system processor which includes a set of subprocesors
that carry out transformations on the expression-states with-
in a process state. System processor execution takes pla
in three phases: subprocessor allocation, subprocessor
application, and message dispatching. Each process in the
network has a single process state (contained in one system
at a time) and is said to undergo one process step each time
a subprocessor is applied to that state. A process step be-
comes the only invariant measure of "time" in the network.
The system processor will use Information contained
in the process state to apply subprocessors, but will apply
only one subprocessor to a process state each process step.
Since only one system processor has access to a process
state at a time, subprocessor application becomes an opera-
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tion local to that system.
Subprocessor designers do not have to be concerned
with race conditions due to simultaneous access to a process
state because only one subprocessor is applied to it each
process step. The design of subprocessor operations which
require more than one process step, must still solve race
problems. Interrupts might occur between process steps 5
causing a different subprocessor to be applied, or the same
subprocessor to be applied to a different part of the process
state. If process designers choose to permit Interrupts,
they must take the appropriate actions to ensure that the
occurrence of an interrupt does not have an improper effect
on the- process.
Each process state is composed of a set of typed ex-
pression-states (EC)
s
soma of which may be paired with con-
trol-points (CP) to form ES/CP pairs. All transformations
local to a process state are carried out by the subproces-
sors. An operation is local to a process state if the pro-
cess state contains all of the information necessary for the
operation and if the effects of the transformation are con-
tained in that same process state „ Expression-states con-
tain all of the information necessary for subprocessor
operation. All operations which are not local to a process
state are carried out by the system processor using informa-
tion associated with the control-points.
The system processor only accesses control-point
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Information and not information in expression states, there-
fore the internal structure of expression-states can be made
subprocessor dependent. Certain expression-states may be
interpretable by only a subset of the subprocessors in the
network. Subprocessors are constrained from arbitrarily
accessing a type of expression-state other than their own.
If a subprocessor designer wishes for it to have access to
another expression-state type, then the subprocessor must
be designed to abide by the conventions laid down by the
designer of the other expression-state.
The second part of an ES/CP pair is a control-point*
A control-point has associated with it the information
necessary for subprocessor application (type of subproces-
sor to be applied, priority, demand bit) and interprocess
communication (unique name, destination buffers with arm
bits, enable bit). Control-points provide a common inter-
face for interaction between subprocessors and the system
processor.
Process designers use the demand bit to request that
a subprocessor be applied to that ES/CP pair. It may be set
locally by a subprocessor operating on the containing pro-
cess state or because of the receipt of a message destined
for that control-point. If more than one ES/CP pair lias
its demand bit on, the system processor uses the priority
associated with each control-point (priority assignment is
static and arranged so no intraprocess conflicts can occur)
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to determine which pair should cause a subprocessor to be
applied, and then uses that pair's control-point to deter-
mine which subprocessor to apply.
Control-points are recognizable by all system pro-
cessors so that it is possible to move a process from one
system to another without concern over how to cause sub-
processors to be applied. (Note: All systems are not re-
quired to contain all subprocessors, each system processor
applies only those it knows about.) The user is thus free
to move a process from one system to another to gain access
to special subprocessors.
Interrupts and faults are clearly distinguishable
in the design. An Interrupt occurs within a process be-
cause the demand bit of a higher priority control-point was
turned on. Such occurrences only affect the decision of
which subprocessor to apply on the next process step and
do not cause pre-emption of a subprocessor executing a pro-
cess step. Faults
5, on the other hand, occur during a pro-
cess step and cause an executing subprocessor to change its
program interpretation sequence. Faults have no direct
effect on which subprocessor will be applied on the next
process step.
Single Interprocess messages are generated by sub-
processors during the subprocessor application phase of the
system processor. They are placed in the interface buffer
along with a destination address (CP name, buffer name).
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During the message dispatching phase, the system processor
will remove the message and transmit it. The destination
system (containing the process state with the destination
CP in it) will look at the appropriate buffer (a static
number are associated with each control-point and are named
individually) to see if it is armed. If the buffer is armed,
the message will be buffered (overwriting any previous
message) and if not armed the message will be disregarded.
Also associated with each control-point is an ena;
bit which enables sending messages to cause an interrupt.
If the control-point is enabled and of appropriate prior-
ity, the system processor will place a pending message in
the interface buffer on the message delivery phase and apply
the appropriate subprocessor on the subprocessor application
phase.
Since control-point names are unique and serve as
destination addresses for messages, it is not necessary for
the sender to know either the system in which the destina-
tion process resides or even the process Itself. Processes
can thus be moved between systems without a need to arran;
a new communication link. The control-point itself could
even be moved to a different process without a transmitting
process knowing the difference.
The relationship between the processes in the net-
work looks like a tree and defines their hierarchy of
responsibility and control over descendent processes which

13 ;*
may be distributed arbitrarily over the network. Each net-
work system will have an AO subprocessor (identical in all
systems) which will account for certain objects s and enforce
restrictions placed on them; each process will contain an
ES/CP pair upon which the AO subprocessor operates. The
AO control-point always has the highest priority in the
process which makes it impossible for the AO services in a
process to be uncooperative with its parent. The AO sub-
processor cannot be locked out since a message to the AO
ES/CP pair will always interrupt all other pairs in that
process.
All accountable objects will be maintained in the
AO expression state. This gives the AO subprocessor de-
signer control over the mechanisms used to access them c
Some of the accountable objects may represent rights to
carry out certain operations. Each control-point is an
accountable object. This permits a parent to control which
subprocessors a child can use since subprocessor type Is
associated with the control-point. A parent can control a
child's message transmission capability by rights to trans-
mit to particular control-point buffers . Rights to move a
process or execute a particular subprocessor operator may
also be included. In addition to rights, accountable objects
may contain logical objects such as files. The set of ac-
countable objects can be thought of as representing the
logical capabilities of a process.
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In addition to the AO subprocessor, there will be at
least two other subprocessors (GP, PR) contained in each
system. The OP will provide general programming services
and access to all the initial network services by interpret-
ing a common language. Without one such common subprocessor
in the network, process intersystem movement might not be
very useful.
The PR will provide process state receipt, transmis-
sion, and creation services in each system. Communication
between the processes in the network and systems forei;
to the network is also permitted using normal interprocess
communication mechanisms. The set of accountable objects
may contain rights to transmit to control-points which
exist only in foreign systems, and certain control-points
will be permitted to have buffers to which only foreign
systems transmit. No special mechanisms are required to per-
mit a process to interact freely with some outside agent.
Use as a Model
The network was designed to be general in the sense
that it contains the concepts of most other systems. This
section will model three current systems using the designed
network to show that such models exist and to relate the
three system structures. These systems do not completely
meet our needs (they were designed for different goals).
TENEX (BB71) and the RC'1000 (Ha 70, Ha 71a) system will be
described first, as examples of systems which give users the

136
ability to create and control a "process" hierarchy. The
ARPA network (CC 70, CH 72, TH 72) will be used as an ex-
ample of a distributive network composed of different types
of computers.
TEHEX is a time-sharing system Implemented on an
augmented DEC PDP-10. It is the logical structure as seen
by the user that is to be modeled f not the implementation
of it. Three examples of the many alternative ways that
TENEX could be described in our terms are shown in Figures
1, 2 and 3» Boxes in the Figures represent our asynchron-
systems, circles represent our process state, and the lines
joining them represent the process hierarchy. In Fig. 3
each set of parentheses represents an expression-state.
We might first describe TENEX as a process tree distributed
over a set of asynchronous systems, each system (box) con-
taining one process (circle). (Fig. 1). Since we would
thus have only one process in each system and since TENEX
processes have no well-defined structure below process state
(like our expression state), we would need no structure be-
low the system process and would consider the user process
to be the system process as well. The Monitor (running on
the real system) can be thought of as the root process of
a single process tree. The monitor process creates an
asynchronous command system with an EXEC process in it for
each new job, which then serves as the top of that job's
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TENEX virtual
machines











Fig. 2- -TENEX Model 2 Fig. 3—TENEX Model 3
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virtual system since from the user's point of view it inter-
prets the command language and not the language of the TENEX
virtual machine. For each job process below the EXEC we
would create a system containing a. TENEX subprocessor.
Model one puts each TENEX process in a separate
asynchronous system. In model two the whole process tree
is contained in one system with each TENEX process being
represented by one of our processes, while in model three
the whole process tree has been collapsed into one process,
each TENEX process being represented as one expression
state. Three subprocessors (schedule, command, TENEX) are
contained in the single system in models two and three, in-
stead of one subprocessor for each system as in model one.
It might appear that the multisystem model of TENEX
is better than the other two since it maps each TENEX vir-
tual system onto one of our asynchronous systems. Although
this may be the appearance they wished the system to have,
in fact it is not what exists. This model completely hides
the presence of the time-sharing algorithm (we say nothing
about the relative speed of asynchronous systems) and the
sharing of memory by TENEX virtual systems (our asynchronous
systems do not logically share memory).
In the first and second models we can explicitly
represent the time-sharing algorithm by the introduction of
an extra ES/CP pair (highest priority) in each process and
a time-sharing process at the top of the process tree to
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receive clock signals and monitor messages for controlling
the schedule. The T/s process would Interrupt the executing
Process by sending a message to the extra pair. The message
could include the next process to run so that as soon as the
demand bits and enable bits for any control-points in the
Process had been turned off, the extra pair would send a
message to the extra pair in the next process to run.
One way of representing shared space in models one
and two is to represent all space shared by TENEX processes
as an object message and transmit it along with the wakeup
message. This is . good model in tho senag ^ ^ ^.^
^
ties shared memory to access to a subprocessor, but it hides
the relationships between the processes doing the sharing.
Model three not only can represent the time sharing algo-
rithm but also the sharing of space. The T/S pair „ould
receive the monitor and clock Information and manipulate
the control-points associated with the
-TEHEX processes to
execute the scheduling, since expression states within our
Processes are permitted to share address space and the sys-
tem processor applies only one subprocessor at a time to a
Process state, model three provides an exact representation
of TENEX in our terms.
In each of the three models the TEHEX
-pseudo" inter-
rupt, as they call it, could be represented either as an in-
terrupt or as a fault. If we used our interrupt mechanism




associated with it. A higher priority control-point would
interrupt the process when pseudo-interrupt messages were
received from the monitor. The lower priority control-
point would be used for the normal processing, including
the receipt of wakeup messages after certain monitor calls.
The alternative is to describe each TENEX process
with only one control-point, representing the pseudo-inter-
rupts as faults delivered by the Implementation to the sub-
processor being applied. The interrupt models nicely the
fact that certain of the events are truly asynchronous with
respect to a processes execution (from terminals, other
processes) but the fault models nicely those events which
are a result of a local execution (arithmetic). Since the
TENEX virtual machine does not clearly distinguish between
interrupts and faults as we have in our system, either
solution would be sufficient as a model of TENEX. In all
three models using the interrupt mechanism, a hierarchial
subprocessor application scheme would be used to determine
how to apply the subprocessors to the process states.
There are almost no accountable objects manipulated
by job processes in TENEX since the time-sharing implemen-
tation attempts to allocate to each TENEX process its "fair
share" of physical resources. A major difference between
TENEX and our system is that we have introduced accountable
objects and the AO subprocessor to provide a mechanism for
a parent process to use if it wishes to allocate some of its
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accountable object to its children while maintaining con-
' trol over the use of them. The ability to receive pseudo-
interrupts in TENEX can be thought of as an accountable ob-
ject in the sense that a parent has the right to field in-
terrupts for its children. One of the major consequences
of not having accountable objects is that TENEX is not
really able to support a hierarchy of operating systems.
There are several features of our network which are
not present in TENEX. The TENEX virtual machine is as com-
plex as their concept of system can get and in it there is
no concept of lockstep process transformations which we get
when multiple processes reside in one of our systems. TENEX
also does not have the complex process states we can con-
struct using multiple expression states (Model 3). The
authors of "TENEX, a paged time sharing system for the
PDP-10" (BB 71) use, as an example to illustrate the useful-
ness of TENEX 's structures, a program wishing to wait for
terminal input but only for a specified length of time. Two
processes are created, one waiting for the input and one
waiting for the timer. V/e could solve this same problem
using two ES/CP pairs within the same process rather than
two processes. The process could even be doing some addi-
tional processing using a third lower priority ES/CP pair
and still be interrupted when either of the two events oc-
curred.
Whereas we can model their system with its time-
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sharing algorithm, they could not hide the fact that they
are a time sharing system if they were to try and model our
system. The TENEX structures are designed for single sys-
tem interprocess interactions. Even these are highly con-
strained between jobs in the same system, whereas our normal
interprocess communication structures are the same no matter
what the residence of the processes carrying out the inter-
action , Since our processes are free to move between sys-
tems in the network, we have not permitted processes to
share address space except through explicit transfer of the
information (by the process not the system). With respect
to our goals, TENEX is most lacking in the facilities pro-
vided for user management of potentially uncooperative pro-
cesses
.
The RC^tOOQ multiprogramming system developed by Re-
gencentralen was designed to "be extended with a hierarchy
of operating systems. . . " (Ha 70). Resources are allocated
recursively by a parent process to its children. The RC'JOOO
system can be represented in our design as a single system
containing one process state, similar to the third TENEX
model (Pig. 3). Instead of the three subprocessors in the
TENEX model we can describe the RC'tOOO system with only one.
The single process state will be composed of a scheduling
expression-state and one expression-state for each RC4000
process currently residing in core.
Since expression-states may share address space, the
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decision to model the RC^OOO system with one process state
permits us to model explicitly the potential overlap of ad-
dressing capabilities between RCHoqq processes in core at
any given time (keyed access is used). Those RC4000 pro-
cesses which are currently stopped would exist as data ob-
jects in the expression-state representing their parent
process. This is the way the rc'1000 system permits a parent
to deal with them.
Our model would associate a control-point with each
expression-state (RCiJOOO process), plus one attached to the
scheduling expression-state which would have the highest
priority. The association of a control-point with the ex-
pression-states representing RC4000 processes is necessary
since each process may have messages directed to it by other
processes in the system. Each RC4000 process needs only
one control-point associated with it since there is no con-
cept of our interrupt in their system, as the user sees it.
Their internal interrupts are represented by our faults.
"Wait" operations control RC'IOOO process execution by turn-
ing off the demand bit associated with the single control-
point. After completion of the operation, the scheduler
turns on the demand bit and execution continues where it had
left off before the wait. It is this simple behavior of
the RC'JOOO process that permits us to represent it as a
single expression-state with one control-point attached.
If we knew that the address spaces of all RC4000

process were disjoint, then we would represent each one of
them by one of our processes containing one AO expression-
state and one processing expression-state. The AO expres-
sion-state would perform the parent's breakpoint operations,
insure that resources were allocated properly, and perform
the scheduling function as discussed in the TENEX model.
There are two additional ways we might represent
shared space in our models and still use multiple process
states, without sending a shared space object along with
the scheduling message as was done in the TENEX model. We
could consider the shared space to be maintained by either
a "shared space" process or foreign system, and have the
sharing processes communicate their requests to these
agents. Although this would adequately simulate the ef-
fects of shared space, it would introduce the artifice of
using interprocess interactions to accomplish it.
The implementation of memory sharing mechanisms us-
ually involves either a foreign system (shared memory mod-
ules with conflict resolution on requests) or the process
mechanism (monitor calls which insure that only one process
at a time accesses the information). These models, of
course, are simply models of low level system structures
for normal hardware systems. A machine independent virtual
system structure must not be sensitive to such low level
details.
"P & V" operations can be modeled nicely using
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either of these mechanisms, although in our system 17e could
provide more control over the sharing since the process
address spaces would be disjoint and we could prevent in-
valid entries. In our model, sufficient control over this
potentially uncooperative behavior could be achieved by
explicitly defining the shared space process to supply the
information properly even if the P & V operations were not
used. Uncooperative processes cannot be prevented from
accessing shared space by using only cooperative "P & V"
operations. This mechanism is thus useful but not suffi-
cient for process control.
There are two important differences between the
RC^iOOO system and TENEX with respect to their treatments of
resources and interprocess messages. The RC^tOOO system
makes explicit use of recursive resource allocation. Part
of the procedure for creating a child process involves the
explicit allocation of some of the parent's resources (al-
ways a subset). A TENEX process can control the execution
and existence of its children, and field pseudo-interrupl-n
for them, but it does not specifically allocate resources
to them. All TENEX resource allocation is based on a "fair
share" algorithm built into the implementation.
In our single process model of the RC'IOOO, the re-
source allocation would be represented by creating the
child expression-state with access to objects representing
the proper allocation of resources. In our multiprocess
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model > each process (representing a RC^OOO process) would
maintain the information about that process's allocation of
resources in the AO expression-state, which we use for our
recursive allocation of accountable objects.
In both the RC'lOOO system and our system, a parent
process recursively allocates subsets of what it has, but
there are several important differences between the mechan-
isms used. Our accountable objects are explicitly maintained
in a reliable expression-state in each process and we pro-
vide a common subprocessor in each system to operate on that
expression-state. By including the accountable object in-
formation as part of the process state, it automatically
moves with the process. A transmitting system does not have
to send an additional message to the receiving system con-
cerning all of the accountable objects and information
necessary for their accounting and protection. The common
subprocessor reduces the complexity of each system processor
and assures that each system will invariantly handle ac-
countable objects. In contrast, the RC'1000 monitor main-
tains the resource information and performs the operations
on this information. The RC4000 system does not need to
keep the resource information local to the process state
since their processes do not move between systems. A spe-
cial subprocessor is not really necessary since the resource
function can easily be incorporated into the monitor without
adding unnecessary complexity. RC'IOOO resources are not
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really pre-emptible, other than by killing the child, and
a parent cannot explicitly attach access restrictions to
their use. A RC4000 process is created with a given set
of resources and uses them at its discretion.
Interprocess communication is handled differently
in the RC4000 system and TENEX. TENEX uses their pseudo-
interrupt and a shared address space, but restricts such
interactions to the processes of one job. An advantage of
the TENEX mechanism is that the pseudo-interrupt permits a
process to be told a message is pending, whereas the RC^OOO
system requires a process to ask for the message and if it
is not there, go to sleep. The RC^IOOO system uses message
buffers (a resource not part of a shared address space) and
permits a process to communicate with any process it knows
about. The advantage of the RC^IOOO mechanism over TENEX is
that it does not require shared space; more than one message
can be sent at a tirnej and no restriction is placed on how
many different processes can be transmitting to one receiv-
ing process.
Our communication mechanisms have an interrupt abili-
ty and do not use shared space. We associate multiple buf-
fers with a destination control-point and consider the right
to transmit to a particular one of these buffers as the
accountable object, not the buffer itself. We thus control
the right to transmit to a particular destination while they
only control the means of communication and not who can be

talked to.
Although both TENEX and the RC*J000 systems are mono-
processor systems, the system structure they use could be
extended to a multi-processor level. Appropriate subpro-
cessor application rules would have to be instituted and all
primitive operators implemented so they v/ould leave the user
processes well-defined, regardless of the number of subpro-
cessors operating concurrently in the system. Most of the
difficulties to be faced would arise because the user pro-
cesses can share space and because of system race conditions
for process state information. These are basic problems
that drastically effect the structure and efficiency of si
an extension o The extension to a network or system would be
very difficult and would severely constrain user management
of processes. In our system, process states are disjoint,
only one subprocessor is applied to a process state each
process step, and external interactions with a process do
not occur during a process step. Subprocessor designers
therefore do not have to be concerned with resolving race
conditions for shared access since it never occurs.
We want to briefly look at computer networks . The
most degenerate form of our netv/ork structures would be
achieved by connecting a set of systems together without
defining their system structures or placing restrictions
on their interactions, other than with which other systems
they can communicate. Such a network would be defined as
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a set of autonomous interacting foreign systems. The net-
work designers can say very little about the processes run-
ning in such a network. Only the set of systems with which
a process can communicate would be known. Nevertheless,
this degenerate network is a good model for the ARPA Com-
puter Network (ARPANET).
ARPANET provides "for the interconnection, via
common-carrier circuits, of dissimilar computers at wide-
ly separated" centers (OH 72). Protocols (agreements on
the format and relative sequences of messap^es to be ex-
changed) were designed as a layered hierarchy so each level
does not have to be concerned with the intricacies of the
lower levels (CH 72). The lowest level of the hierarchy
is the message exchange between the Interface Message Pro-
cessors (IMPs), and the highest level is the user procei
to process communication.
In contrast with the degenerate network above, we
can model the ARPANET IMPs as a network whose processes
interact with a set of foreign systems (HOSTs). The IMP
processes are fully defined by the network designers, the
users have nothing to say about them. Although It would be
possible for us to model the whole ARPANET at any one of the
above levels, it is only the higher level we wish to model
here. In our terms, the ARPANET HOSTs can be modeled as a
set of foreign systems supporting interacting user processes.
In order to understand the behavior of any pair of these
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processes, we must; model each foreign system processor down
to the application of subprocessors. Those HOSTs operating
under TENEX could be modeled using one of the models above.
Similar models could be developed for each HOST. Since the
process structure of HOSTs are not constrained, existing
ones can be changed and new HOSTs with new process struc-
tures can be added to the network. Process behavior can
thus be defined only locally to each system according to
current structures.
In the ARPANET, process behavior is dependent on
system residence. There is no standard concept of process
step or interrupt since there is no standard system pro-
cessor. The lack of standard structure requires independent
study of each system model if there is a need to understand
their behavior. Although this is simplifying from the im-
plemented point of view, it is not particularly useful
from the users' point of view. In order for a user to take
advantage of the asynchronous systems to construct an asyn-
chronous multiprocess computation, the structures of each
system to be used must be clearly understood, and local
rules and conventions must be used to design and manage each
process
,
The ARPANET assumes no responsibility towards inter-
acting processes other than providing the communication link
to each operating system, just as our design assumes no re-
sponsibilities towards a process in a foreign system. There
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are no ARPANET structures which permit a user to institute
remote constraints on process behavior, and no notion of tl
RCilOOO resource or our accountable objects. Processes in
separate systems may communicate, but delegation of re-
sponsibility and authority between them must be purely co-
operative and subject to local HOST constraints.
The ARPANET provides five interprocess communication
Primitives in each HOST system Interface. These permit,
via HOST operating systems, interactions between processes
residing in different HOSTs. since there is no standard
concept of either system or process, a user must understand
each local definition before constructing a multisystem com-
putation. The effect of using these primitives becomes
highly system sensitive.
Each ARPANET HOST has a set of send and receive
sockets whose names have three parts: user number; HOST
number; and AEN (a seven bit number plus one bit for send
or receive). Socket names are thus unique throughout the
network while providing a pool of sockets for each user at
each HOST, m order to use these sockets, a process must
interface with its local Network Control Program (NCP),
which acts on its behalf to establish, break, and switch
connections. Once a particular connection between two soc-
kets has been made, the process is free to communicate using
that connection until it is broken.
The ARPANET designers used the fairly .static connec-

Won mechanism because they felt that processes would con-
duct prolonged conversations and not one shot requests Al-
though the NCP ensures that the process requesting use of a
Particular socket to make a connection has the same user
"umber as the socket, once that connection has been made it
as possible to move the connect!m (-„<.no ion to a process running under
a different user number Thi- .,<- ioc . Thio, at least, means that no other
«S er may uncooperatively exhaust another user's pool of soc-
kets, although the processes under one user number must
still be cooperative in their use of sockets to make connec-
tions. There is also no mechanism, other than cooperation
by which a user may control the use of a connection once it
has been made.
Thomas and Henderson (TH 72) describe a major disad-
vantage of the ARPANET connection mechanism as requiring a
Process to know the socket number that the other process
"HI be using for its end of the connection before the con-
nection can be made. This implies knowledge of which HOST
the process v,ill be in and the user number under which it
will be running as well as the particular AEN to be used.
In our design a control-points- name serves as the destina-
tion address, but although the name is unique, it is not
bound to a Particular system or user. Both the control-
Points themselves, and rights to transmit to particular
buffers associated with control-points are accountable ob-
jects and therefore recursively managed by the process
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hierarchy. Our design also leaves the actual making of a
connection up to the implementers. If a process has the
right to transmit to a particular control-point buffer, it
can send a message without becoming involved with making
the connection.
Since all system processors in our network use a
standard concept of process step, interrupt, message deliv-
ery, and standard operations on control-point, the user is
provided with a consistent concept of process and process
step and a standard way to use the services of the network,.
An ARPANET user must be prepared to create all processes
local to the system in which they are to run since different
HOSTs may have different process structures and intersysten
process migration may not be possible. Our design, on the
other hand, provides explicitly for intersystem process
movement and provides for at least one common subprocessor
(GP) which will interpret a general language and provide all
initial network services. This, of course, doss not ensure
that a process, using subprocessors other than those common
to all systems, will run in any system to which it is moved.
A user thus has an alternative to creating a different pro-
cess in each system and exchanging control and data informa-
tion between processes. A user can create a "multi-lingual"
process, U3e the GP subprocessor for common, services, and




discussion here was intended to show how the user-
level protocols compare with TENEX, RC'1000 and our system.
It should bs noted that we could conveniently use these
ARPANET protocols to implement our system structures at each
HOST. Our system would thus become one more level of proto-
col in the ARPANET hierarchy. ARPANET deficiencies largely
arise from the attempt to use such an implementation struc-
ture in place of the virtual network that is really required.
Further Work
It would be conceivable to answer questions concern-
ing the generality of the postulated constraints by extend-
ing this work in several directions. One of the first ex-
tensions which comes to mind is to include not only systems
as components of our network, but also other networks, giv-
ing us structured nodes and a hierarchy of networks. Ques-
tions concerning the relationships between processes in the
various levels of this hierarchy could be investigated. The
systems in one network level might be considered to be for-
eign systems to the processes in all other levels, or per-
haps a logical interface process should be provided ^through
which connections between networks are maintains Re-
sponsibility and authority problems begin to surface again,
in partici t the rights of processes in one network with
respect to such areas as modifications and manipulations of
accountable objects (Global vs. local rights).
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The sufficiency of our constraints and the correct-
ness of our design decisions when real time and continuous
(analogue) processes are added to the system is also in need
of investigation. Does our design remain invariant when
used for these processes, and what can be said about process
behavior? I„ the case of real time processes, the process
state structures probably are not effected but the relative
speeds of system will effect real time process performanc
In. the case of continuous processes, any investigation must
first del what is meant by continuous processes, ho,, to
represent them, and how to combine continuous and digital




m this thesis must be extended to include
the subprocessors ana their modification operators, before
"
•
can bo produced. The GP subprocessor
" to be a programmable subprocessor common to all systems
and must provide all initial network services within a
framewortc of a general language. The design of the AO sub-
processor must include investigations into classifications
of accountable objects, operators for their accounting and
Lntenance, and the effects of process birth., death, and
intersystem movement on them. Investigations into network
modification operators must be continued to determine the
forma they may tats and the freedoms which can be permitted




There are several Implementation questions which can
be pursued based on this design. We can exploit our know-
ledge of the system to study the optimization of an imple-
mentation. Once a prototype implementation exists we can
monitor the process behavior at both subprocessor primitive
level and the system processor operator level to improve our
implementation. We can then study independent of any par-
ticular implementation, the question of practical machine
design including buffering and efficiency along with sub-
processor augmentation, program type objects, and special
subprocessors.
In addition to studying implementation questions we
can abstractly study the properties of our formal defini-
tion. A parallel effort is being pursued (Jo 73) which is
intended to derive and prove assertions that certain fea-
tures of the state languages of systems (using the defini-
tion system in PH 7 1) remain invariant to transformation
under that system processor. We will then be able to use
these mechanisms to investigate the formal definition of our
network and the processes it supports. We would hope, by
studying the network definition itself, to verify and even
formally certify our design from the point of view that cer-
tain of the designed system process state structures are
proven to be invariant under the transformations carried out
by the system processors. Our design has been "debugged" by
test cases, using an interpreter for the formal definition
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system, but this testing alone cannot be sufficient to certi-
fy that these imparlances remain so under all transformation.
Once the network exists, it is clear that not all
users will be permitted or even will want to use the full
flexibility of our structures. Investigations will be
needed to determine what user operating environments should
be created by using appropriate processes in the process
tree and distributed over the network systems. Using the
hierarchy we can investigate distributed vs. central con-
trol, and various levels of user freedoms. We can thus
study concepts of logical operating system structures and
commonly desired services. Our network provides an operat-
ing system implementation language for such studies.
One final area of investigation is the development
of application tool, including the various application lan-
guages which should be provided In a network. We would like
to develop a translator-compiler (written in the GP language)
to take some of these languages and generate translators for
them, whose output is the language interpreted by GP. This
would permit such processes to be system independent since
each system has a GP. We „oula als0 like to develop ^^
special purpose applications such as distributed data base
and management information system, and user process heir-
archies which interact with special purpose foreign systems.
Several of the above items are currently being In-
vestigated. The initial de-i-n or f-h» ™ „, >" u t>ig i the GP subprocessor has
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been completed (Pi ; 2 ) and an implementation of it exists
written in a common subset of FORTRAN IV. A Ph.D. thesis
(Co 73) is under preparation to complete the design of the
AO subprocessor and another student is investigating modi-
fication operators (Pa 73). A single physical system imple-
mentatlon of one logical system is in progress which will
then be duplicated within that physical system to give us
multiple logical systems. A movement to a multiple physical
system implementation of the. multiple logical system will be
attempted dependent on the completion of a small physical
network being constructed at the University of Wisconsin.
A research seminar (Spring 73) is investigating the ques-
tions of translator-compilers and defining one in the GP
language to make it available in each system. Most of the
other projects have been discussed and considered as future
work but are not currently scheduled since they are depend-
ent on the work currently underway.
Summary and Concliisl »s
The emergence of networks of digital computer systems
has resulted in severe problems concerning their managabili-
ty, generality and portability. A manaf;abls netl,ork deslgn
must provide for the resolution of conflicts of responsibili-
ty and authority. Generality must exist if the network is
to be useful to many classes of potential users. Portal Lli-
ty must be possible if the network design and user processes
are not to be implementation dependent.
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A sufficient set of postulated constraints on the
network design were developed to permit a solution to these
problems. Difficulties in network manageability result pri-
marily because of the conflicting goals of the network, im-
plementation, and process designers. The solution requires
a clear factorization, between these three agents, of the
responsibility and authority for controlling the behavior
of the processes running on the network.
A design was then carried out within the postulated
constraints to show both that a solution to the network pro-
blems does exist within these constraints, and that it leads
to a design which it is feasible to implement and which is
general enough to contain at least most of the current sys-
tem structures. A set of derived constraints were devel-
oped to explore in more detail the consequences of the
postulated constraints, and then a set of design decisions
were developed which defined the generality of the struc-
tures to be provided the users. Finally several current
systems were modeled using the network structures developed
and the structures themselves were formally defined.
There are many conclusions which could be drawn from
the work presented here. Cne of the most significant of
these is that it was possible to accomplish such a general
goal, with the result being a clear solution which seems
to be implementable. This success appears to be a result
of having undertaken the whole problem of manageability,
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generality, and portability, and not approaching only one
part of it. The particular- factorizations of the problem
made in this thesis were based on the constraints and de-
sign goals and not as a result of arbitrary or conflicting
decision as defined in current systems. Factorization of
responsibility and authority was the tool which maizes the
solution possible. It does not appear that it is sufficient
to approach these problems independently (for example, try-
ing to solve the problem of portability while leaving cur-
> tructures unchanged and independent). It may
be that because of the interactions of th< se problems, a
»ba] iclution such as presented Lri this thesis, is the
only P° asible path to a gen. solutj We have she.
th^t it ;:: a sufficient path.
As a result of having s set of machine and technology
independent n 1 ns which are at least c Le of
,
ing eurn it systems, it is poi Lble to discuss system and
pro "•'"
' 'trust urea and compare them using the network de-
sign presented here. The vocabulary used is independent o
; being described, and presents a well-defined
framework within which to define problems. The concept of
a genera] process step provides maximum freedom to the user
and designer, while providing sufficient rules to permit
work to bo actually accomplished, Processes defined to run
on our network systems will provide poi billty nor. only
between currently implemented systems but also between
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generations of implementations of the current systems. Th
means that it is now cost effective to invest heavily in
applications and application tools since they can survive
changes in technology. Process designers can define local
logical operating systems, including the management of ac-
countable objects, in distributed computations which are not
system dependent.
Many of the features of the design are interesting
when taken by themselves and need not be applied only to a
network. Control-points combine the functions of both com-
munication and control (interrupt) and permit interprocess
interactions to be directed to particular parts of a pro-
cess state and not just the pro;:-'' itself. Subprocesses
and expression-states in conjunct;! or. with control-points,
permit the concept of process step to be { i i ralized. The
subprocossor designer is able to define its state structures
and operations on that state, thus deferring binding of po~
tentic process behavior indefinitely since the introduction
of new subprocessors does not affect current process be-
havior, The concept of accountable objects, and their
allocation and control by the process hierarchy provides a
cle. i scha li .1 for creating user operating systems. Evo-
lutionary processes permit the deferral of the choice of a
particular network, while providing a clear mechanism for
u rating it and for making adoptive changes to an existing
definition. The fact that there is never any asynchronous
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fighting over a process state by systems or subprocessors
means that the implemented have no race conflicts to re-
solve. The process must, and can, resolve its own problems
locally to that process. Finally, although the network was
designed to provide mechanisms for the control of poten-
tially uncooperative processes, process cooperation can
still be exploited. Within a process state all operations
except operations on accountable objects, are considered
cooperative and limited only by the operators available in
the subprocessors being used. If the processes wish to use
normal control-point communication to interact and not
invoke the AO subprocessor, they may do so. Objects ex-
changed in this way are not subject to accountable object
guarantees and therefore the processes use of them is pure-
ly cooperative. The single unique aspect of cooperation
which is not permitted between disjoint processes is shared
space. The whole structure presented here would be great-
ly complicated and lose much of its implementation effi-
ciency if it were permitted. The implementation would be
constrained to maintain the shared space in the same physi-
cal memory and map the processes onto it with the inherent
conflict and race problems. Processes could not be arbi-
trarily moved. By simply factoring processes into disjoint
address space such problems do not exist. As was shown in
our TENEX model, sufficient generality can be obtained with-
in one process state to model the whole TENEX system includ-






CI. The designed network must consist of a set of inter-
acting bounded programmable digital computer systems
with well-defined processes, and be open to communica-
tion with foreign systems having undefined processes.
C2. Responsibility for meeting the postulated design
constraints and design decisions must be fac-
tored between the network, implementation, and
process designers.
C3. Each designer must have icient authority to con-
trol the effects, on the processes running in the
network, of the interactions for which that designer
has been delegated responsibility.
Ck. Although processes must be permitted to delegate to
other processes their authority to control p: ss
interactions, the delegating process always retains
responsibility for that interaction and the author-
ity to control the process to which it was delegated.
C5. The network definition must provide for modification
of its definition. The design must provide sufficient
constraints to be able to delegate safely to process
designers all modification decisions and authority to
control the effects of such decisions on the processes.

164
Delegation o f Authority Constraint
Dl. Responsibility for each Interaction and authority
to control it must be uniquely assigned to the same
designer.
D2. Network designers are responsible for ensuring that
the network is self protecting, meets the constraints,
and is formally defined.
D3. The implementation designers are responsible for the
design, construction, and maintenance of an optimal
equivalent system.
M. The process designers are responsible for all virtual
interprocess interactions.
D5. If an implementation designer has an unsolvable prob-
lem due to boundedness which effects the processes
in the network, the effect on the process state structure
must be well-defined so the process designers can
ameliorate the consequences.
D6. Network designers are responsible for the initial
definition of the network and implicitly for all
evolutionary paths. Implementation designers are
responsible for the implementation of the initial
definition and for any potential evolutionary path.
Process designers are responsible for selecting




PI, Processes must be arranged in a tree structure defin-
ing their hierarchy of responsibility over descendant
processes.
P2. A unique root process must exist representing overall
process management.
P3. No processor race conditions can be permitted to effect
the process state transformation during that transfor-
mation,
P*i. Operators available to process designers affect only
the containing process state.
P5. Multiple processes may be transformed in parallel.
P6. Distribution of processes over the network must be
permitted and each process state must be uniquely
contained in at most one system at a time.
P7„ Interprocess communication must be permitted and be
subject to parental control. Synchronization between
processes is the responsibility of process designers.
Processes residing in different systems may be syn-
chronized only using interprocess communication.
P8. An "accountable object" chain must exist, and processes




Network Designer Constraint s
NI. The network designer is responsible for providing a
set of invariant names which can be used by the
process designers for communication and control.
N2, The network designers are responsible for changes
in the network formal definition.
N3. Sufficient services must be provided by the network
designers for the process designers to accomplish
their purpose, including resource accounting and
intersystem communication.
N4. Network modification operators are meta-operators
and must first ensure the modification does not vio-
late any of the postulated constraints and then either
act as a no-op if it is one of the permissible paths
of evolution or fault if it is not.
W5. The effects of network evolution, other than the ad-
dition of a new system to the network, must be local
to the system within which the operator was executed.
N6. The network design must permit process designers to
limit the effects of a network modification operator
to the process executing it. Process designers must
be able to uniquely control the right to execute





Al - Each system processor in the network will contain a
set of identifiable subprccessor-s including at least
the following three: GP (General Programmable), AO
(Accountable Object), PR (Process state Receive and
transmit )
.
A2 - A process state is defined by a set of identifiable,
typed, possibly related expression states, and asso-
ciated information necessary for both subprocessor
allocation and interprocess interactions.
A2.1 - Subprocessor -access to structures of any
other type of expression- state must not violate
the conventions of the other expression-state's
designer.
A3 - "Control-Points" are accountable objects.
A3.1 - Individual control-points may be paired
with individual expression-states and more
than one such pair may exist in a process
state at one tin
A3. 2 - When paired with an expression state, a
control-point will have associated with it
the type of 3ubprocessor to be applied.
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A*J - Control-points will serve as uniquely named destination
addresses for interprocess messages. The arrival of
such messages, as well as local subprocessor opera-
tions, may designate an ES/CP pair as requesting a sub-
processor, regardless of the status of other pairs.
The system processor will apply at most one subpro-
cessor to a process state each process step.
Aij.l - Each process state, except the PR process state,
will contain an ES/CP pair which can interrupt
all others in that process and which can be in-
terpreted by the AO subprocessor.
A^.2 - In addition to its basic functions the AO sub-
processor will be responsible for regulating
process birth, death, and intersystem movement,
A5 - A process may generate a single interprocess message
each process step, which is broadcast by the system
processor to a particular buffer associated with the
destination control-point. Process designers can con-
trol the right to transmit, the right to listen, and
the right to allow an ES/CP pair to become demanding
as a result of a buffered message.
A6 - The initial network definition will consist of one
basic system with an initial root process state. Net-
work modification operators will permit the creation
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of at least additional basic systems, subprocessors
,
subprccessor operators, and system processor operators
for control-point housekeeping.
A6.1 - The design of modification operators will be
delegated to subprccessor designers. Modifica-
tion operators will not introduce new modifica-
tion operators.
A7 - Inaccessible objects may result from meta- operations
invoked by implementation designers because either a
subprocessor hits a bound or there is an implementation
failure. ^processors trying to access an inaccessi-
ble object will fault,
A7.1 - Implementation failures affecting the account-




EXAMPLE FORMAL NETWORK DEFINITION
INTRODUCT ION
This appendix will formally define an initial basic
system and also define, as an example, a two system network.
The definition system to be used here is described in F3
and is formally defined in the appendix of Jo73. An imple-
mentation of the definition system exists on the Universi
of Wisconsin's UNIVAC 1108. The representation used in the
listing of the definitions presented later will be that
accepted by the implementation in order to avoid "typographi
cal" errors.
Although familiarity with FH71 is necessary for a
precise understanding of definition details, a brief intro-
duction to the system will be presented here so the reader
who is not familiar with it will have a reasonable idea of
what is being done. The definition system has the ability
to represent a set of interacting asynchronous digital com-
puter systems as extensions of Post production systems
(FH71) . The automaton which interprets the definition sys-
tem defines the concepts of processor and process.
As in Post's formal system there is an alphabet (x)
axioms (a:) and productions Or:). Some of the extensions





where x is in the alphabet; the ability
to discard irrelevant axioms; the ability of one system (SR)
to communicate with another system; and the generalization
of antecedents to permit the use of restricted processors
(RPRs). (RPR is described in FH'/l and (7) is an example of
the use of an RPR in the network definition. The parenthe-
sized numbers correspond to the parenthesized numbers found
on the system listings and are used to indicate specific
items which will be discussed here.)
An SR (system) has the property that it runs asyn-
chronously with all other SR*s. Each of the three systems
presented in the network definition is an SR. Messages are
transmitted as an axiom naming a destination axiom to be
matched (in the destination SR) and a message which replaces
that axiom in the destination SR. A flowchart describing
the primitive automaton is found in fig. 4a, b, c. It
applies the operators (productions including double arrow
productions (9) which transmit messages and restricted pro-
cessors (7) to the axioms, saving only generated axioms, up-
dates the axiom set with any incoming message, and then re-
peats the cycle. A system step is defined as one cycle of
the primitive automaton as described above.
An RPR can be a part of the left hand side of any
operator. The main difference between its representation,
and that of a system, is that it has a pattern, in place of
an axiom set, which must be matched (using the RPR alphabet)
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before the RPR is applied. RPR's operate only on the pat-
tern matched substrings of axioms. An RPR can go through
many cycles itself before returning to the containing SR,
thus permitting arbitrarily complex system steps.
The flowchart (fig. 4a,b,c), symbol descriptions r and
definitions were written by Pamela Smith.
SYMBOLS (fig. 4)
u system process state set,
o ' buffer to hold generated process states during the
system step in which they are generated.
a" message-receiving buffer.
C(a") a consumable copy of a".
ir the set of productions (operators) in the system.
C(vt) a consumable copy of tt .
3 a buffer for (channel, message) pairs during the
system step in which they are generated.
3 a buffer for (channel, message) pairs during the
application of the production from which they are
generated.
3 RPR a buffer for (channel, message) pairs during the
execution of the RPR by which they are generated.
x a buffer for RPR results which are generated before
the RPR terminates.
P a production selected at random from C (tt ) .
S an element selected at random from C(a"); it is a
message set, consisting of a unique channel name
and a set of messages associated with that name.
SR a Boolean stack variable, true if an SR is being
executed, false if an RPR is being executed.













































































Fig. M-b—INTERPRETER Flowchart (Cont.)
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Fig. He—INTERPRETER Flowchart (Cont.)
SR process step termination and message management
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A the null string.
mark a designation that can be attached to a process
state, then erased; it means that no production
has been applied to this process state since the
beginning of the system step.
flag a designation that can be attached to a process
state, then erased; it means that this process
state has just been introduced to c as a trans-
mitted and accepted message.
DEFINITIONS (fig . 4)
TRANSMIT 5 The transmit primitive takes the (channel,
message) pairs of $ and forms them into message
sets before sending. There is a conflict reso-
lution mechanism which enables each system's o"
to be able to determine the order of arrival of
the messages it receives.
SEIZE... FREE A primitive that takes a" out of commission
without loss of messages.
MATCH A $ can match any string over (x+A) * in any
context.
APPLY P TO a Finding a new way to do this implies
binding of the variables.
GENERATE ALL CONSEQUENTS All results (states that match
the pattern but no antecedents) will be used, no
matter when they were generated. A result of A
V7J.11 cause the RPR pattern $ to become A in the




STACK: a,7T,T,e,3p/ ff',C(Tr) , P, SR, X -
DESCRIPTION OF NETWORK DEFINITIONS
In the next section three systems are defined. Sys-
tem A is the definition of an initial root system, and sys-
tems B and C are the two systems in a two system network
example. The implementation accepts an arbitrarily large
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set of "characters" in the form of alphanumeric symbols
(such as Alpha or B3 5) . Each such symbol is treated as a
single character. Alphanumeric symbols may be delimited by
any character (including a space) except a letter or digit.
Meta characters : The following meta characters are
used by the interpreter. (Note that all of these characters
can be quoted and then used just like any other character
in the system definition.)
[] - beginning and end markers for an SR and RPR.
: - marks the beginning of the axiom set {oj_) of
an SR (Note RPRs have only an axiom pattern)
.
# - marks the beginning of the alphabet ( x
:
) of
an SR or RPR.
% - marks the beginning of the productions
(operators) ( tt: ) of an SR or RPR.
& - separator between axioms in the axiom set
and between antecedents in a multiple
production.
; - separator between productions.
*
- arrow used in productions. A single arrow
separates the antecedents and the consequent.
In a double arrow production the second
arrow separates the consequent message from
the destination name.
\ - "NOT" (\a--matches any character in the
alphabet but "a")
.
$ - matches any string over the alphabet including
the null string.
<integer> - subscripts for variables in consequents
which name variables in antecedents.
Axiom sets (1) : The following is a definition of the
possible state sets of the network systems (subject to the
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addition of other state sets of the netv/ork as the result of
network modification)*
<system state> : :-<system phase> <chan list> <buff list?
<process list> <candidate list>
<modify list>
phase- each system has a phase counter (3)»
<system phase>: :=PHASE <phase number>
<phase nuraber> : :=1 | 2 |
3
chan- each system will have a set of channels to receive
messages for its control-points,
<chan list>: :=<message channel>| <message channel>
<chan list>
< message channel> : :=&CHAN < control-point name>
<buffer namexmsg>
<control-point name>::=<AO name> | <PR name> | <GP name>
<A0 name> : :=<process name>AO
<process name>: :=<root name> j <process name>. -cchild name>
<root name> : :=1
<child name>: :=<integer>
<integer> : :=<digit> | <nzeroxndigit>
<ndigit> : :-<digit> | <digit> <ndigit>
<digit>: :=0 |<nzero>
<nzero>::=l|2|3|4|5|6|7|S|9
<PR name> : :=<system number>PR
<system number> : :~<integer>
<CxYJ name> : :=<priority>GP
<priority>: :=<integer>
<buffer name> : :=<parent buffer> | <intcrface buffer>
|
<integer>|<acknowledge buffer>
<parent bufferx :=P | <process name>
<interface buffer> : :=R
acknowledge buffer> : :=S
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<msg> : :=<null> j A<message> [ A<inaccessible object>
<null> i t-
<message> : :=to be defined by subprocessor designers
<inaccessible object> i :=#
buff-each system will have a set of control-point buffers.
<buff list> : :=<message buffer> | <message buff er>
<buffer list>
<message buffer> : :=&BUFF<control-point namexbuff name>
<msg>
process-each system will have a set of processes
<process list> : :=<process> I <process><process list>
<process> : ;=&<interface>PROCESS<process state>
<interface> : :=<null> | <msg>
<process state>::=<PR state> | <user states





<PR expression-state>: :-<acknowledge list>
acknowledge list>: : = <ack> | cackxacknowledge list>
<ack>: :=<slist> ^process name>
<slist>: :=S1|S2
<;user state> : :=CP<process name>AOA<demand>AO[ <A0 exp-
state >]
<A0 exp-state>: : = <AO-ESxGP-ES list>
<AO-ES>::=to be defined by AO subprocessor designer
<GP-ES list>::r--null|^GP ES/CP pair> | <GP ES/CP pair>
<GP-ES list>
<GP ES/CP pair>:: = <GP control-pointxGP-ES> I <GP-E3>
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<GP-ES> : :=to be defined by the GP subprocessor design-
er
<GP control-point? : := CP<GP namexCP statusxarm list?
<CP status? ; :=A<demand>A<enable?A<deliver order>
<enable>: :=0|1
<deliver order>::=0|l
<arm list?: :=<null?| <arm status>| <arm statusxarm list>
<arm status? ::=<status><GP namexbuffer name>
< status > : :=ARM|DARM
Candidate list only exists in phase 1 and tells which control-
points- are candidates to have a subprocessor applied.
<candidate list> : :-<null> I <candidate> | <candidate>
<candicate list>
<candidate> : :=&<can statusxcontrol-point name>
< can status > : : =CAN | NCAN
Modify list is the list of modification operations to be
carried out (phase 3 only).
<modify list> : :=<null> | <;modify> | <modify> <Jnodify list>
<modify> : :=&f-10DIFY<process namex;modxGP name>
<mod>::==NEW|KILL
State set restrictions: the following constraints
will hold on the state set of each system in the network.
a) The system will contain one process with a
<PPl state> with the proper <;system number? . There will be
one <message channel> with corresponding identification for
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each other system in the network and one PR acknowledge
buffer>
.
b) The system will contain a finite number of pro-
cesses with <user state>.
c) For each <A0 name> , one <message channel> will
exist for <parent buffers <interface buffer>/ and <acknow-
ledge buffer> along with one <message channel> (with appro-
priate identification) for each of that processes' children.
d) For each <CP namexbuffer name> in an <arm status>
there will be a <message channel> with the corresponding
<CP namexbuffer name> .
e) For each <CP namexbuffer name> in an <arm status
>
there will be one <message buffer> with the corresponding
<CP namexbuffer name>
.
f) On Phase 1 there will be one <candidate> for each
<control-point name>.
We would consider an appropriate path of evolution,
as a result of modification operator execution, any system
which would meet these constraints.
System processor operators : The % production set (3)
of each system defines its operators. The line numbers refer
to the root system definition as a specific example.




Line 12: Print out axiom set for system verification
purposes » This operator is not required as part of the sys-
tem processor operation.
Lines 13-26 (4): GP message buffer operations are
carried out during all three phases as follows. Line 13
clears all GP input channels at each phase. Lines 24, 25
remember any message already in a GP buffer (if buffer is
still armed), if no new message has arrived on the corres-
ponding input channel. Line 26 buffers any new message (if
the buffer is armed). Note that the productionsj lines 24
and 26 , cause only the most recent message to be buffered.
Line 14 ensures that any disarmed buffer is empty at the
end of phase 3, the other productions are applied in each
phase. There will be a set of productions similar to lines
24-26 for each GP buffer.
Lines 16-23: AO and PR message operations are dif-
ferent in phase 3 than in phase 1 and phase 2. Lines 17, 1&,
22. and 23 update AO buffers in phase 3, and line 19 updates
the PR buffers in phase 3* Line 16 remembers AO and PR
channel messages in phase 2 and phase 3» No buffers are
required for AO or PR control-points except during phase 1
since their communication is, by design, cooperative. There
will be one production like each of lines 22 and 23 for each
AO in the system.
Phase 1: Designate which control-points are to have




for each process determine
1) which subprocessor to
apply based on priority of
control-points which are
candidates,
2) put messages for selected
control-point in interface
buffer as appropriate.















Phase 3 Phase 2
Fig. 5 — System Phases: the system processor
has a cycle of three system steps which includes one process
step (phase 2).
designated within each process will be indicated by a " :"
•
A process which has no control-points which are to have a
subprocessor applied will be marked with a »••« preceding
its state (lines 32 and i+S). If an AO is demanding (line
27, 28) it automatically gets a subprocessor applied since,
by design
v
it is always the highest priority control-point
in a process. If AO has been designated a candidate (done
in phase 3 as a result of being demanding or having a pending
message), and if it is not currently demanding, then lines
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33-35 designate it demanding, place all buffered messages
in the interface buffer for that process > and mark the pro-
cess (with a :) to have a subprocessor applied. Lines 36-
46 determine which GP control-point (if any) should have a
subprocessor applied if the AO control-point in that process
is not a candidate (NCAN). For any GP control-point to be
designated to receive the subprocessor, it must be "CAN" 9
and "NCAN" must hold for all higher priority control-points
in that process. Then, if it is demanding (lines 36, 37) ?
designate it to hove a subprocessor applied (no messages are
delivered). If not demanding, place either single (lines
3&; 39) or multiple (lines 42, 43) messages in the interface
buffer, and designate the control-points to have a subpro-
cessor applied. Lines 40, 41 and 44» 45, 46 clear the buffers
when messages are put into the interface buffer.
Lines 27-32 designate PR to receive a subprocessor.
During phase 1, PR gets all pending messages put in its
interface buffer (lines 29, 30)* If there are no messages,
and it is demanding, then line 31 designates it to have a
subprocessor applied. There will be a set of operations
like lines 33-47 for each process (except PR) in that sys-
tem,
Subprocessors are applied during Phase 2(6) * If the
process was marked as having no control-point which was
to have a subprocessor applied, then the mark is removed
(line 48). The AO subprocessor (lines £3-87) and GP sub-

IB 5
processor (lines £3-92) are not part of this design. As de-
fined here they only clear the interface buffer and set the
control-point not demanding (lines 85 and 90), or if there
is no message in r,he interface buffer, they set the control-
point not demanding (lines £6 and 91) •
The PR subprocessor (lines 51-32) (7) has been defined
as follows • PR may get multiple messages in its interface
buffer (S is used as a message separator). Lines 54? 55
execute a modification operator for incoming requests to
create a new process in the local system. The modification
request tells the system processor which control-points a
process contains. Line $6 turns off the demand bit (if
there is no message in the interface buffer (! Process)
and if the PR expression-state has no work to do (•[Sl$]))
and removes the "!" which will cause the subprocessor to
terminate. Lines 55-5$ move an incoming message to the
expression-state for later FIFO service. Line 59 clears
the null messages which are delivered for empty buffers.
Line 60-62 removes one local request (to create a process)
from the expression-state, transforms it, and places it in
the interface buffer as a "start" request. Lines 63-66
send back to a source system an acknowledgment that the
process state arrived correctly and marks the state to be
started the next time the PR subprocessor is applied. Lines
67-69 start such a process. Lines 70-71 send back to a source
system over the acknowledgment channel that an inaccessible
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object (#) arrived in place of the process state* Lines
72-74 do not transmit another process state since there is
already one outstanding (S1\A$ 9 ]). Lines 75-78 transmit a
process state when there is no transmission pending acknow-
ledgments. Lines $0, Si notify the proper AO by an "S" if
the move was successful, and by an "R" if it was note If a
PR receives a returned inaccessible object it will notify
the AO control-point that initiated the move that the re-
quest failed. If a PR receives a process state it will
return to the sending PR an acknowledgment. The PR origi-
nally sending the process state will notify the AO which
requested the move that it succeeded. That AO will then
kill that process state since it now exists in the other
system. This procedure guarantees that no process state
will be logically lost during intersystem movement.
Phase 3 (£) dispatches messages and designates
potential control-point candidates for subprocessor appli-
cation. Line 93 and 95 designate a demanding AO or GP as
a candidate (CAN). All non-demanding AO and GP control-
points are designated not candidates (NCAN) (lines 94 and
97) • NCAN can be reset (by message overwrite) as a result
of a message on a channel (line 102 and 104) provided the
control-point is enabled and the buffer armed (AO is always
enabled and all AO buffers arc always armed). Messages
generated during phase 2 which are for local control-points,
also reset the control-point to CAN (line 109) • The candi-
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date mechanism permits us to know in advance which control-
points are candidates to have a subprocessor applied.
Lines 106-137 do message dispatching.
Lines 106 and 113 automatically buffer locally any
message generated for a local CP if it is armed.
Lines 111, 121, 124 dispatch any non-local message.
Line 113 kills a process and executes appropriate
modification operations.
Line 127 starts a process (request was from PR)
.
Line 130 buffers a move request for PR.














































































$ - > S SI'
CHAf,\~GP\*
CHAN 1 AO P b CHAN 1 AO N t,
S (,
t I BUFF 1 GP 1
CP 1 PR*1 PR'CSl '
3
CP 1 AO-1 AO'C ' CP 1
2 3 4 CHAN BUFF PROCESS
MODIFY KILL PR AO GP CP P R
START NEW TEST 'a Sl 52
PHASE 2
GP"1 A 1*0 ARM 1
ARM DARM CAN




' $ < 1 > -> PRINT 1 J
.
-> CHAN\'> <1>GP\''<2> ;




PHASE \3 b C H A N C $ « I 2t23C\GP«A0 P R 4 J S
3 b SPROCESS CP I A0~1$ fc CHAN 1
*MOVE\*CP I AOS b CHAN I AOS























> CHANS< 1 >\GP< 1>S<2>
AOS -> CHAN 1 A0$<3>








$ PROCESS CP I
1 b BUFF 1 GP
1 GP I S<1 > 1
1 - S b s A R H 1 G P 1 $ - > 3 U F F
PROCESS CPcsifl 2 % 1 A * 1 S
A0*1K2> S
PR-\~$ 6 BUFF
1 ' 1 P R " 1 $ < 1 > 5
buff\*<i>p:<\ a <2>-x ;
-> chan \"<i> pr\*<2> ;
A0~0a> b CHAN 1 AOS -> BUFF 1
A 0*0* b CHAN 1 AO\*S -> CHAN
IS 6 SPROCESSSANM 1 G P IS
1 GP 1*4< 1>
A0S<3>
1 A0\* <1> »
-> PROCESS C P S < 1 > '

























b CAN 1 GP b SCP
-> .'PROCESS CP 1 • : F rtM S < 1 > i
- > ' ; P R C E S S C P 1 P R * % < I > !






-> s< i>cp i
1 AO b CAN 1
b BUFF l GP
1 AO b CAN 1
b BUFF I GP
1 AO I, CAN 1
b BUFF 1 GP
1 AO f, CAN 1
b BUFF 1 GP1S
-> BUFF 1 GP 1*<3> -> BUFF 1 GP IS<4>
1 AO 6 NCAN 1 GP b PROCESS CP 1 AOS ->
2 'tPROCESSS - > PR0CESS$<1> I
3 b S^ROCESSS -> PR0CESSi<2> !
2 - > MODIFY II
2 l CS'rPRSttPROCESS A K .1 DARM CP P R S PR AO GP *
1 2 3 4 »[ '3 ' START MOVE NEfl TEST ! . CHAN
' » ' ! SI 52
8}\*NEVV\ ACPCS«1 2.S3A0sCPC\"»l / 3 483GPS*:s
- > K0DIFYS<l>NEW\*O>GP - > MODIFY 1 I
fPRCCESSSPR-l P R * C S 1 S -> PROCESSS<1>PR A PH'CSIS<2> J
r. cp i ' : a o m $ < i > ;
1 GPM*
: GP" 1 S < 2 > !
GP & S C P 1 GP^O^l-OS
i"i - > -i<3>s<i>cp i';6P*i*i*os<2> ;
GP b iCP 1 GP A0*l*OS b CHAN I CP IS
1*1 - > buff i gp ;s<3> -> buff i gf i ~ $ < 4 > j
GP b 5CP 1 G P ~ "1 ~ 1
S
is -> so>s<i>cp i':sp*i*i*i$<2> :
GP b iCP 1 GP^n^l^lS b CHAN 1 GP IS





























































-> !S<2>' :s<3>\*< !>$<!>! Si «<4>
PR
A0 GP "
fC\~$«ARM DARM CP P R S AO GP
TEST MOVE NEV.83fS';sSlS
ms':s -> r s< i >* : s<2> ;
{PROCESSSPR'CO NEW C $ M A R M OARM CP P R S AO GP CP
1 2 3 H *C '3 ' TEST MOVE NErt ' * Si 52
83!S -> -STARTS<2>PR0CESSS<1>PR» CS<3> J
JPROCLSSS P R ' C \ NEA\OCS<«ARM DAKM CP P R SAOGP*Q123H*C'3' tZ3!S
-> *CHAN\Q<1>PR S*R PR0CESS$<1>
PRTSTARTs<2> f S<3> 1
•PROCESSSPR'CSTARTCSWARM OARM CP P R S
1 2 3 *» *C '3 ' • SI S223JS
->^5TARTs<2>PR0CESS$<l>PR'CS<3> i
JPROCESSSPR'CX^'e.'S
-> *CHAN\*<l>PR S*>S PR0CESS$<1>PR'CS<2>!
JPROCESSSPR'CO KOVE\OCSt»ARM OARM CP P R S
AO GP * 1 2 3 H ' C '3 ' .23!$S1\*S'3
->PR0CESSS<1>PR'CS<3>0 MoVE\0<l>S<2>»Sl\
JPROCESSSPR'CO M0VE\0CPC$»1 2 , 3 1 A C S
H ARM DARM CP P R S AO GP * 1 2 3 H
'C '3 ' . 23!SS1' 3
->"CHA', \0<1>PR I "NEW 1 CP$<2>A0$<3>
;
, RocESsi<i>PR'cs<M>sis<2>'J :
lPROCESS$PR*CSC\*«R S 8 3 J $ 5 1 S ' 3
->-CHAN$<3>A0 R~\"-<i>PRoCESSS<l>PR'CS<2>Si'3
3 -> S<1>PRS<2> I
2 b C$':A0S*PKOCESS ARM DARM P R S CP AO GP
2 3 H 'C ' 3 ' ''.'». TEST
Z^SPROCESS CPCSttl 2 . 8 j ' t A ~1 S - > PROCESS CPS<2>'!A0*IS<J>




CS':GP$ ^PROCESS ARM OARM P R S AO GP *• 1
TEST CP 2 3 4 'C ' 3 ' ' » t
% "SPROCESSS'JGP'MS -> PK0CESSS<2>';GPM$O> •





> PR0CESS$<1>' :GP~0 <»<2>







, 2 3 A S C P C \ * tt 1
CAN s<2>A0 5







SPROCESS CPCSttl 2 O $ C \ *r 2 3 'UIGP'MS
\*<1>GP !
SPROCESS CPCS»1 2 ,Z3A0SCPC\~»1 2 3 *ii3GP'-0S
- > NCAN \"<1> GP i
PHASE 3 b "KOVESCPCSttl 2 3 M.8JC\
-> NCANS<2>\*<1> i
PHASE 3 -> NCAN I PR !
PHASE 3 b CHANCShI 2 .«3C\GP U A0 PR23\~*S
»> CANS<|>\GP<1> - > NCAN$<1>\GP<1> }
PHASE 3 b C\*»CriAN 13UFFZ3 I GP 1*5 b SCP
-> CAN 1 GP -> NCAN 1 GP i
PHASE 3 b *CHAN I GP l~SPROCESS$ b :-CP 1
b CS^fCHANI U F F 8 3 I GP IS
- > BUFF 1 GP 1~S<!> -> HUFF 1 GP 1S<6> !
PHASE 3 b ~CHAN 1 GP 1~SPR0CE5S$ b SCP 1 GP'
~> CAN i GP -> NCAN 1 GP i
PHASE 3 b ~CHANC\~w2 3 4
2
3GP \~S PROCESSS
~> CHAN\"<1>GP\*<2>S<1> -> CHAN\"><l>GP\-*<2> 5
PHASE 3 b KlLLCSB'C '3 ' ARM DAR'I CP F R S AO GP
































1 2 3 H «
8SCPC\*\*»| 2 3 4 AO GP8DS ->
M0DIFY\*<1>\*<2>KILL -> MODIFY 1 1
3 -> 5
PHASE 3 fc •CHAUtiKl 2.»3AOsPkOCESSS - > BUFFS<l>A0S<2> {
PHASE 3 b SPR0CES5 CP 1 AO-Os & ~CHAN 1 AO R$
-> CAN 1 AO -> NCAfJ 1 AO i
PHASE 3 fc SPROCESS CP 1 AO~lS b "CHAN 1 AO RSPR0CE5SS
CHAN 1 AO R$
-> CHAN 1 AO R$<5>5<3> -> CHAN 1 AO R5<5> 1
PHASE 3 fc ~CHANC'SAO\'> ttl 2 3 H .
S 1 A0\* -> , AO t J
3$PR0CESS5 - > CHANS<1>A0\*<1>S<2> -> CHANS<l>AO\*<l>}
PHASE 3 6 "STARTiPROCESS CP l PRS -> PR0C£SSS<1> J
PHASE 3 i, *CHANC\*f<283PR\*'5P«0CESSS
->CHAN\"<1>PKS"<2>$<1> - > CHAN\*<1>PR\*<2> 1
PHASE 3 & A MOVE\"CPCSttl 2 .23A0S
-> BUFF 1 PRS<1>~0 MOVL\"< 1 >CPS<l>A0i<2> ;
PHASE 3 6 ~MOVE\~S -> PROCESS 3<1> !
PHASE 3 & *C\*«MOVE NE»S3S -> CAN 1 PR -> NCAN I PR {
PHASE 3 "'NE A SPROCESS C P C S « 1 2 . Z 3 A S - > BUFF 1 P R $ < 2 >
"0 NEW Q5<2> ;
PHASE J i, "CHAN SPROCESS CPLSul 2 . Z 3 A $ - > BUFF t P R S < 2 > ~ ',




1 (1) c: PHASE 3 b CHAN 1 AO P b CHAN I AO R
2 & CHAN I AO 1 t CHAN 1 AO 2
3 fr CHAN I AO S ( CHAN I PR S
H & CHAN 1 PR 2
5 b CHAN 1 GP 1 b BUFF 1 GP 1
6 t CHAN I GP 2 & BUFF 1 6P 2
7 &CHAN1GP3&BUFF1GPJ
8 6 MODIFY 1
9 t PROCESS CP I PR*1 PR'CSI']
10 b PROCESS CP 1 A " AO'C ' CP 1 G P A A 1 A U OARM
11 1 dP I DARN 1 GP 2 DARN | GP 3 GP'C']']
12 (2) ii PHASE 12 3 4 CHAN BUFF PROCESS ARM DARM CAN
13 NCAN MC01FY KILL PR AO GP C P P R S * ' C ' 3 » '; J ,
1
H
MOVE START NEW TEST » Si S2
15 (3) a PHASE 1 -> PHASE 2 1
16 PHASE 2 -> PHASE 3 I
17 PHASE 3 -> PHASE 1 !
18 S > S SI' ' $<1> •> PRINT I I
1? (1+) CHA(,\~GP\ A S -> CHAN\~<1>GP\ A <2> 1
20 PHASE J b SPROCESS C P C S « 1 2 . S 3 A $DARM\"\ A \"S
21 -> BUFr \-<
1
>\~<2>\ A <3> !
22 PHASE \ 3 b C H A N C $ » 1 2#23C\GPtiA0 P R 3 3 $ - > CHAN$<1>\GP<1>$<2> {
23 PHASE 3 b SPROCESS CP 1 A A 1 s b CHAN 1 A $ -> CHAN 1 A0$<3> I
24 PHASE 3 b A MOVE\~Cp 1 AOi b CHAN ! AO S
25 •> CHAN 1 A0$<2> I
26 PHASE 3 (. CHAN\ A PR\ AA S -> B U F F \ A < 1 >PR \ A < 2 > A \ A < 2>5 < 1 > {
27 PHASE 3 b CHAN\ A PR\ A -> BUFF \ A < 1 >P(x \ A <2>~ i
28 PHASE 3 b CHAN \* PRV'S -> ChAN \ A <1> PR\ A <2> 5
29 PHASE 3 b SPROCESS CP 1 AO"Oi b CHAN 1 AOS -> bUFF 1 A0$<3> J
30 PHASE 3 b SPROCESS CP 1 AO'Dl 6 CHAN 1 A0\*5 -> CHAN 1 A0\*<1>
31 CHAN 1 GP ! b BUFF 1 GP 15 £- SPROCESSSARM 1 GP 1$
32 -> bUFF 1 GP 1$<1> I
33 CHAN 1 GP 2 £. BUFF 1 GP 2$ b SPROCESSSARM 1 Gp 25
3 4 •> BUFF I GP 2S<1> I
35 CHAN 1 GP 3 b BUFF 1 GP 3$ 6 SPROCESSSARM 1 GP 3$
36 -> BUFF 1 GP 3S<1> J
37 CHAN 1 GP l~i> b SPROCESSSARM 1 GP 1 i - > d J F F 1 GP I * S < 1 > {
38 CHAN J GP 2*$ b SPROCESSSARM 1 GP 2S -> BUFF 1 GP 2 A S<1> 5
39 CHAN I GP 3 A S b SPROCESSSARM 1 GP 3* -> BUFF 1 GP 3 A S < 1 > 1
40 (5) PHASE 1 b PROCESS CPCSWl 2 ,'A 3A0*1S
4 1 - > PROCESS CPS<1>':a0~1s<2> 5
42 CAN | PR b PROCESS CP l PR"\*S b BUFF l PR 1*$
43 b BUFF 1 PR 2"J 6 BUFT I PR S A S
44 -> JS<2>fS<3>.»S<4>!PR0CES5 C F 1 ' 5 P R A 1 S < I > !
4 5 NCAN i PR b PROCESS CP 1 PR-Ms "> fPROCESS CP 1 : P R " 1 IS < 1 > i
46 NCAN l PR t- PROCESS CP 1 PR A 3s -> 'IPROCESS CP 1 PR A Oi<l> 1
47 CAN i AO b PROCESS CP 1 AO~Oi & BUFF 1 AO P5
48 t flUFf ! AO RS i EUH-' I AO S5
49 b BUFF 1 AO 15 b BUFF 1 AO 2%
50 -> S<2>S<3>S<4>S<5>$<6>PK0CESS CP 1 * I A » 1 S < 1 > i
51 NCAN AO 6 CAN 1 GP & SCP I GP"1S
5 2 ->$<1>CP1':GP A 1$<2>;
53 NCAN 1 AO b CAN 1 GP b SCP 1 GP A a A l A OS
54 b BUFF 1 GP I A S - > A S<J>S<1>CP 1':gP~1 a 1*0$<2> I
55 NCAN 1 AO b CAN l GP b SCP 1 GP'O'TOS b CHAN 1 GP IS



































































1 GP 2*5 & CriAN 1
BUFF l GP 2 ~S<3>
SCP 1 GP*, 0*1*'0S
I GP 2 t BUFF 1 GP
GP 2S
3*S
NCAN 1 AO (, CAN 1 GP C
6 BUFF 1 GP 1 £, BUFF
-> -S<3>S< 1 >CP 1 ' : GP
NCAN 1 AO 6 CAN 1 GP (,
(, 3UFF 1 GP 1 & BUFF
->BUFF 1 GP 2S<4> ->
NCAN 1 AO (, CAN I GP b
b BUFF 1 GP 1 £» BUFF
-> A S<3>$<1 >CP t * : GP-* 1 * 1 *0S<2> \
NCAN 1 AO fc CAN 1 GP 6 SCP 1 G P*0* 1 "0
S
(, BUFF 1 GP 1 6 BUFF 1 GP 2 6 CHAN 1 GP 3S
6BuFF 1 Gp 3~s -> BUFF 1 GP 3S<3> -> BUFF 1 GP 3 A $<4>
NCAN 1 AO (, CAN I GP 6 SCP 1 GP'-Q'M'MS
t BUFF 1 GP IS & bUFF 1 GP 2S 6 BUFF 1 GP 3S
->$<3>S<4>$<S>$<1>CP 1':GP*1 A 1~15<2> »
NCAN I AO 6 CAN 1 GP 6 SCP 1 G P ~ C *M ~1 $ 6 CHAN 1 GP 1$
£• BUFF 1 GP 1$
-> BUFF 1 GP 1$<3> -> BUFF 1 GP IS<4>
1 AO 6 CAN 1 GP o SCP 1 GP^O^l^lS
HAN I GP 2S L BUFF 1 GP 2$
BUFF 1 r,p 2 S<3> -> HUFF I GP 2S<4> {
1 AO £, CAN 1 GP 6 SCP I GP- 0*1-1$
CHAN t GP 3S 6 BUFF 1 GP 3S
BUFF 1 GP 3$<3> -> bUFF 1 GP 3*<4> {
1 AO i, NCAN 1 GP & PROCESS CP 1 AOS ->
•£ 2 (, 'IPROCESSS -> PRuCLSS$<1> ',
£ 3 i, SPROCESSS -> PR0CESS5<2> !
E 2 -> MOD IF Y 1 I













PROCESS CP \ aos<i>;
START MOVE u£rt TEST
GP -
i CHAN1 2 3 4 ' C ' 3
' tt ' : si S2
SJ\*NElfi\*CPCSKl 2.B3A0?,CPC\'*»1 2 3 4 3 3 G P S ' : $
•> M0DIFY$<l>Nt.'<\-<3>GP -> MODIFY 1 J
JPROCESSSPR-1 PR'CSIS -> PROCESSS<t>PR-0 PR'LS1S<2> {
5LS A SBARM DARM CP P R S AO GP - U 1 2 3 4 'C ' 3 . ' ,t SI S2
TEST MOVE NE-VS3 f $' : SSI S -> J S <2> ' '. $< 3>\*< I > -> fl > < S 1 $< 4 >
l f s ' t s -> ;$<i>':s<2> ;
JPROCESSSPR'CO NEW E 5. « A R M DARM CP P R S AO GP CP PR - ,
I) 1 2 3 4 ' C ' 3 ' TEST MOVE NE/< '« Si S2
2 3 ! S - > -STAKTS<2>PR0CESS$<1>PR'C$<3> ,'
.'PROCESS* PH't\0 NEW \OCS BARM DARM CP P R S
AO Gf- - U 1 2 3 4 'C ' 3 ' t23f S
- > -CHAN\(,<1>PR S-R PROCESS S<1>
PR'CSTARTs<2>fS<3> I|PROCESS$PR'CSTARTC$«ARM OARM CP P R S AO GP -
1234'C'J' . S I S 2 S 3 .' S
->-STARTs<2>PR0CESSS<l>P;<'C$<3> i
|PR0CE5S$lR'C\"'rtfS
-> -CHAN\-<1>PR S-S PR0CESS$<1>PR'CS<2>{
fPROCESSSPR'CO MOVE\OCS»Ar(M DARM CP P R S
AO GP * 1 2 3 't ' C '3 ' .S3fSSl\"*'3
->PR0CESr!S<l>PR'CS<3>0 MO V E \0< 1 >S<2> J S 1 \-< 1 >$< 4> • 3 I
•PROCESSSPR'CU MOVF\OCPCS»1 2 t Z 3 A l S
ttAKrOARMCPPRSAOGP-Oi 23 4
' C 'J ' . % 3 ! S S 1 ' :,




































































PHASE 2 6 CS'
:
AOIKPROCESS ARM DARM P R S CP AO GP * 1
234'C'3' ':'». TEST
ii*SPROCESS CPCSal 2 ,2D':A0"1S -> PROCESS CPS <2> ' • AC t $<3> J
PROCESS CPCSttl 2 .43'JA0-1S -> PROCESS CPS< 1 > ' I AO-OS <2> 1
3 -> $<1>A0?<2> I
PHASE 2 6 CS'JGPS bPROCESS ARM DARM P R S AO GP * 1
TEST CP 2 3 4 ' C ' 3 • ' t* •
a -$processs':gpm$ -> processs<2>*:gp*1s<3> ;
PROCESS*' :6P~lS -> PP0CESS$<1>' :GP~Qi<2> ;
-> 5<1>GP$<2> ;
SPROCESS CPCSM1 2 .83A0~lS -> CAN $<2>A0 5
SPROCESS CPCSsl 2 ,»3A0"0S -> NCAN $<2> AO J
SPROCESS CPCStU 2 . 2 3 AO sCPC \* tt I 2 3 4fcJGP*lS
\*<1>GP !
SPROCESS CPCSW1 2 .% ]AO$CPC\*i* I 2 3 4S3GP A US
N \ * < 1 > G P ;
"MOVESCPCSw 1 2 3 4.23C\ A KA0 GPS3S
<2>\-><l> i
NCAN 1 PR J
CHANCSsl 2 .Z3C\GP B A0 PRSJ\**S
S < 1 > \ G P < 1 > -> NCANS<1>\GP<1> 5
C\"»CHAN B U F F 2 3 1 GP 1*5 i, SCP I GP"U*15A"N I GP IS
Art 1 GP -> NCAN 1 GP !
CVtlCHAN B U F F a 3 1 GP 2 * S 6 SCP 1 G P " * 1 3 A R M 1 GP 2 5
GP -> NCAN 1 GP I
C\*mCHAN B U F F 3 31 GP 3*5 6 SCP 1 GP^msARM 1 GP 3S
GP -> NCAN 1 GP !
*CHAN 1 GP i-SPROCESSS 6 SCP 1 GP ~Q* 1 S ARrl 1 GP 1$
A TJ B U F F 2 3 1 GP IS
t GP 1~S<1> -> BUFF I GP 1S<6> !
CHAN 1 GP 2*$PR0CE5Si 6 SCP 1 GP A 0* 1 S ARM I GP 25
N B U F F 2 3 1 GP 25
GP 2 * $ < 1 > -> BUFF 1 GP 2S<6> J
CHAN 1 GP3*SPR0CES5$ & SCP i GP*0*1SAHM 1 GP 3S
N BUFF2JI GP 35
r,.° 3 * 5 < 1 > -> DUFF 1 GP 3 S < 6 > i
* C H A N 1 GP 1*SPR0CESS$ & SCP 1 GP*U'MSARM 1 GP |S
AN 1 GP -> NCAN I (,P i
*CHAN 1 GP 2 A 3PR0CLSSS 6 SCP 1 &P*0»lSARM I GP 2$
GP -> NCAN 1 GP !
"CHAN 1 GP 2*iPR0CESS$ & SCP I GP*OMSARM 1 GP 35
GP -> NCAN 1 GP J
"CHANC\*H2 3 'U3GP\ A S.o R0CES5S
AN\»<1>GP\*<2>»<1> -> CHAN\*<l>SP\*<2> 5
KILLCSM'C '3 ' A R ,-, DARM CP P R S AO GP " ,
U 1 2 3 H ' «
BSCPC^N^nl 2 3 4 AO GP23S ->
M0DlFY\*<i>\*<2>KILL -> MODIFY 1 1
3 -> ;
PHASE 3 t, *CHANCS»1 2.Z3AOSPKOCESSS -> BUFFS<1>A0$<2> \
PHASE 3 L SPROCESS CP 1 AO"OS 6 "CrlAN 1 AO R5
-> CAN 1 AO -> NCAN I AO i
PHASE 3 6 1.PR0CESS CP 1 AO-lS 6 *CHAM 1 AO R5PK0CES3S

























































































1 (1) cj phase 3 fc Chan i.i ao i & Chan l.t ao r
2 & CHAN 1*2 A 1 & CHAN 1.2 AO R
3 I, CHAN 1,1 AO S & CHAN 1,2 AO S
6 CHAN 2 PR S (, CHAN 2 PR I
(, CHAN 2 GP I (, BUFF 2 GP 1
6 CHAN 2 GP 2 6 BUFF 2 GP 2
b CHAN 2 GP 3 6 BUFF 2 GP 3
& CHAN 3 GP 1 fe BUFF 3 GP I
6 CHAN 3 GP 2 t BUFF 3 GP 2
c Chan m gp i t, buff '






10 t h & 4 gp i
1
1
















(, ODI Y 2
6 PROCESS CP 2 PR-M PR'CSl'j
PROCESS CP 1.1 A0*0 AU'C CP 2 GP-O^l^l
DARM 2 GP 1 DARM 2 GP 2 DART 2 GP 3 GP'C'3'3
6 PROCESS CP 1,2 AO-U AO'CCP H GP *0~1~1 DARM
M GP 1 DARM <4 GP 2 G P ' C ' 3 CP 3 GP ~ -> 1 ~ 1 DARM 3 GP 1
DARM 3 GP 2 GP'C 3' 3
n HASE 1 2 3 <4 CHAN BUFF PROCESS ARM DARM CAN
ICAN MODIFY KILL PR AO GP CP P R S * 'C '3 ' 'J J
I V E START NEW TEST ' i» Si 52
HASE 1 -> PHASE 2 t











































































CHAN 3 GP 2 6 BUFF 3 GP 2$ 6 3 GP 2S
-> BUFF 3 GP 2$<1> i
CHAN 4 GP 1 (, BUFF 4 GP IS fc
-> oUFF 4 GP 1$<1> i
CHAN 4 GP 2 (, BUFF 4 2$
-> BUFF 4 GP 2S< 1 >
CHAN 2 GP 1 - S fc
CHAN 2 GP 2*S i,
CHAN I GP 3*S (,
CHAN 3 GP 1*5 U
CHAN 3 GP 2*5 t.
CHAN 4 GP l*S b
CHAN 4 GP 2*S
PHASE 1 6 PROCESS CPCS«1 2
-> PROCESS C P S < 1 > ' : A
CAN 2 PR t> PROCESS CP 2 PR
I- BUFF 2 PR S*S
6 BUFF 2 PR 1.1~S & BUFF 2 PR 1.2"$






































































1.1 AO RS ->
i, PROCESS CP
PR-MS -> .'PROCESS CF 2 '
PR-OS. -> ' JPROCESS CP 2
1.1 AO-OS 6 BUFF | t I AO
; PR-M $< 1 >
PR">0S<1> t
IS
S<2>S<3>S<4>PR0CESS CP 1 . I ' : AO* 1 S< 1 > J
1.2 AO-OS <, BUFF 1.2 AO 1$
QUFF 1.2 AO SS
6 BUFF 1.2 AO R$ - > S<2>S<3>S<4>PR0CE5S CP 1.2':A0"1$<V> 1
1.1 AO 6 CAN 2 6P 6 SCP 2 G P * I S
-> $<1>CP 2' IGP-l S<2> ;
1.1 AO 6 CAN 2 GP b SCP 2 GP*U*1 A 0S
6 BUFF 2 GP 1*$ -> -i<3>S<l>CP 2';GP*l*i"0S<2> {
.1 AO (, CAN 2 GP 6 SCP 2 GP*rj»l*Q$ 6 CHAN 2 GP IS
BUFF 2 GP 1*$ -> BUFF 2 GP 1S<3> -> BUFF 2 GP 1*S<4> J(,
NCAN 1.1 AO (, CAN 2 GP
6 BUFF 2 GP 1 6 BUFF
-> *S<3>$< 1 >CP 2' ! GP'
NCAN 1.1 AO fc CAN 2 GP
6 BUFF 2 GP 1 & CHAN
& SCP 2 GP*OM~U$
2 G P 2 * $
i*l*os<2> ;
& SCP 2 GP*0"1*0$
2 GP 2S 6 BUFF 2 GP 2*S
-> OUFF 2 GP
NCAN 1.1 AO (, CAN
6 BUFF 2 GP 1 6
->-*$<3>S<l>CP 2
NCAN 1.1 AO i, CAN
<, BUFF 2 GP 1 f,
& CHAN 2 GP 3S
-> BUFF 2 OP 3S<3> -> BUFF
NCAN 1.1 AO o CAN 2 GP 6 SCP
& BUFF 2 GP IS 6 BUFF 2 GP
2$<3> -> BUFF 2 GP 2~S<4> j
2 GP t SCP 2 GP*0"l*OS
BUFF 2 GP 2 & BUFF 2 GP
'
: GP-1 * 1 ~0s<2> i
2 &P t SCP 2 GP-O-l'-OS
BUFF 2 GP 2




2S 6 BUFF 2 GP
-> S<3>$<4>$<5>'5<1>CP 7'IGP
NCAN 1.1 AO & CAN 2 GP 6 SCP 2 GP
6 BUFF 2 GP IS
-> BUFF 2 GP 1$<3>
NCAN 1.1 AO f, CAN 2 GP &
&CHAN 2 GP 21 (, BUFF 2
"> 3UFF 2 GP 2S<3> ->




CHAN 2 GP IS
-> BUFF 2 GP I 5 < 4 >
SCP 2 GP*U-*1*I$
GP 2$
BUFF 2 GP 2S<4> }
NCAN I . 1
(
, CHAN 2 GP
CAN
3S i
































































-> BUFF 2 GP 3S<3> -> BUFF 2 GP 3S<4> J
NCAN 1*1 AO fc NCAN 2 GP fc PROCESS CP 1.1 AOS
-> ' ! P K C E S S CP 1.1 A $ < I > S
NCAN 1.2 AO fc CAN 3 GP 6 SCP 3 GP"1$
-> S< 1>CP 3 ' 1GP" 1$<2> 1
NCAN 1.2 AO fc CAN 3 GP fc SCP 3 GP^O^l^QS
fc BUFF 3 GP 1~$
-> *$<3>$<1>CP 3' :GPM*1 *0s<2> I
NCAN 1.2 AC fc CAN 3 GP fc $CP 3 GP-O^l^OS
fc CHAN 3 GP 1$ fc BUFF 3 GP 1"$
-> BUFF 3 GP 1»<3> -> UVFF 3 GP 1*5<4> J
NCAN 1.2 AO £ CAN 3 GP fc SCP 3 GP*0~l*OS
fc BUFF 3 GP | fc BUFF 3 GP 2*S
-> *S<3>S<1>CP 3' :gpm M*0S<2> I
NCAN 1,2 AO fc CAN 3 GP fc SCP 3 GP-QM-OS
fc BUFF 3 GP 1 fc CHAN 3 GP 2 $ fc BUFF 3 GP 2*5
-> BUFF 3 GP 2i<3> -> BUFF 3 GP 2*, S<4> I
NCAN 1.2 AO fc CAN 3 GP 6 SCP 3 GP~U~1*1$
6 BuFF 3 GP IS 6 BUFF 3 GP 2S
-> S<3>S<4>s< 1 >CP 3 ' ! GP* 1 " 1 * 1 S<2> ;
NCAN 1.2 AO fc CAN 3 GP fc SCP 3 GP"0*l*l$
fc CHAN 3 GP IS fc BUFF 3 GP \%
-> BUFF 3 GP 14<3> -> BUFF 3 GP IS<4> \
NCAN 1,2 AO fc CAN 3 GP fc SCP 3 G P * " I * 1 S
fc CHAN 3 GP 2S fc BUFF 3 GP 2$
-> BUFF 3 GP 2$<3> -> BUFF 3 GP 2$<4> i
NCAN 1.2 AC f. NCAN 3 GP fc CAN 4 GP
fc SCP 4 G P A 1 S
-> s<i>cp 4':gp-i$<2>;
NCAN 1.2 AO fc NCAN 3 GP fc CAN 4 GP
fc SCP 4 GP*0*1*US fc BUFF 4 GP 1*$
~>*$<3>s< i>cp 4' :gp* 1 /M"US<2> I
NCAN J.2 AO fc NCAN 3 GP fc CAN 4 GP
fc 3CP 4 GP~OM A OS fc CHAN 4 GP 1$ fc BUFF 4
-> BUFF 4 GP 1$<3> -> BUFF 4 GP 1 * S < 4 > i
NCAN 1.2 AO fc NCAN 3 GP fc CAN 4 GP
fc £CP 4 GP *0»1*0S fc BUFF 4 GP 1
->*$<3>$<1 >CP 4' :&PM'M'> G$<2> !
NCAN 1.2 AC fc NCAN 3 GP fc CAN 4 GP
fc SCP 4 GP~n*l-OS
fc BUFF 4 GP 1 fc CHAN 4 GP 2 5 fc BUFF 4 GP 2-S
-> BUFF 4 GP 2S<3> -> bUFF 4 GP 2 A,5<4> 1
NCAN 1.2 AO fc NCAN 3 GP fc CAN 4 GP
fc s C P 4 G P * - 1 * 1 °> fc t>\jyF 4 GP 1$ fc BUFF 4 GP 2$
-> S«3>S<4>S<1>CP 4':GP*l*l*iS<2> {
NCAN 1,2 A o N C A N 3 G P fc CAN 4 G P
fc 5CP 4 GP-OMMS
fc CHAN 4 GP IS fc BUFF 4 GP 1?
- > BUFF 4 GP 1 S<3> -> BUFF 4 GP I S < 4 > |
N C A N 1 . 2 A fc NCAN 3 G P fc CAN 4 G P
fc SCP 4 GP-0 A 1M$
fc CHAN 4 GP 2S fc BUFF 4 GP 2S
-> BUFF 4 GP 2 $<3> -> BUFF 4 GP 2$<4> J
NCAN 1.2 AO fc NCAN 3 GP fc NCAN 4 GP
fc PROCESS CP 1.2 AOS
-> » :PROCE c,S CP 1.2 AO S<1> (
PHASE 2 fc 'JPROCESSi - > PR0CESSS<1> 1
GP !*$
fc BUFF 4 GP 2*S

198
171 PHASE 3 SPROCESSs -> PR0CESSS<2> J
172 PHASE 2 -> MODIFY 2}
173 (7) PHASE 2 fc C$' :PR$»PROCESS ARM DARM CP P R S PR AO GP *
174 I 2 3 H *C * 3 ' START MOVE NEa TEST l . CHAM
175 » t» ' : SI S2
176 31 \~NEA\~CPCS»l 2.23A0sCPC\"*l 2 3 4Z3GPS':$
177 ->MODIFYS<l>NEh\ A <3>GP-> MODIFY 2 J
178 JPROCESSSPRM PR'CSIS -> PRO CE SSS < 1 >Pt<-0 PR'CS1$<2> J
179 |[\*U*8h OAKH CP P (i S (10 GP » 1 2 3 4 'C '3 . ' a SI S2
180 ' TEST MOVE NEW S 3 f S ' 5 SS 1 $ -> J $ <2> ' I $<3> \*< 1 > J < 1 > I S 1 S<4> I
l a i i ! s* : $ -> ;s<i >' : t<2> ;
182 fPROCESSSPR'CO N E ft C S » A R u DARM CP P R S AO GP CP PR -> ,
183 1 2 3 4 'C '3 ' TEST MOVE NEW ' M SI S2
184 8]|IS -> -START$<2>PR0CESSS<1>PR'CS<3> I
185 fPROCESS$PR'C\0 NElV\DCSt»AKM DARM CP P R S
186 AO GP » o 1 2 3 4 'C ' 3 ' .231$
187 - > *CHAN\D<1>PR S"R PRGCESSS<1>
188 PR' CSTARTs<2> !S<3> I
189 {PKOCESSSPR'CSTARTCSttARN DARM CP P R S AO GP *
190 01234»C'3'.Sl S223JS
191 -> A STARTs<2>PR0CESSS<l>PK'C$<3> i
192 !PROCESSSPR'C\ A 'ttfS
193 -> -CHAN\-<1>PR S~S PR0CESS$<l>PR'C4<2> f
194 fPROCESSSPR'CO MOVE\0CS«AKM DARM CP P R S
195 AO GP * U I 2 3 4 T. ' 3 ' . % 3 .' SS I \ "i ' 3
196 ->PK0CESS5<1>PR'C$<3>0 M0VE\0<l>$<2>.'Sl\ A <l>S<4>'3 I
197 [PROCESSSPR'CU MOVE\OCPC$«1 2 . S 3 A C $
198 « »R« DASH CP P R S AO GP * I 23 1
199 ' C ' J ' . 2 3 .' i S 1 ' J
200 ->-CHAn\0< 1 >PR 2*NEW 2 CP S < 2> AOS< 3>
201 PR0CESSS<l>PR'C5<4>Sl$<2>»3 {
202 fPR0CLSS$PR'C5C\ A i»R S s 3 • $ S I 5 ' 3
203 ->*CHANS<3>A0 R'-\-<l>PRoCESSS<l>PR*i;s<2>Sl'3 !
204 3 -> $<1>PR?<2> i
2H5 PHASE 2 t, CS' 1 AOSmPROCESS ARM DARM P R S CP AO GP - U 1
206 2 3 4 *C J ' ' ! ' n . TEST
207 2-SPROCESS CPCSal 2 t S : ' ! A - 1 $ -> PROCESS CPS<2>' I AO* I S<3> !
208 PROCESS CPCSttl 2 »z3':aO a 1$ -> PROCESS CP S < 1 > ' 1 AG *Q$< 2> i
209 3->S<l>A0s<2>i
210 PHASE 2 i, CS':C-P$ ttPROCESS ARM DARM P R S AO GP * 1
21 1 TEST CP234'C'J' 'tt .
212 2 -SPROCESSS' :GP A 1 i -> PROCE SSS<2> ' .« GP - 1 5 < 3> I
213 PROCESSS' :GP"IS -> PR0CESSS<1>' :GP-05<2> i
214 3->$<l>GP5<2>;
215 (8) PHASE 3 fc SPROCESS CPC%»1 2
216 PHASE 3 t, SPROCESS CPCSul 2
217 PHASE 3 £, SPROCESS CPCShI 2
218 ->CAN \"<1>GP 5
219 PHASE 3 (, SPROCESS CPCSttl
220 -> NCAN \«<l) (iP ;
221 . PHASE 3 h -MOVESCPCSM 1 2 3 4 .23C\*nA0 GPZ3S
222 -> NCANS<2>\~< t > ;
223 PHASE 3 •> NCAN 2 PR i
224 PHASE 3 i, CHANCSa! 2 ,z3C\GP ri A0 PR23\— S
225 -> CANS<1>\GP<1> -> NCANS<1>\GP<1> i
226 PHASE 3 6 C\~*CHAN 8UFFZ3 2 GP 1~4 b SCP 2 GP"U*15AR,1 2 GP IS
227 -> CAN 2 GP -> NCAN 2 G° i
. S 3 A - 1 4 - > CAN $ < 2 > A i
, 2 3 A '• $ -> NCAN l<2> AC |
,23A0SCPC\*«1 2 3 423GP-1S





























































PHASE 3 b C\ A «CHAN 8UFFZ3 2 GP 2 A $ 6 SCP 2 GP A U A 1SARH 2 GP 2*
-> CAN 2 GP -> NCAN 2 GP I
PHASE 3 b C\~«CHAN B U F F z 3 2 GP 3 A S 6 $CP 2 GP~0 A 1SARH 2 GP 35
-> CAN 2 GP -> NCAN 2 GP I
PHASE 3 b C\-tiCHAN BUFF233 GP l A S 6 SCP 3 GP*0 A 1SARM 3 GP 1$
-> CAN 3 GP -> NCAN 3 GP 1
PHASE 3 6 C\ A «CHAN BUFF 2 3 3 GP 2 A S 6 SCP 3 GP"0 A 1SARM 3 GP 2$
-> CAN 3 GP -> NCAN 3 GP I
PHASE 3 b C\~»CHAN 8UFF234 GP 1*$ 6 SCP 4 GP"G A 1SARM 4 GP IS
-> CAN 4 GP -> NCAN 4 GP (
PHASE 3 6 C\~«CHAN B U F F z J 4 GP 2"% b SCP 4 GP->u A 15ARM 4 GP 2 5
-> CAN 4 GP -> NCAN 4 GP I
PHASE 3 b '•CHAN 2 GP l~SPROCESSS b SCP 2 GP A A lSARM 2 GP 1$
6 L\"t*CHAN BUFF232 GP IS
-> BUFF 2 GP 1 A $<1> -> BUFF 2 GP 1$<6> ?
PHASE 3 6 "CHAN 2 GP 2 A SPR0C£SSS b iCP 2 GP"0 A 1SARM 2 GP 2$
b r\ A «CHAN 3UFF2D2 GP 2$
-> BUFF 2 GP 2 A $<1> -> BUFF 2 GP 2S<6> 1
PHASE 3 b A CHAN 2 GP 3 A 3PR0CESS$
b SCP 2 GP"0 A ISARM 2 GP 3$ 1 C\ A t»CHAN BUFF232 GP 3S
-> BUFF 2 GP 3 A $ < 1 > -> BUFF 2 GP 3 5 < 6 > 1
PHASE 3 b "CHAN 3 GP 1 A PR0CE5SS
b $CP 3 GP A Q A 1SARM 3 GP 1$ 6 C\"«CHAN BUFF233 GP IS
-> BUFF 3 GP 1 A S < I > -> BUFF 3 GP 1 S < 6 > ;
PHASE 3 b "CHAN 3 GP 2 A PR0CESSS
b sCP 3 GP"0 A 1$ARM 3 GP 2$ & C\ A «CHAN BUFFZ33 GP 2S
-> BUFF 3 GP 2 A S < 1 > - > BUFF 3 GP 2$<6> 5
PHASE 3 b "CHAN 4 GP fSPRGCLSSS
b SCP 4 GP"0 A 1SARM 4 GP IS b L\"rtCHAN BUFFS "J 4 GP 15
-> BUFF 4 GP 1 A $ < 1 > - > BUFF 4 GP 1 5 < 6 > }
PHASE 3 b "CHAN 4 GP 2"SPR0CES5$
b SCP 4 GP"0"! SARM 4 GP 25 b C\ A nCHAN BUFF234 GP 2S
-> DUFF 4 6 P 2 A S < 1 > -> BUFF 4 GP 2S<6> i
PHASE 3 b "CHaN 2 GP l A 5PR0CESSS b SCP 2 GP A A 1SARH 2 GP 15
-> CAN 2 GP -> NCAN 2 GP 5
PHASE 3 b "CHAN 2 GP 2 A SPR0CESS$ b SCP 2 &P A CM5ARH 2 GP 2S
-> CAN 2 GP -> NCAN 2 GP i
PHASE 3 b "CHAN 2 GP 3 A SPR0C£SS$ b iCP 2 GP A OMSARM 2 GF 35
-> (.AN 2 GP -> NCAN 2 GP J
PHASE 3 6 '-CHAN 3 GP |*SPR0CeSS$ b SCP 3 GP"OMSARM 3 GP 15
-> CAN 3 GP -> NCAN 3 GP !
PHASE 3 b "CHAN 3 GP 2 A SPR0CESSS b sCP 3 GP A A l$ARM 3 GP 25
-> CAN 3 GP -> NCAN 3 GP !
PHASE 3 b "CHAN 4 GP i"4PR0CESSS b SCP 4 GP"0"lsARrt 4 GP 15
-> CAN H GP -> NCAN 4 GP !
PHASE 3 b "CHAN 4 GP 2 A 5PR0CESSS 6 SCP 4 GP"0"1SARH 4 GP 25
-> CAN 4 GP -> NCAN 4 GP 1
PHASE 3 b A CHANC\'t« 1 S 3GP\ A 5PK0CESSS
- > CHAN\*<1>GP\"<2>S<1> -> CHAN\"<1>GP\"<.2> 1
PHASE 3 b K I L L r. 5 « ' C '3 ' ARM DARM CP P R S AO GP " .
1 2 3 4 ' U
ZSCPC\ A \ A iil 2 3 4 AO GPSJS ->
M0DIFY\ A <l>\"<2>KILL -> MODIFY 2 J
3 -> :
PHASE 3 b "CHANCShI 2.63AOSPROCESSS -> BUFFS<;>A0S<2> {
PHASE 3 b SPROCESS CP 1.1 A0*0$ b "CHAN 1,1 ACS



























PHASE 3 6 SPR
- > CAN 1,2
PHASE 3 6 SPR
6 CHAN I . 1
-> CHAN 1 , 1
PHASE 3 6 SPR
6 CHAN 1 .2
-> CHAN 1 ,2
PHASE 3 6 "CH
JSPROCESSS
PHASE 3 & "ST
PHASE 3 6 "CH
->CHAN\*<












OCESS CP 1,2 AO-05 fc "CHAN 1,2 AOS
AO -> N C A N 1,2 AO ]
OCESS CP 1,1 A M $ 6 "CHAN 1,1 AO RSPROCESSS
AO RS
ao R$<s>s<3> -> Chan 1.1 ao Rs<s> i
OCESS CP 1,2 A " 1 S & "CHAN 1,2 AO R5PR0CE5SS
AO RS
AQ R$<S>S<3> -> CHAN 1,2 AO RS<3> J
ANC$AO\"t>l 2 3 H .
2 1.1 A0\" -> . AO , {
1 ,2 A0\" -> . AO , 5
-> CHAN$<1>A0\"<1>$<2> -> CHAN$<1>A0\"<1>J
ARTsPROCESS CP 2 PKS -> PK0CESSS<1> J
ANC\"B18 3PR\"$PK0CESS$
1>PR\"<2>S<1> -> CHAN\"<1>PR\"<2> 1
VE\"CPCSt)l 2 .23ACS
PR$<1>"0 M0VE\"<1>CP$<1>A0$<2> i
VE\"S -> PR0CESS$<1> ;
" a M V E N E iV 8 3 $ -> CAN 2 PR -> NCAN 2 PR I
ASPROCESS CPCitti 2 .S3A0S - > BUFF 2 P R S < 2 >
w o s < t > :
ANSPROCESS CPCSul 2 ,23A0S -> DUFF 2 PRS<2> " 1
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